APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Rickey Williams, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on the definition of “knowing.” Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The majority, relying upon the authority of McLaney v. Bell, affirms the grant of habeas corpus relief. However, relying upon the authority of the Tennessee Supreme Court cases discussed below, I must respectfully dissent. My reasons are two-fold.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, William T. Carter, of premeditated first-degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006), felony murder, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2), and aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-402(a)(2). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding all three convictions. He also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he qualified as a dangerous offender regarding the aggravated robbery conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve the aggravated robbery sentence consecutively to his firstdegree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand for the execution of a proper merger of the first degree murder findings of guilt.

In 1982, appellant prisoner was sentenced to one twenty-five year determinate sentence and four five-to-ten-year indeterminate sentences, to run consecutively. In 2003, appellant filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court, alleging that he had been wrongfully denied the possibility of custodial parole. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals such ruling. We affirm.

On remand pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-3-128, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for assault. We affirm.

The defendant, David Wayne Watkins, pled guilty to the offenses of theft over $1000, felony reckless endangerment, and felony failure to appear. As a result, he received a total effective sentence of eight years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence of six years he was already serving. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and ordering confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Justin Mathis, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant claims that (1) the trial court erred by allowing an expert to testify about the appellant’s potential gang membership; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence a picture of a gun stored in a witnesses’ cellular telephone; (3) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a photograph of the victim’s heart; (4) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff buyer, a Texas resident, became aware of a used car for sale in Memphis through an internet advertisement. The plaintiff contacted the defendant who had prepared the internet advertisement for the seller, and who provided him with the phone number of the defendant seller.
The plaintiff and the defendant seller agreed that the plaintiff would travel to the seller’s house in
Memphis to see the car and decide whether to purchase it for $38,000. The plaintiff and his stepson drove to the seller’s home in Memphis, inspected the car, and took it on a short test-drive. The plaintiff noted several problems with the car during the test-drive, but declined the defendant seller’s offer to have the car inspected by a Memphis area mechanic prior to purchase. The plaintiff tendered full payment for the car, and he and the seller signed a bill of sale that contained “as is” disclaimers of warranty. After the plaintiff arrived back home in Texas, he took the car to a mechanic for routine maintenance. The mechanic informed the plaintiff that the car’s frame was severely rusted, rendering it dangerous to drive. The plaintiff received the same opinion from a restoration specialist, and the plaintiff claims ultimately to have spent nearly $35,000 restoring the vehicle. The plaintiff filed a complaint in Shelby County Circuit Court, asserting claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The plaintiff claimed actual damages which included over $25,500 in restoring the car to the condition represented by the defendants, and he sought treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After discovery, the trial court granted the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to address two matters.

This case involves the third and fourth appeals (consolidated) of successive petitions to modify custody. The mother and father of the child at issue were never married. The mother was designated the primary residential parent for the child, and the father was given designated parenting time and ordered to pay child support. In 2002, the father filed a petition to modify custody. The trial court denied the father’s petition, and the decision was affirmed by this Court (“E.J.M. I”). During the pendency of that appeal, the father filed a second petition for a change of custody based on facts that arose after his first petition was denied. A hearing on this petition was conducted shortly after this Court issued its decision in E.J.M. I. A juvenile court judge held that, though he might otherwise change custody to the father, he was bound by the appellate decision in E.J.M. I to give final decision-making authority to the mother. Nevertheless, joint custody was ordered. The father now appeals that decision. Shortly after that, the father filed another petition to modify custody, based on facts that arose after the decision to award joint custody. Another juvenile court judge conducted a hearing, heard testimony, and reviewed the entire record. After doing so, the juvenile court judge strongly criticized the father’s litigiousness and, in light of the pending appeal of the joint custody award, dismissed the father’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The father appeals that decision as well. Both appeals were consolidated, but the appeal was dismissed due to a procedural defect (E.J.M. II). The procedural defect was cured, and we now hear the consolidated appeal. We reverse the conclusion by both juvenile court judges, holding that the trial court has jurisdiction and authority to modify custody even while an appeal is pending, so long as the modification is based on new facts and changed conditions that arose after the trial court judgment that is the subject of the appeal. The cause is remanded for a decision on the father’s petitions to modify custody.

Following a short marriage of less than four years, Thomas R. Jones, Jr. (“Father”) filed a complaint for divorce from Heather L. Rusch-Jones (“Mother”). Mother filed a counter-claim also seeking a divorce. Both parties sought to be the primary residential parent of their young daughter. While this case was pending, both parties filed competing petitions for orders of protection. Father’s petition was granted; Mother’s was not. Following a very lengthy trial, the Trial Court designated Father as the primary residential parent and awarded Mother supervised and restricted co-parenting time. The Trial Court awarded Mother a limited amount of alimony. Mother appeals raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the Trial Court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent and the amount of alimony she was awarded. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

An inmate of the Department of Correction appeals dismissal by the trial court of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari of a Department of Correction Disciplinary Proceeding. The trial court upheld the action of the Department of Correction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Wife appeals from the trial court’s final decree of divorce, alleging various deficiencies in the proceedings. Based on the limited record before us, which includes Wife’s specific waiver of most of the issues she now raises, we affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Kellom Timbs, appeals as of right his conviction for reckless aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, a Class D felony, imposed as a result of his jury trial in Franklin County Circuit Court. He received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation upon the completion of eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. He argues that there is insufficient proof to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion and that the trial court erred in not granting him full probation. Upon a full consideration of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

This case involves wrongful interference with an easement. The plaintiff utility operates an underground gas transmission line. The utility had an easement for the gas line, running along thenorth edge of a large tract of real property. For the gas line to operate safely, it needed sufficient soil both on top of the pipeline and on each side of the pipeline. The defendant developer acquired the real property, subject to the easement for the pipeline. The developer then sought to develop the real property. In May 2002, the defendant developer began excavating large amounts of dirt from within the easement site without proper authorization from the utility. Despite the utility’s repeated demands to stop, the developer continued the excavation. Only when the utility threatened to have the developer arrested did he finally stop excavating dirt from around the pipeline. By this time, there was so little dirt surrounding the pipeline that there was serious danger to the public, and the utility was required to engage in immediate corrective work. The utility hauled in and spread 21,467 yards of dirt, restoring the easement site to a safe condition. The utility then filed suit against the developer, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the utility compensatory damages and punitive damages. The defendant developer now appeals. We affirm, finding ample evidence to support the award of damages.

Appellant and inmate in the Department of Correction filed a declaratory judgment action asserting various deficiencies in the judgment of the trial court convicting him of first degree murder and sentencing him to life in prison. He asserts that the murder conviction should not have been used in the calculation of his prison sentence. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant, George Little, the Commissioner of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In January 1998, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the petitioner, Robert Earl Johnson, on one count of first degree premeditated murder. In November 1998, following a jury trial in Davidson County Criminal Court, the petitioner was convicted on the sole count of the indictment and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This court affirmed the conviction on appeal. See State v. Robert Earl Johnson, No. M2000-01647-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1180524 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2001). In December 2002, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed in January 2003, and following another change in counsel, an amended petition was filed in December 2005. In July 2006, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The petitioner appeals, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his due process right to a fair trial was violated. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the petition and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a personal injury case involving the Tennessee suspension statute. On August 27, 2003, the defendant rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle. On August 23, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
against the defendant for damages arising out of the accident. On the same date, a summons was issued to the defendant at her last known address in Tennessee. A few days later, the summons was returned with a notation indicating that the defendant had moved to Georgia. The plaintiffs failed to renew process within one year of the original date of service. Finally, in March 2006, an alias summons was issued and served on the defendant in Georgia. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the suspension statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-111, because the defendant lived in another state when suit was filed. We affirm, concluding that the suspension statute is inapplicable in this case.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer asserts that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the employee’s work injury of October 15, 2003, rather than his non-work injury of March 2004 caused his permanent disability; (2) assessing 60 percent vocational disability for the employee’s injury; and (3) assessing the employer for the medical treatment received by the employee by Doctors Smith and Hodges. We agree with the findings of the trial court and in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this administrative appeal, a Shelby County firefighter challenges the judgment of the lower court reinstating the Fire Department’s decision to terminate his employment for a conceded violation of the county residency requirement set forth in the Shelby County Charter. The Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board (Merit Board) had modified the Fire Department’s sanction from termination to suspension without pay for the time of suspension already served. The trial court, however, ruled that the Merit Board exceeded its authority by failing to heed the Shelby County Charter’s provision mandating termination. The Appellant argues that the Charter does not mandate termination; that, even if it does, he had moved back to Shelby County at the time of his termination and should not have been discharged; and that, alternatively, he is entitled to a remand to advance an equal protection argument because he was unfairly prevented from doing so in the lower court. We affirm.

The defendant was indicted for one count of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping of his live-in girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old, mentally-challenged daughter. A jury convicted the defendant of both indicted offenses. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years for the aggravated rape and eighteen years for the aggravated kidnapping to be served concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a previous sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing questions to jurors in voir dire regarding mental retardation; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding the victim’s I.Q. test scores and capabilities; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing testimony by a State witness regarding statements of the victim; (5) that the trial court erred in allowing testimony from a lay witness regarding recency and appearance of the injury to the victim; (6) that the trial court erred in determining that the victim was competent to testify; and (7) that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to an enhanced and consecutive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This lawsuit concerns coverage for real and personal property under three insurance policies issued by Defendant. The trial court awarded partial summary judgment to both parties and entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Both parties appeal. We vacate the trial court’s order entering final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02 and remand.

The petitioner, Billy Ray Riley, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of theft of property valued more than $1000 but less than $10,000, and he was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by not thoroughly reviewing his file with him, by not convincing him to testify at trial, and by having a conflict of interest regarding the case. The post-conviction court found that counsel was not ineffective and denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner contests the postconviction court’s ruling. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Plaintiff, former employee of Defendant Memphis Light Gas and Water Division (“MLGW”), upon determining that Plaintiff was entitled to severance benefits under “personnel policy 22-25" because revocation of the policy by MLGW’s Board was negated due to violations of the Open Meetings Act. We reverse the award of summary judgment to Mr. Thompson and award summary judgment to MLGW on other grounds.

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his "Personal Injury Suit" against the attorney who represented him in a previous criminal matter. The trial court dismissed the action finding the complaint does not state a cause of action due to the lack of any allegation of severe mental injury and that any action arising out of alleged misconduct occurring on March 9, 2001, would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Finding the inmate's suit wholly without merit, we affirm.