APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a breach of contract case. The defendants own a commercial building that was seriously damaged by a fire. The plaintiffs entered into a lease-purchase contract with the defendants to acquire the building at the expiration of a ten-year lease. Under the contract, the plaintiffs agreed to renovate the building from the fire damage, consistent with the local city building code and the defendant owners’ approval. After some renovations were made, prior to the expiration of the contractual repair period, the defendants deemed the renovations to be not in compliance with the city code and disapproved them. The defendant owners then declared the plaintiffs to be in breach of the contract and repossessed the property. The plaintiff lease-purchasers sued the defendant owners for breach of contract, claiming that, at the time of repossession, the renovations were not yet completed and that they still had time under the contract to complete them. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs had breached the contract because the renovations were not in compliance with the city code and did not meet the approval of the defendant owners. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs breached the contract by making repairs that were not in compliance with the applicable code; the fact that the contractual repair period had not yet expired is immaterial.

This is a parental relocation case. After the parties separated, the mother and the child moved in
with the mother’s parents in Memphis, Tennessee. Under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”), the mother was designated the primary residential parent for the parties’ child, and the father was granted parenting time every other weekend. Two months after entry of the divorce decree incorporating the MDA, the mother sent the father a letter notifying him of her intent to move to South Carolina with the child. The mother explained that her parents were moving to South Carolina and she wanted to move with them. The father filed a petition in opposition to the mother’s proposed relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the mother did not have a reasonable purpose for the move and denied her request to relocate. The mother now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose but remand the case to the trial court for a best interest determination as required pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(e).

This is a quiet title action. The plaintiff’s mother owned a parcel of real property. In 1977, the mother executed a deed, conveying the property to one of her sons. Two years later, the plaintiff and her four siblings filed a separate but related lawsuit to set aside the 1977 deed for fraud. In 1985, by court order, the trial court divested the son of sole ownership and created a trust; the son was appointed as trustee for the use and benefit of the mother’s grandchild and the grandchild’s minor children, until the youngest minor child reached the age of majority. In 1986, by court order, the trial court removed the son as trustee and substituted the grandchild in his place. Despite these orders, in 1994, the son executed a deed purporting to convey the property to a third party. In December 2001, the defendants obtained a deed to the property from a successor in interest to the son. Meanwhile, the youngest beneficiary of the trust reached the age of majority. The plaintiff later obtained a warranty deed to the property from the youngest beneficiary and a quitclaim deed from the trustee grandchild and her other four children. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit and moved for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment. The defendant answered, raising the defense of adverse possession, and filed a motion to dismiss, raising a defense under T.C.A. § 28-2-110. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the 1985 and 1986 orders, as well as the deeds from the grandchild and her five children, established the plaintiff as the rightful owner. The defendant appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employer has appealed the action of the trial court, which found that the Employee is permanently and totally disabled and that the Employer is responsible for 62.5% of the award and the Second Injury Fund is responsible for 37.5%. We find that the award should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new hearing.

The defendant, Marquette Houston, appeals as of right from his conviction of second degree murder for which he received a twenty-five-year sentence as a violent offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying the admission of first aggressor evidence; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s statement to police; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court and remand this case for resentencing under the 1989 Sentencing Act with consideration of the constitutional restrictions upon enhancing the defendant’s sentence above the presumptive minimum.

This appeal involves a dispute between a city and a rural water association as to which entity is entitled to provide water service to a proposed subdivision. The rural association has a defined service district in which it is empowered to provide water service, and most of the disputed property lies within the rural association’s boundaries. However, the city annexed the proposed subdivision and now claims that it has the exclusive right to provide water service to the property. The rural association argues that 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), the Anti-Curtailment Provision of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, protects its service area and prohibits the city from providing water service to the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding the federal statute inapplicable. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, James D. West, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claimed in his petition that he was entitled to relief from the state’s incarcerating him following an eleven-year delay in execution of his sentence. We hold that the petitioner stated a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief, reverse the trial court’s dismissal, and remand for appointment of counsel and a hearing on the allegations.

The circumstances of the present case are unusual and demand an unusually circumspect analysis of the axioms of post-conviction review. The petitioner, who is serving a life sentence for first degree murder, declined a plea offer of three years as a Range I offender for reckless homicide based upon counsel’s advice to go to trial and pursue an “all or nothing” strategy.  Although I do not quarrel per se with counsel’s recommendation in this respect, I do point to counsel’s failure to exploit at trial the indications of Ms. Davis’s sole responsibility for the victim’s death, and I view the failure as deficient performance of counsel that prejudiced the petitioner.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the petitioner failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Defendant, Samuel L. Mangrum, was convicted by a Williamson County jury of driving under the influence, second offense. On appeal, he alleges the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after he objected to a portion of the videotaped stop that was played for the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dennis Pylant, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Cheatham County Circuit Court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends the trial court erred in: (1) suppressing hearsay testimony; (2) finding trial counsel effective; and (3) denying relief based on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors. After careful review, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief.

The defendants, Atoya L. Every and Charlie Letez Fleming, were indicted for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect resulting in the death of the two-year-old victim, Amber Cox Cody. A jury convicted the defendants of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (Class A misdemeanor). Both defendants were sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. Defendant Every was placed on full probation. Defendant Fleming was sentenced to serve six weeks, with the remainder on probation. The defendants’ appeals of their convictions have been consolidated. Defendant Every poses two issues: 1) whether misdemeanor reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of first degree murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Defendant Fleming contends that the trial court erred in its failure to grant (1) his pretrial motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action; and (2) his motion for judgment of acquittal for failure to “present sufficient facts to constitute felony murder.” After review, we affirm the defendants’  judgments of conviction.

The Defendant, June Leeann Franks, pled guilty to statutory rape. Her request for judicial diversion was denied by the trial court, who sentenced her to fifteen months to be served on probation. She appeals that decision. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Trial court ordered foreclosure on a deed of trust finding obligor failed to prove failure of consideration for the lien. We reverse.

This appeal arises from a custody dispute involving a minor child. The plaintiff mother filed a complaint for divorce against the defendant father. The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement as to property and debt division, but they could not come to an agreement on custody for their three-year-old son. A trial was held on the custody and visitation issues. The trial court granted the divorce, named the mother the primary residential parent of the child, and gave the mother full decision-making authority for the child. The parenting plan adopted by the court allowed the father visitation on alternating weekends and holidays, and for four weeks each summer. The trial court awarded the mother the federal tax exemption for the child, as well as $1,500 in attorney’s fees that she incurred litigating the custody issue. The father appeals the trial court’s initial custody decision regarding visitation and decision-making, and the award to the mother of the federal tax exemption and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.

The petitioner, Carl McIntosh, was convicted of one count of selling 0.5 gram or more of cocaine(Class B felony), one count of delivering 0.5 gram of cocaine (Class B felony), and two counts of simple possession (Class A misdemeanor). The convictions for selling and delivery were merged, and the counts of simple possession were merged. He was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction for the Class B felony and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor, to be served consecutively to the Class B felony for a total effective sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. He appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed his convictions. State v. Carl McIntosh, No. W2003-02359-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 303, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 30, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 29, 2005). Here, he appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief and contends that trial counsel was ineffective. The petitioner specifically contends that counsel did not meet with him prior to trial, failed to adequately investigate the confidential informant, failed to discuss the petitioner’s testimony with him prior to trial, and failed to object to a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) forensic report used at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment from the postconviction court.

The defendant, Donald D. Mathis a.k.a. Michael D. Mathis a.k.a. Michael Lee Dixon, was convicted of robbery (Class C felony) by a Davidson County jury and was subsequently sentenced to serve fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal he contends that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not suppressing his confession to police; (3) the trial court erred in allowing introduction of a surveillance photo; (4) the trial court erred in denying a requested jury charge; (5) the trial court erred in approving the jury verdict as the thirteenth juror; and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to the maximum within his range. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Marquerite L. Tibbs, was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of driving on a revoked license. Each count of vehicular homicide involved the same victim, but alleged different theories of guilt. On February 16, 2005, Defendant pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide and one count of possession of marijuana. In exchange for her plea, Defendant received eight years for the vehicular homicide conviction and eleven months, twenty nine days for the possession conviction, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. An order of nolle prosequi was entered as to the remaining counts of vehicular homicide and driving on a revoked license. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eight years in the Department of Correction for the vehicular homicide conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for resentencing.

The defendant, Robert Franklin Delzell, III, appeals from the judgment of the Stewart County Circuit Court, revoking his community corrections sentence and imposing confinement. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In May 2005, the defendant, Arthur Pirtle, was indicted by a Marshall County grand jury on one count of possession of more than .5 gram of a Schedule II Controlled Substance (cocaine), a Class B felony, and one count of Simple Possession, a Class A misdemeanor. In June 2006, a jury trial was held in Marshall County Circuit Court. At the conclusion of the trial, the defendant was convicted of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance but acquitted on the simple possession charge. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-seven years in prison as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Father and Mother entered into an agreed permanent parenting plan following their separation in 2004. In 2005, Father requested a modification of the plan to increase his co-parenting time with the parties’ daughter. The petition to modify was filed shortly after the trial court increased his child support from $30 per week to more than $100 per week, and also less than a week after his marriage to his longtime girlfriend. The trial court found that Father’s marriage and the fact that he had quit smoking marijuana were both material changes of circumstance, and that Father should receive equal parenting time with the child. Mother appeals. After careful review, we find that there has been no material change of circumstance justifying reconsideration of the parties’ parenting arrangement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan and remand.

A member of the Sumner County YMCA was terminated from membership in the organization because of inappropriate sexual comments he allegedly directed toward female staff members. He brought pro se lawsuits against numerous employees of the YMCA, first in United States District Court, claiming that their actions had violated his civil rights, slandered him, invaded his privacy, and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. The federal court dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. A subsequent complaint in the Circuit Court of Davidson County alleging substantially the same facts was also dismissed, for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Undeterred, the plaintiff then filed a nearly identical complaint in the same court. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata. We affirm the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Mack Jones, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and twenty-two years for each of the nine counts of attempted first degree murder, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court subsequently denied. In this appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of ammunition discovered from Defendant’s residence; admitting testimony that the photo line up contained a “juvenile photo” of Defendant; and excluding testimony that Defendant received a social security disability stipend and had difficulty counting money. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff purchasers sued Defendant sellers, real estate agent, and real estate company alleging intentional fraud and seeking rescission of a contract to purchase real property and punitive damages.  The matter was tried by a jury, which awarded Plaintiffs rescission of the contract and assessed punitive damages against Defendant real estate agent. The trial court further awarded Plaintiffs discretionary costs and attorney’s fees, which it assessed against Defendant sellers and real estate agent jointly and severally. The jury also determined real estate agent was an independent contractor and that Defendant real estate company was, therefore, not vicariously liable for punitive damages.  Plaintiffs and Defendant sellers subsequently entered into a confidential, sealed settlement under which Plaintiffs received a substantial partial refund of the purchase price and retained ownership of the real property. Defendant real estate agent appeals the award of punitive damages and the award of attorney’s fees. Appellant additionally asserts the post-trial settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant sellers resulted in an election of damages as a remedy or, alternately, in accord and satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, asserting the jury verdict finding that Defendant real estate agent was an independent contractor is not supported by the evidence. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Jasper L. Vick, appeals his sentencing classification as a Range II offender, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the criminal conduct leading to his South Carolina conviction for aggravated assault of a high and aggravated nature would have constituted a Class C felony in Tennessee. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the defendant to be sentenced as a Range I offender.

The petitioner, Tyrone A. Walker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an independent psychological examination. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.