APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There was no evidentiary hearing. While the petitioner submits an extensive brief outlining a number of issues, we have summarized his claims as follows:

(1) whether the trial court erred when it determined that sentence reform legislation adopted in 1979 and 1989 did not apply to petitioner's sentence;

(2) whether the subsequent sentence reform acts deny petitioner equal protection under the law and due process of the law;

(3) whether the petitioner's sentence is cruel and unusual punishment;

(4) whether the trial court erred by not appointing counsel to represent the petitioner during this habeas corpus proceeding;

(5) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this petition; and

(6) whether the trial court erred by determining that it did not have jurisdiction to alter the petitioner's sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Obion County, granting Appellant’s motion to modify her sentence, but denying her full probation. See, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Appellant was convicted upon a plea of guilty of the offense of theft of property in excess of $60,000, a Class B felony.  Her original sentence, imposed April 17, 1995, was to a term of eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. The sentence was suspended except for one year which Appellant was ordered to serve in the Obion County Jail. A probationary period was imposed for the balance of the term and restitution ordered as a condition thereof.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 24, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in January 1981, and was convicted of the same in May 1981. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The Defendant appeals to this court as of right from a judgment entered on a Weakley County jury verdict convicting him of attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault. The defendant presents four issues for review: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict for attempt to commit first degree murder; (2) that principles of double jeopardy prohibit his conviction for both attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault; (3) that the twenty-five year sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is excessive; and (4) that the court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively to four prior sentences of incarceration.   After review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s decision.

The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was timely filed. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this medical malpractice action on December 5, 2003, against three healthcare providers for a surgical procedure performed on husband on December 8, 2000. All defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding the plaintiffs had knowledge of enough facts more than one year before filing the lawsuit to put a reasonable person on notice that an injury had been suffered as a result of wrongful conduct by the defendants. The trial court also found that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 21, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of rape in May 1984, and was convicted of rape in October 1984. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The biological father of S.A.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he had no notice of the final hearing. The notice of the hearing was sent in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.02 to the address supplied by the biological father. Proof of due mailing creates a presumption of receipt and nothing in the record rebuts this presumption. We affirm.

Appellant Michael Bellew pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. As a Range I standard offender, Appellant received a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he presents the following issue: whether his sentence is excessive.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants appeal the trial court’s failure to set aside, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the grant of summary judgment in this intentional tort case. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of attempt to commit second-degree murder and aggravated assault. After a hearing, he was sentenced to twelve years on the attempt offense and eight years on the assault offense, to run concurrently. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that his two convictions must be merged; that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial; and that his sentence is excessive.  Finding merit in the first of these issues, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. We otherwise affirm the judgment below.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 12, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on November 15, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count of aggravated rape, one count of incest, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery in June 1989, and was convicted of the same in October 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained a permanent injury to his lower back as a result of a fall. Employer took the position that Employee did not sustain a permanent injury. At trial, an evaluating physician testified that Employee had a 7% permanent impairment to the body as a whole; two physicians who examined Employee shortly after the accident testified that he had no impairment. The trial court awarded benefits for 33% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that Employee had sustained a permanent injury. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the decision of the trial court and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Adrian Wilkerson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding under TCA 50-6-207 (4) (B) that the employee is totally incapacitated from working at an occupation that brings the employee an income and the resulting award of one hundred percent permanent and total disability when the collective evidence of all the vocational experts was a vocational impairment ranging from 55% to a maximum of 80%. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding, and award and affirm the judgment.

The biological father of F.M.B.P.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he should have been personally served rather than served by publication and that he had no notice of the final hearing. Because we have determined that the statutory requirements of service by publication were not met, we vacate the order and remand the case to the trial court.

The appellant, Stanley Adams, was indicted for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The state sought the death penalty. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, however, the appellant pled guilty to second degree murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 45 years for second degree murder and 15 years for aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

The defendant, Perry A. Cribbs, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, first degree murder during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary, first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and attempted first degree murder. The death penalty verdicts were based upon two of the aggravating circumstances prescribed by statute:

(1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; and

(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing a burglary.

The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 29, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for robbery with a deadly weapon in January 1989, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in May 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

Appellant, Robert Glen Coe, appeals from the dismissal of his third post-conviction relief petition. He has been convicted of first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnaping. He was sentenced to death for first degree murder and received two sentences of life imprisonment for the other charges. Coe contends the trial court erred in dismissing his petition and presents to this Court the following issues for review:

(1) whether the state withheld exculpatory evidence and presented misleading testimony;

(2) whether the use of the felony-murder aggravating circumstance rendered the death penalty unconstitutional;

(3) whether the jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt” was unconstitutional;

(4) whether the jury instruction on first degree murder omitted an essential element of the offense;

(5) whether he was denied the fundamental right to a unanimous jury verdict;

(6) whether the jury instruction on expert testimony was unconstitutional;

(7) whether the jury was unconstitutionally instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity;

(8) whether the jury instructions precluded full consideration of the defense of insanity;

(9) whether the failure to instruct the jury about eligibility for parole was unconstitutional;

(10) whether the jury instructions erroneously omitted information about the effect of a non-unanimous verdict;

(11) whether he was denied effective review of the death sentence;

(12) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, including the denial of entitlement to investigative funds;

(13) whether electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;

(14) whether he was unconstitutionally precluded from consulting with counsel during trial;

(15) whether the death sentence unconstitutionally infringes upon his fundamental right to life; and

(16) whether he was arrested without probable cause.

We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The appellant, Charles P. Grigsby, entered an Alford plea to one count of aggravated burglary in the Shelby County Criminal Court and received, pursuant to a plea agreement, a sentence of eight years as a range II offender. The manner of service of the appellant’s sentence was submitted to the trial court for its determination. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s request for an alternative sentence and ordered that his sentence be served in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals this sentencing decision, specifically contending that the trial court erred by failing to impose a sentence under the Community Corrections Act.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the classification and division of marital property after a marriage of approximately thirteen years. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of various assets and debts, and the resulting distribution of the marital estate was inequitable. Therefore, we modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

The petitioner, Willie Claybrook, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, two issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the trial court's order denying relief met the minimum statutory requirements. 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from a contract dispute between the parties. The Appellant herein, Nashville Hockey Club, entered into a “Sponsorship Agreement” with the Appellee herein, Robert J. Young Company. Subsequently, the parties agreed to change their agreement. As a result, the parties entered into a subsequent “Letter of Agreement.” When a players’ strike occurred, Appellee wished to cancel the contract. Appellant claimed that the “Sponsorship Agreement,” and particularly the force majeure clause contained therein, were not superseded by the “Letter of Agreement.” The trial court granted summary judgment against Appellee and, following a hearing on Appellant’s counterclaim, granted judgment in favor of Appellant but did not award damages based upon its finding that Appellant had mitigated all of its damages. Appellant appeals on the issue of damages. Appellee appeals on the issue of what, if any, agreement exists between the parties. Finding that the plain language of the “Letter of Agreement” supports a finding that same supersedes the “Sponsorship Agreement,” we reverse and remand.
 

On February 10, 1994, the appellant was convicted by a jury of his peers of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication.¹ Following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to six years incarceration for each count with each sentence to be served consecutively. Much aggrieved by his convictions and resultant sentences, the appellant appeals from the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 3, Tenn. R. App. P.