APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff purchasers sued Defendant sellers, real estate agent, and real estate company alleging intentional fraud and seeking rescission of a contract to purchase real property and punitive damages.  The matter was tried by a jury, which awarded Plaintiffs rescission of the contract and assessed punitive damages against Defendant real estate agent. The trial court further awarded Plaintiffs discretionary costs and attorney’s fees, which it assessed against Defendant sellers and real estate agent jointly and severally. The jury also determined real estate agent was an independent contractor and that Defendant real estate company was, therefore, not vicariously liable for punitive damages.  Plaintiffs and Defendant sellers subsequently entered into a confidential, sealed settlement under which Plaintiffs received a substantial partial refund of the purchase price and retained ownership of the real property. Defendant real estate agent appeals the award of punitive damages and the award of attorney’s fees. Appellant additionally asserts the post-trial settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant sellers resulted in an election of damages as a remedy or, alternately, in accord and satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, asserting the jury verdict finding that Defendant real estate agent was an independent contractor is not supported by the evidence. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Jasper L. Vick, appeals his sentencing classification as a Range II offender, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the criminal conduct leading to his South Carolina conviction for aggravated assault of a high and aggravated nature would have constituted a Class C felony in Tennessee. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the defendant to be sentenced as a Range I offender.

Husband appeals the dismissal of his Complaints for Divorce. In a confusing series of pleadings created by Husband, his two separate Complaints for Divorce were dismissed. One was dismissed for failing to pay the filing fee and the other for procedural deficiencies. We affirm the dismissal of the matter in which Husband failed to pay the requisite filing fee. We, however, reverse the dismissal of the first Complaint for Divorce, which was dismissed for alleged procedural deficiencies, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Anthony Allen, was convicted in 2002 of seven counts of aggravated robbery, eight counts of aggravated rape, and one count of facilitation of aggravated rape which the trial court merged with one of the rape convictions, and received an effective sentence of 124 years. In State v. Anthony Allen, No. W2004-01085-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1606350, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2005), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005), this court reversed one of the convictions for aggravated rape, remanding it for a new trial, and affirmed all of the remaining convictions but remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing to determine whether consecutive sentencing was appropriate. Following the reconsideration by the trial court and the defendant’s being sentenced to an effective sentence of 104 years, the defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that he was a dangerous offender and that his criminal activity was extensive.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, George T. Haynie, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, serving a sentence of nine years for two convictions for passing worthless checks, alleges that his judgments of conviction are void because (1) the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant failed to disclose that the Petitioner had made partial payment towards the debt, (2) the indictment failed to make any reference to written notice, (3) accepting partial payment from the Petitioner constituted an election to pursue the matter civilly, and (4) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Anthony Tyrone Robertson, appeals from the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In July of 2000, the Defendant pled guilty to sexual battery and received a six-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. The sentence was suspended following service of one year in the county jail, and the Defendant was placed on probation. On July 16, 2004, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. The warrant was twice amended to include additional violations. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original six-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that the remainder of his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Jeremy Wayne Pittard, was indicted on one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. Petitioner entered a best interest plea to the offense of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and agreed to a sentence of twelve years as a Range I standard offender. Petitioner argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying him post-conviction relief. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On remand pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-3-128, the trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for assault. We affirm.

The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this negligence action. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Calvin Lewis Hill, was convicted of car jacking, theft of property valued over $1000.00, and forgery, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition, and we affirm that judgment.

Wayne County- The Petitioner, Joey Salcido, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred because: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him because of a defective indictment; and (2) the delay in the disposition of his post-conviction petition has deprived him of due process of law. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The defendant, William Thomas Heckart, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; misdemeanor violation of the sex offender registry, a Class A misdemeanor; and felony violation of the sex offender registry, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to an effective six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form in count two of case number S50,856 to reflect that the conviction offense was a Class C felony.

The defendant, Betty R. Chumbley, pled guilty to two counts of theft between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony; three counts of official misconduct, a Class E felony; and one count of destruction of and tampering with governmental records, a Class A misdemeanor. The theft counts were merged and the official misconduct counts were merged. She received an effective five-year sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rashad Jamal Chandler, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney (1) failed to interview witnesses who would have helped his case and (2) should have argued a different theory of defense. Based upon the record and the parties’  briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

I am, respectfully, unable to join in the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s motion to modify court-ordered restitution. The majority notes, and I completely agree, that there is no proper avenue of appeal to this Court via Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). However, in my view, this case is not a proper application of the Court’s power to grant a writ of certiorari.

The defendant, Latarsha R. Wheeler, was convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, for money stolen from her employer, Back Yard Burgers. See T.C.A. § 39-14-105(3). The defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to three years with forty days of periodic confinement in the workhouse coupled with probation. In this appeal, we consider her claims of error due to insufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony, lack of a jury charge on facilitation, denial of judicial diversion, and error in imposing the amount of restitution. We hold that the trial court did not err and affirm its judgment.
 

The Appellant, Carri Chandler Lane, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her motion to modify court-ordered restitution. The State responds that the denial of a request to modify restitution is not appealable under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b), and, even if appealable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. While we agree that Rule 3(b) does not provide for an appeal as of right from a trial court’s denial of a motion to modify restitution, we, nonetheless, conclude that the Appellant’s issues are entitled to a review as the appeal may be treated as a writ of certiorari. See T.C.A. § 27-8-101 (2006). After review of the Appellant’s motion on the merits, we conclude that material changes in circumstances have occurred since the order and, further, that it would be unjust to require adherence to the restitution order currently in effect. Accordingly, the trial court’s order denying modification is reversed, and this case is remanded for a hearing to determine, following consideration of the Appellant’s present financial resources and her future ability to pay or perform, the proper amount and method of payment of restitution to be made. See T.C.A. § 40-35-304(d) (2006).

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court ordered the employer to provide medical treatment pursuant to a court approved settlement for a 1995 injury and awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2). The employer has appealed contending that the trial court erred because the employee’s current condition is caused by age-related degenerative arthritis and not by the 1995 work accident and that the attorney fee award was not proved to be reasonable in amount. After a careful review of the record we conclude that the trial court should be affirmed.

The petitioner, Hollis G. Williams, who is serving a life sentence without possibility of parole for first degree murder, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief and motion to reopen his prior post-conviction proceedings. We hold that we are without jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion to reopen. We also hold that we have jurisdiction to consider the trial court’s denial of relief on the petitioner’s other post-conviction claims, and we affirm its judgment on those claims.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of a work-related knee injury and awarded permanent and total disability benefits until the employee is, by age, eligible for full benefits in the Old Age Insurance Benefits Program under the Social Security Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(B)(2003). The employer has appealed the trial court’s award contending that the trial court erred in finding that the employee gave notice of the work-related injury and that the trial court erred in considering a summary of the medical depositions as opposed to having read the medical depositions before rendering a decision. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court should be affirmed.

This is the second appeal of a case involving the termination of a county employee. The petitioner was a deputy jailor for the County Sheriff’s Department. His employment was terminated because he failed to report an injured inmate. The county’s administrative board upheld the termination. The petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court denied the writ, and the petitioner appealed. In the first appeal, the trial court’s order was vacated and the cause was remanded for reconsideration under the standard of review set forth in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, see T.C.A. § 4-5-322. On remand, the trial court entered a revised order, affirming the termination. The petitioner now appeals the revised order. We affirm, finding that the petitioner received a fair hearing before the administrative board and that the board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the Plaintiff eighty-five percent vocational impairment for each arm for a bilateral carpal tunnel work injury. The employer has appealed contending that the trial court erred in awarding eighty-five percent vocational impairment to each arm in light of the employee’s work history subsequent to the work-related injury. The employer also contends that the trial court erred by inappropriately weighing the testimony of the employee’s vocational expert in assessing the eighty-five percent vocational disability. Finally, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Rodney Caldwell, PhD. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court should be affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal the employer asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting the opinion of the treating physician in awarding the employee benefits based upon a finding of 32.5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. We agree with the findings of the trial court and in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joshua Glenn Trivette, pled guilty to two counts of auto burglary, theft over $1000, five counts of vandalism over $1000, vandalism over $500, felony evading arrest, driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license stemming from one indictment (Case No. S50,046), and to driving on a revoked license second offense, violation of the seat belt law, and failure to provide proof of financial responsibility from a separate indictment (Case No. S50,045), with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days in Case No. S50,045 and an effective six-year sentence in Case No. S50,046, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors, ordering consecutive sentences, and denying an alternative sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Mobley, was convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and setting fire to personal property, and the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences plus twenty-two years. On appeal, he alleges: (1) there is insufficient evidence upon which to convict him on either count of first-degree murder; (2) there is insufficient evidence upon which to convict him of especially aggravated robbery; (3) the trial court erred in initially prohibiting testimony from a defense expert, which caused a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we conclude the Defendant was improperly sentenced. Thus, we modify the Defendant’s sentences for his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and setting fire to personal property from twenty to eighteen years  and from two years to one year, respectively.