APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Blount County- The Defendant, Trisha Plemmons, appeals the revocation of her community corrections sentence. Finding no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm.

Plaintiffs purchased property from defendant by Warranty Deed which stated the property contained 15 acres. Plaintiffs subsequently learned in litigation with a neighbor over the boundary line, that the parcel only contained 10.66 acres. Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendant to recover damages and the Trial Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to damages under the warranties in the Deed in the amount of $6,660.00 for the shortage of acreage plus costs and the judgment they incurred in the boundary line dispute with their neighbor. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Anthony Tyrone Robertson, appeals from the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In July of 2000, the Defendant pled guilty to sexual battery and received a six-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. The sentence was suspended following service of one year in the county jail, and the Defendant was placed on probation. On July 16, 2004, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. The warrant was twice amended to include additional violations. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original six-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that the remainder of his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The trial court held Husband in contempt because he failed to comply with the terms of a postdivorce agreed order which modified the terms of the divorce decree regarding the disposition of the marital residence. On appeal, Husband argues that the agreed order was void because the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree after it became final. We hold that the agreed order, which was a modification of the divorce decree by the parties, was valid and enforceable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in enforcing the terms of the agreed order by holding Husband in contempt of court for noncompliance with the order.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.  60.02 motion for relief from judgment. Following a bench trial and judgment in favor of the defendant, a third party provided additional materials pursuant to an agreed discovery order, which were not previously disclosed to the parties before trial. The plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02, requesting that the judgment be set aside based on this newly discovered evidence. The plaintiff also argued that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel should be applied to grant relief from the judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. After careful review, we find that the trial court incorrectly applied the law in deciding on the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion. Therefore, we vacate and remand.

In this suit on a credit card debt, the Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment on the amount claimed. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Leah Joy Ward, was found guilty by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment. The only issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence supports the element of premeditation. After review, we conclude the evidence was sufficient and affirm the conviction.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Alton Tappan, of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court imposed an effective incarcerative sentence of 14 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and complains that his sentence is excessive because the State failed to prove an offender range above Range I. Our review assures us that the evidence is sufficient and that the defendant was properly sentenced. We therefore affirm the convictions and sentence.

The petitioner, Guillermo Matias Juan, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to second degree murder and received a sentence of sixty years incarceration in the Tennessee Departmentof Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief,  alleging that his sentence was void because he did not have the requisite criminal history to qualify as a persistent offender. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Steven L. Anderson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends: the trial court did not follow the proper procedures for processing his petition for writ of habeas corpus; the court improperly dismissed his petition; and his right against double jeopardy was violated. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The appellant contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his appeal from general sessions court when he failed to appear on the date of the hearing. He claimed that he had gone to the wrong courthouse on the hearing date. We affirm.

We granted this appeal primarily to determine whether Tennessee common law includes a law enforcement investigative privilege (“law enforcement privilege”) which operates to exempt from disclosure governmental records that would otherwise be accessible via the Tennessee Public Records Act (“Public Records Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (Supp. 2006).1 We hold that Tennessee common law does not include the law enforcement privilege and that it should not be adopted herein. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which adopted the law enforcement privilege and applied it as an exception to the Public Records Act. However, we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether any of the police department records at issue are part of a pending, open, or ongoing criminal investigation and thus exempt from disclosure. We also reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the judgment of the trial court permitting Petitioners to recover their attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505(g) (1999). On remand, the trial court shall calculate and award Petitioners the attorneys’ fees they have incurred on appeal. Finally, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the permanent injunction issued by the trial court requiring the City of Jackson (“City”) to respond in writing to future Public Records Act requests of The Jackson Sun or its agents.

The majority holds that the Judgment denominated “Final Judgment” reducing the previous Judgment from $723,426.27 to $598,426.27 was a “juristic act” of acceptance of the remittitur under protest. I do not agree.

In this class action lawsuit filed against the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs a portion of their attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Defendants argue on appeal that the trial court erred in finding the Plaintiffs to be “prevailing parties” in the litigation and that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was unwarranted and erroneous. We hold that although the Plaintiffs were not successful on all of their claims, they achieved enough success in their lawsuit to be “prevailing parties.” We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in awarding Plaintiffs $45,000 in attorney’s fees, and consequently affirm.

John Wayne Webb was injured in a car wreck and filed suit against two other drivers. A jury found defendant Brandon O. Canada to be solely at fault and awarded Mr. Webb $723,426.27 in compensatory damages against Mr. Canada. An order was entered awarding Mr. Webb judgment against Mr. Canada in the amount of $723,426.27 and dismissing the case as to the other driver, Douglas D. Townsend. Mr. Canada filed a motion seeking a new trial or in the alternative, a remittitur. Following a hearing, the trial court suggested a remittitur in the amount of $125,000. Final judgment was entered on July 24, 2006, referencing the remittitur and reducing the amount of the judgment to $598,426.27. On appeal, Mr. Canada argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Mr. Webb never accepted the remittitur, the verdict was excessive, and the remittitur was inadequate. After review, we find no error and affirm.

The defendant, Savalas O. McNeal, was convicted by a Madison County jury of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and received a ten-year sentence to the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Thomas M. Powell, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to assert a ground that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

The father was granted custody of his minor child in juvenile court after the court found the daughter to be dependent and neglected. Three years after the order was entered, the mother filed a petition for change of custody in juvenile court, which was denied. The mother appealed the juvenile court’s order to circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the petition filed by the mother was not a part of the dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the subsequent custody decision was a part of the dependency and neglect proceeding so that it is properly appealable to circuit court for a de novo hearing.

The Petitioner, Ulysses Richardson , appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is a second such petition and as it is barred by the statute of limitations. The petition similarly fails if considered as a petition for habeas corpus relief, a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief or a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The primary residential parent of the parties' eleven-year-old child requested permission to relocate to Georgia because her husband accepted employment that provided a significant increase in pay and better opportunities for advancement. The father opposed the relocation. The trial court, which made no findings of fact, denied the request based upon the conclusion the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. We have determined the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding that the mother had a reasonable purpose for relocating to Georgia. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant the requested relocation to Georgia.

The Defendant, Arthur T. Copeland, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The jury found a single aggravating circumstance, that the Defendant previously had been convicted of one or more felonies involving violence to the person, see Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997), and further found that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (1997). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification but committed plain error by failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tenn. 1999), and ordered a remand for a determination of whether the error was harmless. Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the sentence of death as disproportionate. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in order to resolve the dispositive issues. We first hold that the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant from offering expert testimony regarding eyewitness testimony and overrule State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000). Because the exclusion of the testimony cannot be classified as harmless under these circumstances, the Defendant must be granted a new trial. Although the trial court failed to conduct a Momon hearing, consideration of that issue is not necessary because of the grant of a new trial. Finally, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by finding that the death sentence was disproportionate; thus the State may choose to seek the death penalty upon remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

The Appellant, Kim McGill, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. McGill pled guilty to aggravated robbery and received a sentence of 7.2  years, as a mitigated offender, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her of the right to request recusal of the trial judge based upon the judge’s comments to the Appellant following her request to obtain private counsel. Following review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a prisoner seeking parole. The petitioner was convicted in 1981 and is serving a life sentence. In 2004, he was denied parole based on the severity of his offense. He filed the instant petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, claiming violations of his constitutional right to equal protection and due process, and a violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. The trial court dismissed the petition on its face, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner filed this appeal. We affirm, concluding that the petition does not state a claim for relief.

The Appellant, William T. Utley, was convicted by a Chester County jury of the Class D felonies of burglary and theft of property over $1000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent four-year sentences of incarceration for each conviction. On appeal, Utley has raised three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; and (3) whether the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences.

The petitioner, Christopher Lovin, was convicted of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal.