APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, David Michael Anderson, Jr., pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, and reserved, under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), a certified question of law dispositive of the case. The certified question of law is whether the officer in this case lacked reasonable suspicion to effect a seizure in stopping appellant and as a result the evidence seized should have been suppressed. Following our review, we agree with appellant, reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge.

We accepted this appeal to determine whether a juvenile charged with being delinquent by virtue of having committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult is entitled to a jury trial on appeal de novo to circuit court. We answer that question in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Defendant, Thomas Carter, was convicted of coercion of a witness, a Class D felony, and sentenced to serve four (4) years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the State did not introduce sufficient evidence to convict him of the charge of coercion of a witness; and (2) the trial court violated his constitutional rights by requiring him to wear shackles and his prison uniform during his trial. Finding the second issue to have merit, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

Petitioner Robert Dallis Payne was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder and received a sentence of life in prison. On December 2, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. On December 8, 2005 the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his petition for habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Edward R. Forester, was convicted of aggravated burglary and received a sentence of eleven years in the Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to call two witnesses; and (2) failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Dewayne R. Cross, was convicted of rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He appealed, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Petitioner filed a petition and two amended petitions for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petitions. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it found that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a bench trial in Hamilton County, the appellant, Kenneth Ramsey, was convicted of speeding, simple assault and resisting arrest. As a result, the trial court sentenced the ¹ appellant to thirty days for speeding, six months for resisting arrest and eleven months and twenty-nine days for assault, with the sentences to run concurrently. The trial court suspended the effective eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence and placed the appellant on unsupervised probation. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to allow the appellant to call a witness to testify on his behalf; (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to present a copy of the indictment to the appellant; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying a continuance because the appellant was not provided documents as required by law in a timely manner; (4) whether the trial court failed to provide equal access to the court by denying a continuance; and (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.  Because the judgment forms do not properly reflect that the appellant was found guilty after a bench trial, we remand the matter for entry of corrected judgment forms. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony M. Bond, was convicted of first degree felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1997). The jury returned a verdict of life without parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (1997). In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for felony murder because the facts and circumstances of the underlying robbery were not the proximate cause of the victim's death; (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's request for a curative instruction after the prosecution stated in its closing argument that the jury had been sequestered because of the defendant; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of testimony concerning the defendant's teeth; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to bolster an expert witness's credibility. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Anthony M. Bond, was convicted of first degree felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1997).  The jury returned a verdict of life without parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (1997). In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for felony murder because the facts and circumstances of the underlying robbery were not the proximate cause of the victim's death; (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's request for a curative instruction after the prosecution stated in its closing argument that the jury had been sequestered because of the defendant; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of testimony concerning the defendant's teeth; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to bolster an expert witness's credibility. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Nicholas Goff, entered a plea of guilty to one count of driving under the influence, first offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with two days in jail followed by probation. Five months later, a violation warrant was issued and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the original sentence into execution. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that he was not afforded due process of law; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) that the trial court erred by revoking his probation on the basis of a "mere arrest;" and (4) that the trial court erred by appointing an assistant public defender as his lawyer. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the granting of specific performance pursuant to an option to purchase contained in a lease agreement between Sam Teague and Sam Teague Chrysler, Inc., and the predecessor in interest of Harper-Wittbrodt Automotive Group, LLC. Each of the parties have made numerous assignments of error with respect to the ruling of the trial court and the relief granted by it. After consideration of each of the issues raised by the parties, we affirm, in all respects, the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Nicholas Goff, entered a plea of guilty to one count of driving under the influence, first offense.  Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with two days in jail followed by probation.  Five months later, a violation warrant was issued and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the original sentence into execution. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that he was not afforded due process of law; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) that the trial court erred by revoking his probation on the basis of a "mere arrest;" and (4) that the trial court erred by appointing an assistant public defender as his lawyer.  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Shirley Peters (Pettit), pled guilty to reckless homicide (Class D Felony) and agreed to a sentence of eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined following a sentencing hearing. On July 11, 2005, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in confinement and denied any alternative sentence. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) overruling her motion for deferred judgment and (2) requiring confinement when she is eligible for alternative sentencing. We conclude that the defendant has not carried her burden of showing that the sentence imposed is improper, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Peggy Dale Hall,¹ was convicted of four counts of statutory rape, and the trial court sentenced her to an eight-year probationary sentence. A violation of probation warrant was subsequently issued, and the Defendant admitted violating the rules of her probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when, after revoking her probation, it ordered her to serve the balance of her eight-year sentence in prison. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jeffery Todd Epps, was convicted by a jury in the Sevier County Circuit Court of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence within the range.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marvin L. Locke, appeals from his Bradley County Criminal Court convictions of selling methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance, in a school zone; possession of methamphetamine in a school zone with intent to sell; unlawful possession of a firearm; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that the sale and possession of methamphetamine (the subjects, respectively, of the first two counts of the indictment) occurred within 1,000 feet of a school. Following our review of the case, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bobby Davis, appeals from the post-conviction court’s order dismissing his petition or post-conviction relief after finding that the petition was filed outside the statute of limitations.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). On appeal, the petitioner argues that his right to due process required the statute of limitations be tolled. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Jimmy Bernard Clark, was convicted by a Madison County jury of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received a twelve-year sentence as a career offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement made to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Ciondre T. Moore, alias, Ciondre T. Porter, was convicted in three separate cases of multiple offenses and sentenced to twelve years of intensive probation. Subsequently, two violation of probation warrants were issued, and the Defendant pled guilty to violating his probation. He then filed a pro se motion alleging that the trial court had made a clerical error by not giving him sentencing credit for the time that he had served on probation. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Colico Walls, was convicted by a jury of attempted aggravated robbery. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by this Court. See State v. Colico Walls, No. W2000-03008-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1381261 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 7, 2001). The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After counsel was appointed to represent the petitioner, three amended petitions were filed. The post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals the judgment of the post-conviction court. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Willie Calvin Taylor, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Dyer County Circuit Court. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner had filed his petition outside the one year statute of limitations period. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Marques Lanier Bonds, AKA “Mark,” was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of attempted second-degree murder, reckless aggravated assault, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to an effective term of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges: (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion in limine regarding testimony of his prior incarceration; (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence; (3) the trial court’s acceptance of the jury’s verdict; and (4) the sentence imposed by the trial court. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we modify the judgments of the trial court to reflect the merger of the defendant’s aggravated assault conviction into his attempted second-degree murder conviction and his reckless endangerment conviction into his reckless aggravated assault conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

The appellant, Thomas R. Cook, III, was convicted by a jury of assault, resisting arrest and carrying a dangerous weapon. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation after the service of thirty days in jail. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant argues that he was denied the right to testify because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling made by the trial court and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a review of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in determining that the piece of evidence was admissible. However, because we are unable to determine from the record whether the error was reversible, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal these post-conviction cases and then consolidated them to determine a question common to both: were the petitioners denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to an erroneous jury instruction regarding the release eligibility for a person convicted of first degree murder when there had been a recent change in the law. Both petitioners also raise additional arguments regarding whether their trial counsel were ineffective in other respects. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the decision of the post-conviction court, holding that the petitioners were not denied their right to effective assistance of counsel. We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals in part, holding that the petitioners were denied their right to effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object to erroneous jury instructions regarding release eligibility. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals on all other issues, holding that neither trial counsel was ineffective in any other aspect of their representation. Therefore, we reverse both petitioners’ convictions for first degree murder and remand for new trials on that charge alone. We affirm all remaining convictions.

This appeal involves a dispute over a non-marital child's surname. Father/Appellant filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County, seeking to legitimate his son and to give him his surname. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court legitimated the child, and directed that the
child's surname be changed to a hyphenated surname consisting of Mother’s maiden name and Father’s surname. Father/Appellant appeals.¹ We reverse the trial court’s finding concerning the child’s surname and remand for further proceedings consistent with T.C.A. 27-3-128 and this
Opinion.

¹Because juvenile courts are courts of record, T.C.A. § 37-1-159(a) (2005), appeals in proceedings such as this one proceed directly to this court. T.C.A. § 37-1-159(g).