APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Benny Ray Mitchell, was convicted of theft of property valued over $10,000 and for operation of a chop shop. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a persistent offender, to twelve years for the theft conviction and ten years for the operation of a chop shop, and it ordered that the sentences run consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the jury was unable to render an unbiased verdict because one juror had a medical condition that he willfully failed to disclose. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

This appeal involves a dispute over a non-marital child's surname. Father/Appellant filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County, seeking to legitimate his son and to give him his surname. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court legitimated the child, and directed that the
child's surname be changed to a hyphenated surname consisting of Mother’s maiden name and Father’s surname. Father/Appellant appeals.¹ We reverse the trial court’s finding concerning the child’s surname and remand for further proceedings consistent with T.C.A. 27-3-128 and this
Opinion.

¹Because juvenile courts are courts of record, T.C.A. § 37-1-159(a) (2005), appeals in proceedings such as this one proceed directly to this court. T.C.A. § 37-1-159(g).

This appeal stems from a divorce. In this appeal, the husband asserts that the circuit court erred when it (1) awarded his wife transitional alimony in the amount of $4,000 per month for the first four years and $1,000 per month for the next five years, (2) assigned 100% of the parties’ marital debts to him, and (3) allocated $650 for his wife’s work related child care expenses when calculating the parties’ child support obligations. Husband argues that the amount of transitional alimony was excessive as he did not have the ability to pay that amount and that the amount exceeded his wife’s needs. He also argues that the circuit court should have equitably distributed the parties’ marital debts and that the circuit court should not have allocated work related child care expenses in excess of his wife’s monthly gross income. Additionally, the wife has requested that this Court award her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm as modified the decisions of the circuit court. We decline to award the wife her attorney’s fees on appeal.

I agree with most of the majority’s analysis in this case, and in particular I agree with the majority’s holding that the question of the applicability of the arbitration agreement is a “gateway” issue, properly before this Court. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the dispute as to Mr. Fuller’s coaching position was subject to arbitration. 

The Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for sale of cocaine, less than 0.5 grams. Following a jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years to be served at thirty-five percent as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court incorrectly allowed in testimony from two witnesses who were not qualified as experts. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer's insurer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was not proximately caused by intoxication from the use of an illegal drug, marijuana. The panel has concluded the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Board of Education, vacating a portion of an arbitration award that required reinstatement of Plaintiff to his high school coaching assignment. We reverse.

This is the second time this case has been on appeal. This case stems from an alleged breach of an employment contract between an employer and its employees. In this appeal, we are asked to determine (1) whether the chancery court erred when it dismissed eight of the ten plaintiffs from the appeal as they had not perfected an appeal to the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict that was reversed on appeal; (2) whether the chancery court erred when it found that the employer had not breached its contract when it incorporated an integrated master seniority list that did not “endtail” pilots from another corporation that merged into the employer; (3) whether, assuming that a breach occurred, the employees waived their breach of contract claims by failing to object to the alleged breach in a timely fashion; and (4) whether the chancery court erred when it awarded discretionary costs for court reporter expense for hearings. On appeal, the employees contend that the chancery court erred when it dismissed eight of the ten employees as they had not properly perfected an appeal because the eight employees should be able to benefit from the appellate decision regarding the remaining two employees. The employees also assert that the employer breached their employment contract when it incorporated an integrated seniority list altering their seniority rights and that they had not waived any claim for breach of contract because of their conduct. Finally, the employees contend that the chancery court erred when it awarded discretionary costs for court reporter expenses for hearings as rule 54.04(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the recovery of court reporter expenses for depositions or trials only. The employer contends that it did not breach the employment contract and that, assuming breach, the employees waived any breach of contract claim because they failed to challenge the arbitration award that established the integrated master seniority list in a timely fashion and that they failed to object to the breach of contract in a timely fashion after the breach. We affirm the decision of the chancery court finding that the employer had not breached its employee contract with its employees and affirm the decision of the chancery court dismissing eight of the ten employees from the new trial as they had not properly perfected an appeal to the chancery court’s original judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Further, we affirm the chancery court’s award of discretionary costs.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. This Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder on direct appeal and remanded for a retrial on the defendant’s two charges of felony murder. Prior to his retrial, the defendant filed a motion stating that his prosecution for the felony murder charges is a violation of the principles of double jeopardy. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion. The defendant now brings an interlocutory appeal to determine whether the principles of double jeopardy bar a trial on the two felony murder charges. We find that a retrial on the felony murder charges would not constitute double jeopardy and affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Willam H. Grisham, II, was indicted on two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The jury returned not guilty verdicts on each count of felony murder. The defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive life sentences for each of the murder convictions and a consecutive sentence of ten years for the robbery. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support any of the three convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Patient filed a medical malpractice claim against an orthopedic surgeon for his alleged negligence in her diagnosis and spinal surgery. After a three week trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the physician. The patient appealed, claiming that she was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred with regard to several evidentiary rulings, its communications with the jurors, its jury instructions and verdict form, and its decision to permit the jury to examine medical articles used in cross-examination. We have determined that the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

This is a lawsuit for on-the-job injury benefits. The plaintiff was employed as a jailer for the defendant county government. She injured her back in a slip-and-fall accident which occurred during the scope of her employment. The county paid her on-the-job injury benefits while she was being treated for her injuries. After about two months, her treating physician released her from his care, stated that she had no permanent anatomical disability, and determined that she was capable of unrestricted work. The county stopped paying her on-the-job injury benefits and she returned to full-dutywork. Later, complaining of continued back pain, the plaintiff saw another physician. This physician opined that the plaintiff had a 6% permanent disability to her body as a whole as a direct result of the slip-and-fall accident. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit for further benefits under the county’s OJI policy. After a trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff did not have a permanent vocational disability and held in favor of the county. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that there is no reason to reject the trial court’s determinations of credibility and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

The defendant was convicted of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a career offender to thirty years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his current sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion to suppress the evidence; (2) by allowing a law enforcement officer to testify as an expert witness and disallowing defense counsel to fully cross-examine the witness; (3) by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation; (4) by not instructing the jury that evidence of mere association with others involved in criminal activity is insufficient to establish guilt; (5) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (6) in sentencing him as a career offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Donald Haynes, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Rafael Antonio Bush, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault and received an effective twenty-two year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had not received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing, and this appeal ensued. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed about accomplice testimony. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The current round in this on-going child support dispute arises from Mother’s petition for contempt for failure to pay child support filed in April 2004, and Father’s cross-petition to modify child custody. The eldest of the parties’ four children had reached the age of majority when the 2004 petitions were filed, and the parties agreed that Father would assume custody of their son, Darius. Father does not dispute that he does not spend any time with the parties remaining two minor children. Mother requested visitation time with Darius after the change of custody. Thus, the proceedings required a resetting of child support. The issues raised by Mother for our review are
whether the trial court erred by determining Father is capable of earning only $30,000 per year for
the purposes of setting Father’s child support obligation and by ordering Father to pay stipulated
child support arrears of $20,578, plus 12% interest, at the rate of $150.00 per month.

I join with the majority in affirming the defendant’s conviction but write separately for the reasons expressed below.

The defendant, James C. Osborne, was convicted by a jury of rape, a Class B felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to twelve years at 100%. He now appeals his conviction and sentence. After thorough review, we conclude that no reversible error is present. The judgment of conviction is hereby affirmed.

This is an appeal of a judgment on a jury verdict. Plaintiffs- homeowners contracted with a construction company, a corporation wholly owned by a single stockholder, to construct their residence. Because of alleged breach of contract and negligent construction, the homeowners filed suit against the corporation and also the sole stockholder and his wife, a director, alleging that they were in fact the alter egos of the corporation. Prior to trial, the corporation was voluntarily dismissed by the homeowners, and the case was tried against the individual defendants on the alter ego theory.  The jury found that owner-defendants were liable under the alter ego theory for negligent construction and breach of contract. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict. Plaintiffshomeowners appealed stating that the trial court erred in dismissing some of the other causes of action, but a review of the record reveals that no motion for a new trial was filed by plaintiffs homeowners as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (e), and thus those issues are waived. The individual defendants asserted affirmative issues for review as cross appellants. Although the individual defendants filed a motion for a new trial, many of the issues raised were not specifically stated therein and are consequently considered waived on appeal by virtue of Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (e). Finding that there is material evidence to support the jury verdict, we affirm.

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense. The Defendant, William LarryLittles, filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless seizure, alleging the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop that led to the seizure. The Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied. Following his conviction he was sentenced to eighteen months in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). This sentence was suspended, and he was ordered to serve 180 days in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant raises a single issue: that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In April 2003, the plaintiff’s employer terminated his employment. The employer, citing the company’s respectful workplace policy, fired the employee for allegedly cursing a fellow employee.  The employee subsequently filed suit against the employer for retaliatory discharge. The employee alleged that his prior workers’ compensation claims were the real reason that his employer terminated his employment. In his complaint, the employee sought compensatory and punitive damages, but did not set forth the amount requested. After the jury trial got underway, the trial court allowed the employee to amend his complaint to request a specific amount of damages for back pay and front pay, but ultimately dismissed the claim for punitive damages. At the conclusion of the employee’s case-in-chief, the employer moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.  At the close of the employer’s proof, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee finding that his workers’ compensation benefits were a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to terminate his employment. At the end of trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the issue of whether to
award reinstatement or front pay to the employee. After hearing evidence on the issue, the trial court ordered the employer to pay front pay since reinstatement was not warranted under the facts of the case. The employer presented numerous issues related to the jury trial in its motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the employer asks us to review (1) the trial court’s decision to allow the employee to amend his complaint during the trial; (2) the trial court’s decisions regarding the admissibility of certain evidence; (3) the trial court’s decision to deny the employer’s motion for a directed verdict; (4) the trial court’s rejection of the employer’s proposed jury instructions; (5) the trial court’s decision to affirm the jury’s verdict while acting as thirteenth juror; and (6) the trial court’s award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on the various issues raised by the employer on appeal.

The defendant, Mark Edward Ellis, pled guilty to felony escape, a Class E felony. In exchange for his guilty plea, the defendant was sentenced to one year as a standard offender, which was to run consecutive to his prior sentences. On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred by denying his request for suspension of this sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in (a) finding employee’s claim for latex allergy to be compensable, (b) failing to impose liability on a subsequent employer, and (c) awarding 50 percent vocational disability. We affirm.

I concur in the results reached by the majority and agree with most of the reasoning.  However, I do not fully agree with the analysis used to determine whether the Carol Lane Property and the Buffalo Valley Road Property were marital or separate. The analysis used by the majority starts with the presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital, relying on the definition of marital property in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). While the opinion acknowledges in a footnote the definition of separate property that includes property acquired in exchange for pre-marital separately owned property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B), the analysis fails to take that definition into account.1 Logically, that definition should also create a “rebuttable presumption” that is equal in weight to the one used as the basis for the analysis herein.

This appeal involves the financial aspects of the dissolution of a marriage that lasted approximately ten years. Both parties sought a divorce in the Chancery Court for Putnam County. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and approved a permanent parenting plan designating her as primary residential parent for the parties’ two children. In addition, the trial court classified the parties’ assets, divided the marital estate, reduced the husband’s alimony arrearage to a judgment for alimony in solido, and ordered the husband to pay the wife $350 per month in longterm alimony. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the manner in which the trial court classified the parties’ assets and divided the marital estate and with the trial court’s decision to require him to pay long-term alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of the parties’ property. However, we find that the evidence fully supports the manner in which the trial court divided the parties’ marital estate, as well as the trial court’s decision to award the wife long-term alimony.