APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Charles Lee White, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and three counts of sexual battery. He was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence, suspended, and placed on intensive probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and placed his sentence into effect. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A McNairy County jury found the defendant, Cedric P. Golden, guilty of possession of more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of five years and imposed a fine of $5,150.00. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joe Anthony Ivy, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish his entitlement to relief from an unconstitutional or invalid sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the trial court erred in finding that the claimant gave proper notice of his injury, in finding the claimant suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant and in awarding permanent partial disability benefits based on thirty percent to the body as a whole. The Panel has concluded the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

The Appellant, Christopher Nicholas Orlando, was convicted by a DeKalb County jury of facilitation of first degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Orlando raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether he was denied his fundamental right to a fair trial because the State failed to (a) disclose the terms of a plea agreement with a key witness and (b) preserve exculpatory evidence; and (2) whether he was sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington. After a review of the record, we affirm.

The appellant, Lonna K. Brewer, pled nolo contendere in the Williamson County Circuit Court to two counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, a Class D felony. She received concurrent two-year sentences to be served as one day in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Ricky R. Bryan, appeals the judgment of the Rutherford County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. Bryan was convicted of first degree murder and subsequently sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Bryan argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of third party guilt in the homicide. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Cory Lyn Clark, was convicted of second degree murder (Class A Felony) and sentenced to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a violent offender. The defendant contends on appeal that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he claimed self-defense; 2) the trial court improperly admitted his second statement to police because a tape recording of the statement was no longer available; and 3) the sentence was improper. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, that the defendant failed to preserve his appeal of the lost evidence by failing to object at trial, and that the sentence was proper.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a statute of limitations. The plaintiffs’ decedent died in April 2000 at a nursing home. In February 2002, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the nursing home in state court, alleging negligent care by the nursing home. The nursing home removed the action to federal court. Subsequently, the nursing home asserted fault against the hospital that treated the decedent prior to her death. The plaintiffs then amended their complaint to name the hospital as a defendant. Later, the federal court entered an order of dismissal as to the nursing home and remanded the remaining proceedings to state court. After that, the defendant hospital filed a motion to dismiss. The state court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs’ action was a medical malpractice action and was not timely under the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm. 

Aggrieved of his aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape convictions, the petitioner, Scott M. Craig, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Criminal Court of Bradley County after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Darryl Ford, proceeding pro se, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petition fails to raise a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This bitter change of custody proceeding originated with Mother’s filing of a Petition to Stay Visitation based upon concerns that the parties’ youngest child had been potentially exposed to inappropriate sexual behavior while in Father’s custody. Father counterclaimed for a change in custody based upon Mother’s attempt to interfere with Father’s visitation. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Mother’s accusations unfounded, awarded Father joint custody, and decreased Father's child support. Mother asserts that the trial court erred by finding the circumstances had changed sufficiently to modify custody or child support. Since the outcome of the custody issue was dependent on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that there was a material change of circumstances. We, however, have concluded the trial court erred in setting child support, and remand that issue for further proceedings.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which the petitioner alleged that newly-discovered evidence mandated a new trial. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for coram nobis relief after a hearing and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal stems from criminal and civil contempt charges brought by a father of two minor children because of the mother’s failure to pay child support. The father brought his criminal contempt charge based on section 36-5-104 of the Tennessee Code. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court violated the mother’s due process rights during the criminal contempt hearing. The mother asserts on appeal that the chancery court violated her due process rights by (1) allowing the father’s attorney to try the case against her for criminal contempt; (2) failing to provide proper notice to her pursuant to Rule 42 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; (3) failing to provide her with a right to a jury trial; and (4) applying the wrong legal standard when it found her guilty of criminal contempt. Also, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court properly terminated the mother’s visitation rights with her children based on the chancery court’s findings that the mother committed perjury, that the mother was in criminal contempt for violating section 36-5-104 of the Tennessee Code, and that the mother was in civil contempt. We vacate the portions of the chancery court order (1) finding Appellant in criminal
contempt, (2) sentencing Appellant to serve six months in jail for criminal contempt, and (3) terminating Appellant’s visitation with her children until they attain the age of eighteen years, and we remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings.

The appellant, Ricky Butler, filed a petition to rehear in accordance with Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure on June 29, 2006, following the release of the opinion of this Court on June 27, 2006. The opinion of this Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal because the appellant’s notice of appeal was filed outside the thirty day time limit.

The Appellant, Johnny C. Menifee, was convicted by a Maury County jury of Class D felony evading arrest with risk of injury, misdemeanor theft, Class E felony reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and resisting arrest following his involvement in a car theft and resulting police high-speed chase. Menifee was subsequently sentenced to an effective eighteen-year Department of Correction sentence. On appeal, Menifee raises two issues for review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether his dual convictions for felony evading arrest and felony reckless endangerment violate double jeopardy. Following review, we affirm the convictions.

In this case, the unsuccessful Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of a will offered for probate by the defendants, Judith Ann Beardsley as executrix and Cavalry Bank Trust Department as Administrator ad litem for the estate of Olalee McClaran. Plaintiff challenges the will as a product of fraud in the inducement and undue influence. The proponents filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. From the summary judgment grant against him, Mr. McClaran now appeals. We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Latonya Yvonne Taylor, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated  robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of kidnapping. For these convictions, the Defendant received an effective twenty-three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statement given to the police; (2) whether the trial court improperly limited the scope of the Defendant’s mother’s testimony; (3) whether theevidence is sufficient to support her conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping; and (4) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A businessman purchased a house in Jackson, Tennessee for the use of his employees. While he did not live at the residence, the businessman allowed the employees to park the equipment used in the furtherance of his business at the residence. The equipment consisted of parking lot sweepers, pickup trucks, and trailers holding lawn-care equipment. The house is located in an area of the city zoned for residential use only. After receiving complaints from the neighbors, the city discussed the situation with the businessman in an effort to have him remove the equipment. When he failed to do so, the city sent him a letter asking that he remove the equipment or face further action. When this did not produce results, the city issued the businessman a citation for violation of the applicable residential zoning ordinance. The city court ruled that the businessman’s conduct violated the ordinance. The businessman appealed to the circuit court, which likewise entered a ruling in favor of the city. The businessman has appealed to this Court arguing that the applicable ordinance is impermissibly vague and that the citation failed to notify him that storing business equipment at the residence constituted a violation of the ordinance. We affirm.

The majority opinion and some of the participants in this matter have placed significant emphasis on the best interests of the child prong of the modification analysis. In my opinion, a more rigorous analysis of the first prong, i.e., whether there was a material change in circumstances, is in order since that finding is a pre-requisite to consideration of best interest.

I respectfully dissent from the majority. As stated in the majority opinion, in order for an owner or operator of premises to be held liable for negligence in allowing a dangerous or defective condition to exist on the premises, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to the elements of negligence, that the condition was caused or created by the owner or, if the condition was created by someone other than the owner, that the owner had actual or constructive notice that the condition existed prior to the accident. Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004). It is alleged in the Plaintiffs’ complaint that Mr. Williams was walking down a set of steps on the golf course that were made of railroad crossties and that he fell due to the slippery surface of the step. Mr. Williams testified in his deposition that he evidently hit some mud and moss1 on the stairs, which caused him to fall. He testified that it was “raining real, real hard at that time.” However, Mr. Williams recanted this testimony in a subsequent affidavit wherein he stated, “it may have been sprinkling, but it was not raining hard.” In response to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs filed affidavits of Arthur Overall and Larry Rees, both of whom were golfing with Mr. Williams. Mr. Overall stated that

it had been raining heavily early that morning, but at the time we were playing golf,
there was a light drizzle if raining at all. As we approached the 8th hole, Jesse
Williams, Sr., was walking down the steps when he slipped and fell. As I walked
over to help Jesse Williams, Sr., I observed that there was Algae 2 and water all over
the steps and that they were made of railroad ties and were very uneven and worn.
The steps were very slippery.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding that she did not sustain injuries arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment with Employer as a result of an incident occurring on December 14, 2000, and also asserts that the trial court erred in assessing court costs against her. We agree with the findings of the trial court and affirm the judgment.

This is a derivative action. The board chairman of a nonprofit health care center was found guilty of submitting false claims in violation of federal law. Thereafter, the health care center’s chief executive officer and two of its board members filed a derivative action on behalf of the health care
center against the chairman and health care center’s remaining board members for violating their fiduciary duties to the corporation. The derivative suit sought, inter alia, injunctive relief to require the board to take action against the board chairman, and to enjoin the board from allegedly violating the CEO’s employment agreement by terminating her. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the board from violating the health care center’s bylaws, from violating federal regulations, and from terminating the employment of the CEO. Subsequently, the trial court found the defendant board members guilty of contempt for violating that order and entered a permanent injunction against the defendants. The permanent injunction awarded in the contempt action removed the defendants from the board and permanently barred them from the premises. The defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that the trial court’s action was warranted in the face of the board’s failure to take action regarding the board chairman after the federal judgment for filing false claims was entered against him.

This is a premises liability action. While playing golf in the rain, the plaintiff slipped and fell on stairs on the golf course made of railroad cross ties. The plaintiff claimed that the stairs were covered with mud and some variety of moss or algae, making them dangerously slippery. The plaintiff sued the golf course for negligence. The defendant golf course filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff failed to proffer evidence of notice, either actual or constructive. The trial court also found that the plaintiff’s evidence of a dangerous condition was speculative. We reverse, finding sufficient evidence to create a factual issue on whether a dangerous condition existed and whether the defendant golf course had constructive notice.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, RichardBarrom,was convicted of assault by causing extremely offensive or provocative physical contact, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court deferred sentencing, placed the defendant on diversion for eleven months, twenty-nine days, and ordered him to perform thirty hours of community service work and complete an anger management program.  On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to hearsay testimony; (3) the trial court improperly removed a juror based on race; and (4) his conviction was barred by prior jeopardy. Additionally, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.