APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint finding Plaintiff had failed to establish he suffered
an aggravation of a pre-existing fracture to his left wrist. On appeal, Plaintiff argues the medical
evidence preponderates against the court’s dismissal of the action. Defendant seeks recovery of
discretionary costs and also seeks to have the costs of preparing the transcript of the evidence taxed as appellate costs. We affirm the dismissal of the action and remand the issue of discretionary costs to the trial court.

Trial court granted motion to dismiss tort claims as barred by statute of limitations where the injury alleged was loss of employment. To the extent the employee alleged he had a contract for continued employment, his complaint was not subject to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal because the three year statute of limitations applies to cases involving loss of property, including contractual rights.

We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to determine whether lay testimony of olfactory observations alone may support a conviction for possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-433(a). We conclude that the burden of proving the nature and composition of anhydrous ammonia as it is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 43-11-303(a) cannot be met by adducing lay testimony of olfactory observations only. Because the evidence adduced in the case under submission did not include any evidence of the chemical composition of the substance, we conclude that it is insufficient to sustain the conviction for unlawful possession of anhydrous ammonia and reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it affirmed this conviction. Accordingly, we dismiss the defendant’s conviction for possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.

In the latter half of 2001, the defendant, Bobby Ray Johnson, who was living in Coffee County, convinced his girlfriend to engage in fellatio on two occasions with the minor victim, while the defendant watched and videotaped the encounters. The defendant was indicted for two counts of rape of a child. The defendant was convicted on both counts by a Coffee County jury. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive sentences of twenty years each to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Williamson County- The defendant, William Earl Cherry, was indicted for three counts of aggravated assault and three counts of reckless endangerment. He filed an application for pretrial diversion, and the State denied his request. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the trial court ordered that the State enter into a memorandum of understanding. The State filed a Rule 9 appeal. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Bobby Gene Walker, Jr., appeals a certified question of law regarding a police officer’s stop of him which resulted in his arrest for driving under the influence and violating the implied consent law. Because we agree with the Circuit Court for Blount County that reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts existed for the stop, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terry Jamar Norris, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Robert J. Wrigglesworth, Jr., previously convicted in Texas for the offense of indecency with a child by contact, was indicted for violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(c) because of his residing at an address where a minor child also resided. He offered to stipulate that he was a sex offender as covered by this statute. The trial court concluded that the State was required to accept this stipulation and thus barred from proving that the defendant was a convicted sex offender or why it was unlawful for him to live in the same residence as a minor. The State filed a Rule 9 appeal. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, the Trial Court entered Judgment against the defendant for previously awarded obligations, and held him in contempt. On appeal, we affirm.

Jonathan Hulon Brown (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s refusal to change the surname of his minor child, born out of wedlock, from that of the minor child’s mother Jackie Lynn Ross (“Mother”) to that of Father. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

The appellant, Markus K. Hartley, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, fourth offense. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. Subsequently, the appellant pled guilty to driving under the influence, second offense, but reserved a certified question of law to determine whether the trial court properly ruled on the motion to suppress. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants/Appellants appeal the order of the circuit court dismissing their appeal from general sessions court based upon their failure to appear for trial in the circuit court.  We affirm.

In this action, the Trial Court stayed defendant’s planned arbitration and defendant has appealed.  We affirm.

This is a child custody case which originated in juvenile court. On March 24, 2005, the court entered an order which, inter alia, awarded joint custody to the parties, with the mother being the primary custodian. Relying on Local Rule 15 of the Shelby County Juvenile Court, father timely appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County. By order entered October 11, 2005, the circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On October 28, 2005, father filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court, appealing the final judgment of dismissal in the circuit court and the final judgment of the juvenile court entered on March 24, 2005. We vacate the order of the circuit court dismissing the case and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter an order transferring this appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The defendant, Jermaine Scruggs, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor; reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving without a license, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403, -205, 50-351 (2003). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and a $350.00 fine for driving under the influence, first offense; six months and a $100.00 fine for reckless driving; and thirty days and a $50.00 fine for driving without a license, each at a seventy-five percent service rate. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an earlier five-year sentence for tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for the three misdemeanor convictions to be served consecutively to his prior felony sentence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellee is a billboard advertising business engaged in selling advertising space on the billboards it maintains. The Appellants contracted with the principal owner of the business to sell the business in exchange for a commission. One of the Appellants had partial ownership interest in three of the billboards serviced by the business. After closing the sale, the Appellee paid the Appellants a significantly smaller commission than the parties had agreed upon. The Appellants brought suit for breach of contract seeking to recover the remainder of the commission allegedly owed. The Appellee subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, pursuant to the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973 codified at section 62-13-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code, the Appellants could not recover a commission as a matter of law. The Appellee also sought to invoke the Act’s provisions to recover the commission already paid to the Appellants.  Finding it undisputed that the Appellants did not have a real estate broker’s license when negotiating the sale of the business and that real estate comprised a significant portion of the Appellee’s assets,  the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Further, the trial court ordered the Appellants to return the commission already paid by the Appellee. The Appellants have appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. We affirm.

This is a divorce case. In a post-trial proceeding after remand by the Court of Appeals, Husband appeals the order of the trial court which effectively awarded certain stock to Wife. The appeal is dismissed for failure to file a timely notice of appeal.

Because I conclude the defendant’s due process rights were violated by the introduction of unreliable pretrial identification evidence, I respectfully dissent.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Corey Biggs, was convicted of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by not suppressing his out-of-court identification by a police officer.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Busby, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Shaune Woolen, appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Willie L. Pegues, who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree felony murder, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The petitioner, Raymon Haymon, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, he raises thirteen issues regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the violation of certain constitutional rights. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, including the petitioner’s reply brief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Frederick D. Deberry, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his “motion for new trial.” The trial court dismissed the pleading because it “was not timely filed, the issue has previously been adjudicated in this matter and the Motion for New Trial is not well-taken.” We affirm the order of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Casey Watson, entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; one count of possession of dihydrocodeinone with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony; one count of possession of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; one count of unlawful possession of a weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense, a Class E felony; and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years for his Class B felony conviction, two years for his Class D felony conviction and for each of his Class E felony convictions, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in split confinement, with probation after serving ninety days in confinement. As a condition of his plea agreement, Defendant reserved a certified question of law regarding the validity of a search warrant. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.