APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 13, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on December 3, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count each of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping in September 1986, for which the petitioner was subsequently convicted. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508- CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court was correct in awarding benefits for 50% permanent partial disability to a scheduled member, i.e. hearing loss, rather than the body as a whole. We hold that the award should have been apportioned to the body as a whole and therefore capped at two and one half times the anatomical impairment. We modify the judgement accordingly.

Defendant Armstrong appeals as of right from a jury verdict of guilty for the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine). Sentenced as a Range I standard offender, Armstrong received thirty-seven (37) months in the Tennessee Department of Correction and was fined $2,000. The sole issue for review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Armstrong’s conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There was no evidentiary hearing. While the petitioner submits an extensive brief outlining a number of issues, we have summarized his claims as follows:

(1) whether the trial court erred when it determined that sentence reform legislation adopted in 1979 and 1989 did not apply to petitioner's sentence;

(2) whether the subsequent sentence reform acts deny petitioner equal protection under the law and due process of the law;

(3) whether the petitioner's sentence is cruel and unusual punishment;

(4) whether the trial court erred by not appointing counsel to represent the petitioner during this habeas corpus proceeding;

(5) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this petition; and

(6) whether the trial court erred by determining that it did not have jurisdiction to alter the petitioner's sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Obion County, granting Appellant’s motion to modify her sentence, but denying her full probation. See, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Appellant was convicted upon a plea of guilty of the offense of theft of property in excess of $60,000, a Class B felony.  Her original sentence, imposed April 17, 1995, was to a term of eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. The sentence was suspended except for one year which Appellant was ordered to serve in the Obion County Jail. A probationary period was imposed for the balance of the term and restitution ordered as a condition thereof.

The appellant, Billy Joe Harris, appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing his motion for a new trial. The appellant claimed he was entitled to a new trial due to newly discovered evidence. The trial court found the motion was not timely filed pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was tried and convicted on April 27, 1989. His motion for a new trial was denied. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court also affirmed the sentence. He subsequently instituted four suits for post-conviction relief. All four suits were denied at every stage of the proceedings. The present motion was filed June 26, 1995 as a separate action.  After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law governing the issue presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

The Defendant appeals to this court as of right from a judgment entered on a Weakley County jury verdict convicting him of attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault. The defendant presents four issues for review: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict for attempt to commit first degree murder; (2) that principles of double jeopardy prohibit his conviction for both attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault; (3) that the twenty-five year sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is excessive; and (4) that the court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively to four prior sentences of incarceration.   After review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s decision.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 24, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in January 1981, and was convicted of the same in May 1981. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was timely filed. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this medical malpractice action on December 5, 2003, against three healthcare providers for a surgical procedure performed on husband on December 8, 2000. All defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding the plaintiffs had knowledge of enough facts more than one year before filing the lawsuit to put a reasonable person on notice that an injury had been suffered as a result of wrongful conduct by the defendants. The trial court also found that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

The biological father of S.A.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he had no notice of the final hearing. The notice of the hearing was sent in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.02 to the address supplied by the biological father. Proof of due mailing creates a presumption of receipt and nothing in the record rebuts this presumption. We affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 21, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of rape in May 1984, and was convicted of rape in October 1984. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

Appellant Michael Bellew pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. As a Range I standard offender, Appellant received a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he presents the following issue: whether his sentence is excessive.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants appeal the trial court’s failure to set aside, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the grant of summary judgment in this intentional tort case. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

A Hamilton County grand jury indicted the defendant, Frank Bennie Jackson, Jr., for possession of cocaine for resale, driving without a license, and failure to stop at a traffic signal. The defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging that the search of his vehicle incident to a custodial arrest was illegal because he should have received a citation in lieu of arrest for driving without a license and running a red light, both class C misdemeanors. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court agreed and suppressed all evidence seized as a result of the search incident to arrest. It is from this order that the state now appeals. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Edward Meeks, was indicted for first-degree murder. The jury found him guilty as charged and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.  He has appealed as of right, raising for review the trial court's instructions to the jury and the State's conduct during closing argument. We find the defendant's issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Richard Wayne Otey, appeals as of right from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Williamson County, finding him guilty of aggravated assault in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender, to be served consecutively to a sentence for which the appellant was on parole at the time of the offense at issue in this case.

This appeal involves a change in child custody and a petition for contempt. When the parties divorced, they agreed upon a parenting plan providing that Mother would have primary custody of their two sons. Less than a year later, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, seeking primary custody. Mother filed a counter-petition, also seeking modification of the parenting plan. She also filed a petition to cite Father in contempt. Since the divorce, Mother had become pregnant by another man, and she did not tell the child’s father that the child was born. Mother also lied to Father and others about the circumstances surrounding the child’s birth. Mother had remained unemployed since the divorce, and her only source of monthly income was child support from Father for his two sons. The parties’ oldest son was doing poorly in school and was frequently tardy or absent. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and that it was in the best interest of the children for Father to have primary custody. The court also found that Father’s actions did not rise to the level of contempt. Mother appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to change custody, its refusal to find Father in contempt, and other procedural issues. Finding no error, we affirm.

On February 10, 1994, the appellant was convicted by a jury of his peers of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication.¹ Following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to six years incarceration for each count with each sentence to be served consecutively. Much aggrieved by his convictions and resultant sentences, the appellant appeals from the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 3, Tenn. R. App. P.

The defendant, Brandon D. Thomas, was convicted of one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and three drug offenses including possession with intent to sell a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class B felony; possession with intent to sell a Schedule III controlled substance (dihydrocodeinone), a Class D felony; and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the cocaine offense, eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the other drug offenses and six months for the conviction for resisting arrest, with all the sentences to run concurrently for a total effective sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his cocaine conviction and that he was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we find that the defendant was sentenced improperly but not for the issues on which he appeals. The sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class D felony conviction is illegal because the minimum sentence for a Class D felony is two years. We remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the minimum sentence and affirm the trial court as to the other raised issues.

The Appellant, Maurice Lashaun Nash, appeals the sentencing decision of the Tipton County Circuit Court. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Nash entered guilty pleas to six felonies and one misdemeanor and received an effective ten-year sentence. The agreement provided that the ten-year sentence would run consecutively to an effective ten-year sentence which Nash was serving at the time of sentencing. The terms of the plea agreement also provided that the manner of service of the ten-year sentence would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Nash’s request for alternative sentencing, which Nash now asserts was error. After review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The appellant, James Polk, appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery entered in the Circuit Court of Maury County. The appellant contends that the trial court should have ordered a new trial pursuant to Rule 33(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The original trial of this case took place in Montgomery County. Judge John H. Peay presided over the trial of the appellant and his co-defendant, Brett Patterson, which resulted in two convictions for felony murder, one conviction for first degree burglary, and one conviction for aggravated rape for each defendant. The jury sentenced the appellant to death. The appellant’s co-defendant received a life sentence. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant’s convictions were affirmed, but the death penalty was set aside and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. State v. Cauthern, 778 S.W.2d 39 (Tenn. 1989). On remand, Judge Peay granted the appellant’s motion to transfer the case out of Montgomery
County. The new sentencing hearing was held in Gibson County.

The appellant, Thomas H. Aldridge, was convicted of driving while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, leaving the scene of an accident, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving after having been declared a habitual vehicle offender, a Class E felony, following his pleas of guilty to these offenses. The trial court imposed the following sentences pursuant to the plea bargain agreement:

a.) Driving while intoxicated, a fine of $500 and confinement for thirty (30) days in the Shelby County Correctional Center, twenty-eight days of the sentence was suspended;

b.) Leaving the scene of an accident, a fine of $500; and

c.) Driving after having been declared a habitual vehicle offender, a Range I, standard offender sentence consisting of a $500 fine and confinement for one (1) year in the Shelby County Correctional Center.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of five counts of armed robbery, four of which were affirmed and one of which was reversed and dismissed by this Court in an opinion filed on March 6, 1985. Application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was denied on June 10, 1985. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 24, 1995, which the court below treated as one for post-conviction relief and dismissed without a hearing on the basis that it was time-barred. He contends that this summary dismissal was improper. After reviewing the record, we affirm the lower court’s judgment.

The defendant, Shamarcus Antwan Hunt, was convicted of the sale of cocaine under .5 grams, a Class C felony, and possession of cocaine over .5 grams with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class B felony. He was sentenced, respectively, to eight years and twelve years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court should have declared a mistrial following allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the defendant’s sentences are to be served consecutively, rather than concurrently.