APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves equitable estoppel against a municipal government. In 1998, a real estate company developed a large residential subdivision just outside the defendant city. The city annexed the property and provided services to the area. The developer later became insolvent and failed to pave one of the roads in the subdivision. Subsequently, the plaintiffs purchased lots in the subdivision fronting the unpaved road and applied to the defendant city for building permits for the lots. The city denied the permits in part because the road in front of the lots was unpaved. The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action against the city, arguing that the city was estopped from denying the building permits on the basis of the unpaved roads, and that city was obligated to pave the road and to issue building permits to the plaintiffs. The trial court concluded that the city was not estopped from enforcing the requirement that the road be paved and was not obligated to pave the road. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision not to apply equitable estoppel under the circumstances of this case.

The juvenile court established child support based on a finding that the obligor was capable of earning $6 per hour. Having determined that the record before us contains no evidence to support that finding, we reverse.

This is an attempt to set aside a child support order. The child in question was born in February 2001. The mother of the child and the respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, certifying that respondent was the child’s biological father. The respondent’s sister obtained primary custody of the child and began to collect State benefits for the child. In September 2003, the State, on behalf of the sister, filed a petition against the respondent to set child support payments. An order was entered, setting current and back child support payments. Subsequently, the State filed a petition for contempt against the respondent for failing to make the child support payments required under the order. The respondent appeared at the contempt hearing and signed an order acknowledging being in contempt and agreeing to make support payments as provided. A week later, the respondent filed a petition to set aside the original support order, asserting that he was not served with process and that he is not the biological father of the child. The trial court permitted the respondent to undergo DNA testing, which showed that he was not the father of the child. On that basis, the trial court dismissed the case against the respondent. The State now appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part, concluding that the respondent is not entitled to retroactive relief from the support order, but that he is entitled to prospective relief because he submitted sufficient evidence on which to rescind his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity.

The petitioner, Jon Douglas Hall, appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without a hearing and that the judgment of conviction is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this divorce action, the parties announced a property settlement in open court which settlement was made a part of the Divorce Decree. Defendant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 Motion to Set Aside Divorce and to reopen the issue of the property settlement which the Trial Court refused. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Jermaine Hughey, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years for each aggravated robbery conviction and five years for each attempted aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered (1) that in Case No. 03-00283, the three attempted aggravated robbery sentences be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the aggravated robbery sentence, for a total sentence of sixteen years; (2) that in Case No. 03-00284, the three aggravated robbery and one attempted robbery sentences be served concurrently to each other, for a total sentence of eleven years; and (3) that the sentences in Case No. 03-00284 be served consecutively to the sentences in Case No. 03-00283, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals claiming: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the interpreter to participate in the trial, (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness’s testimony and in not allowing the defendant to cross-examine witnesses about their immigrant status, (4) that the prosecutor made improper comments about the defendant’s right to testify, (5) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on lesser included offenses, and (6) that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael E. Bunting, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine for resale, and he subsequently pled guilty to felony failure to appear. Following a joint sentencing hearing for these two convictions, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-one-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his cocaine possession conviction, and (2) a sentence of community corrections was appropriate, and his sentences were improperly enhanced in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). After a review of the record, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences are affirmed.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Henry A. Edmondson, Jr., of carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress, (3) that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on possession, and (4) that the trial court erred in sentencing him. We conclude that although the trial court erred in charging the jury on the definition of possession, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce involving the classification of property as “marital” or “separate.” The parties were married in 1986. In 1998, the wife received a substantial inheritance. She used a portion of the inheritance to pay off the mortgage on the marital home, to purchase undeveloped property adjacent to the marital home, and to purchase a vehicle. Later, the parties separated and the marital home was sold. From the proceeds of the sale, the wife received her separate contribution to the property, as well as half of the profit earned on the property. She used her proceeds to purchase another home.  The husband’s name was on the title of the new home, but he was not an obligor on the mortgage.  The parties made an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile, and subsequently filed cross petitions for divorce. They resolved all issues, except for the classification and division of certain property that was titled in both parties’ names but purchased with the wife’s inheritance. After a hearing, the trial court found that the wife did not intend to transmute any of her inheritance into marital property.  Based on this finding, the trial court determined that the parties had already equitably divided their interest in the marital property, and that there was no property left to divide. From this order, the husband now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Timothy Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately investigate the case or explain the ramifications of the plea agreement and that his guilty pleas were consequently unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Rashad K. Sanders, pled guilty to one count of introduction of marijuana into a penal institution, a Class C felony. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced him to a four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Plaintiffs purchased from two of the Defendants a home located on a two-acre parcel of land that had been part of a larger parcel. The Plaintiffs later discovered that the two-acre parcel had been illegally subdivided from the larger parcel, and they filed suit alleging breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, negligence per se, and breach of warranty of title. In addition to other damages, the Plaintiffs sought damages for emotional distress. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and awarded $170,000 as compensatory damages and an additional $5,000 as punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held, in pertinent part, that the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages for emotional distress was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions. We hold that the one-year personal injury statute of limitations does not apply to this case, and we therefore reverse that part of the intermediate court’s judgment. We affirm all other aspects of the intermediate court’s judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The defendant, Michael White, was convicted of five counts of rape and sentenced to fifty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals asserting that: (1) insufficient evidence was presented to support his convictions; and (2) the sentence imposed was excessive and contrary to law. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joel Keener, was convicted of facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, and the trial court sentenced him, as a Range II offender, to eight years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Washington County- This appeal involves the construction of a hotel in Johnson City, Tennessee. During construction, the general contractor, Barker Building Company, Inc., ("Barker Building") agreed to subordinate its lien rights to a deed of trust to be filed by First Tennessee Bank (the "Bank") related to the Bank's loaning of funds which allegedly were represented to Barker Building as being sufficient to complete construction of the hotel. In reliance on the alleged representation and in order to protect its subcontractors, Barker Building, before entering into the Subordination Agreement, also obtained a Performance Bond to assure that its subcontractors would be paid. Barker Building obtained the Performance Bond from Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America ("Travelers"). Several lawsuits were filed and the hotel's owner filed for bankruptcy protection. One of the lawsuits filed was a suit for injunctive relief filed by the Appellants in this appeal, Barker Building and Travelers, against the Appellee in this appeal, the Bank, seeking injunctive relief for various reasons after the Bank filed the Performance Bond with the Register of Deed's Office in order to bond-off subcontractors' claims. The lawsuit seeking injunctive relief was resolved in favor of the Bank by a judgment on the merits which became final several years ago. The lawsuit now on appeal involves various other claims by Barker Building and Travelers against the Bank challenging the validity of the Subordination Agreement and Performance Bond. The Trial Court ruled all claims by Barker Building and Travelers against the Bank at issue in the lawsuit now on appeal were barred by the res judicata effects of their previously completed lawsuit against the Bank seeking injunctive relief. We affirm.

I respectfully dissent. First, we must bear in mind that the sole issue for this Court is whether the trial court erred in not directing a verdict for Swift and in not granting Swift a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

This is a retaliatory discharge case. The former employee of a trucking company filed suit against the trucking company for statutory and common law retaliatory discharge, alleging that his employment was terminated due to his refusal to violate a Tennessee Department of Safety regulation that required the truck to carry an original “cab card” showing registration. The employer had directed the employee truck driver to deliver merchandise to a customer, assigning him a particular truck. The original cab card for the truck could not be found, so the employer gave the employee a photocopy of the cab card. The employee refused to drive the truck with only a photocopy, and another truck could not be located. The next day, the employee truck driver was fired. The truck driver sued the employer trucking company for retaliatory discharge, alleging that his employment was discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal activity. The Shelby County Circuit Court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the employee. We reverse, finding that the employee’s refusal to perform the assigned work based on the regulation requiring the original cab card, as opposed to a photocopy, did not further important public policy concerns, and therefore would not support a claim of retaliatory discharge.

This appeal involves a business patron who tripped over a snow-covered wheelchair ramp during a snowstorm. The patron filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that the landowner was negligent for failing to keep the ramp clear of snow or to post warnings of the presence of a wheelchair ramp concealed by the fallen snow. The landowner filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it did not have a duty to remove the snow or provide warnings of the presence of the wheelchair ramp as long as the snow was falling. The trial court granted the summary judgment, and the patron appealed. We have determined that the landowner is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because it did not owe a duty to the public to keep the wheelchair ramp clear of snow during the snowstorm or to warn persons coming onto the property of the existence of the wheelchair ramp that was concealed under several inches of snow.

The Appellant, Mozella Newson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. Following a transfer hearing, Newson, who was fourteen years old at the time of the crimes, was transferred from the juvenile court to the Shelby County Criminal Court to be tried as an adult. She subsequently pled guilty to carjacking, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which she received an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Newson argues that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that the attorney representing her during the transfer hearing was ineffective by: (1) failing to advise the juvenile court of Newson’s age; (2) failing to challenge the transfer order which stated that Newson was sixteen years old or older; (3) failing to present any favorable evidence at the transfer hearing which might have prevented her transfer; (4) failing to object to the identification procedure employed at the transfer hearing; and (5) failing to advise Newson of her right to appeal the juvenile court’s decision to transfer the case. After review, we conclude: (1) Newson’s subsequent guilty pleas waived all issues regarding guilt; and (2) Newson’s failure to prepare a complete record precludes review of her allegations of  deficient performance which resulted in her transfer to the criminal court. Accordingly, the  judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Following the untimely diagnosis of her cervical cancer, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against several doctors and the laboratory that interpreted her test results. In addition to her individual suit, the plaintiff sued on behalf of her minor son for loss of consortium. Shortly after filing the lawsuit, the plaintiff died. The executrix of her estate was substituted as a plaintiff in the case. Some of the named defendants sought to enter into a settlement with the minor, who was the only beneficiary of any proceeds to be derived from the suit. Pursuant to section 34-1-121 of the Tennessee Code, the settling parties petitioned the trial court to approve the settlement. At the hearing, the trial court excluded the non-settling defendants from participating in the hearing. The trial court subsequently entered an order approving the settlement, but the court sealed the contents of the settlement. Thereafter, the non-settling defendants moved the trial court judge to recuse herself, arguing that she could no longer impartially preside over the remainder of the case by virtue of having heard disputed facts during the ex parte settlement hearing. When the trial court denied their motion, the non-settling defendants applied for and received the trial court’s permission to seek an interlocutory appeal to this Court. We decided to grant the non-settling defendants’ application for an interlocutory appeal to address the narrow issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied the motion to recuse. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the Appellants’ motion for recusal.

Following a jury trial, defendant, William Thomas Branch, was found guilty of the offense of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to fifteen years. In his appeal, defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We took this case to address whether the child support obligation of a non-residential parent continues after the death of a residential parent when custody is awarded to another party. We conclude that a non-residential parent’s obligation to support a minor child continues until the child reaches majority, no matter who retains custody of the child. The duty of support is owed to the child and may be paid to a custodian on behalf of that child. Because parents owe child support regardless of the existence of a court order to that effect, third party custodians are entitled to retroactive child support from the date a child is legally placed in their custody. This action is affirmed as modified and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, William B. Thurlby, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of both pre-arrest and trial counsel, the State withheld evidence and failed to make an election of offenses, his due process rights were violated, and the cumulative effect of the various errors resulted in the denial of his right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Defendant was indicted for the first degree premeditated murder of Danquel R. Batey. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years confinement. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Julius E. Gunn, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.