APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Reese L. Smith Jr., was convicted of two counts of impersonating a licensed professional, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years for each count to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant seemingly contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, James Castile, was indicted with charges of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and criminal impersonation. Prior to trial, the trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence which alleged that the evidence seized as a result of a search of his person and a search of his hotel room was unconstitutional. After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, simple possession of methamphetamine and criminal impersonation. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court disregarded the simple possession conviction as a lesser-included offense of the manufacturing and possession counts and sentenced the appellant as a Range II offender to an eight-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, an eight-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and a six-month probationary sentence for criminal impersonation. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a previously imposed sentence for which the appellant was on probation from the State of Kentucky. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (3) the trial court erred by sentencing the appellant as a Range II offender and; (4) the trial court erred by ordering the sentence to be served consecutively to the Kentucky sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Millard E. Smith, the defendant, was indicted and stood trial on one count of aggravated rape. A jury convicted the defendant on the lesser included offense of rape (Class B felony). The defendant was sentenced as a repeat, violent offender to life without parole. He now appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to convict. After review, we conclude the evidence was overwhelming and affirm the judgment of conviction.

This is a petition for a common law writ of certiorari arising out of prison disciplinary proceedings.  The prison disciplinary board charged the petitioner with money laundering, a state offense. After a hearing, he was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to punitive and administrative segregation. He filed this petition for a common law writ of certiorari, challenging the board’s disciplinary decision. The writ was granted, and the record of the disciplinary proceedings was sent to the trial court for review. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment. The respondent filed a notice that it did not intend to respond to the motion, because the record had already been sent to the trial court for review. The trial court dismissed the petition on the merits without first addressing the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. The petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court was required to decide his motion for summary judgment before addressing the merits of his petition. We affirm, concluding that, under the circumstances, the trial court was under no obligation to address the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment prior to dismissing the action.

Husband appeals the action of the trial court asserting that the trial court erred in denying his pro se motion for a continuance after allowing his attorney to withdraw. He further asserts that the trial court erred in the disposition of marital property. The action of the trial court in denying a continuance and granting a divorce to Wife is affirmed. The action of the trial court on all other issues is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

In December of 2004, the petitioner pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery. On May 25, 2005, the petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. By order on June 13, 2005, the post-conviction court denied the petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals arguing that the post-conviction court should have held a hearing. The State concedes that the petitioner is correct. We agree as well. We reverse the decision of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The petitioner, Robin Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Betty Brown (“Plaintiff”) was involved in an automobile accident where her car was struck in the rear by the vehicle driven by Gary Hugo (“Defendant”). Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendant in order to recover medical expenses for injuries Plaintiff claims to have incurred as a result of the accident along with other damages. At trial, the jury found that Plaintiff was not entitled to recover from Defendant. Plaintiff appeals arguing that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by competent and credible material evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held a hearing on May 8, 2003. The court then entered an order on May 9, 2003 denying the petition. The petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal over a year and a month later on June 17, 2004. We now dismiss the petitioner’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed outside of the thirty days required under Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This appeal involves child support arrearages incurred by Ralph Edward Simpson (“Father”) over the course of many years. Following a trial, the Trial Court concluded that certain payments made directly to the child were gratuitous and should not count as a credit against Father’s child support obligation. The Trial Court also concluded that various payments made by Father to third parties for expenses incurred on the child’s behalf and which were made as expressly directed by Tracye Jenae Simpson (“Mother”) also should not count as credits against Father’s child support obligation. We affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion with respect to the money sent directly to the child. However, we conclude that the Trial Court erred in its conclusion that Father should not be given a credit for payments made to third parties for expenses related to the child and which were made by Father in accordance with the express directives of Mother. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Trial Court dismissed the case on the grounds the process issued more than one year after the issuance of the previous process was invalid. On appeal, we vacate.

We granted interlocutory review in this post-conviction capital case to clarify the procedure for determining competency to proceed in a post-conviction action. For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the civil standard for mental incompetence adopted in State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 (Tenn. 2001), applies to a competency determination during post-conviction proceedings. To trigger a hearing on competency, a petitioner must make a prima facie showing of incompetence by submission of affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence. A petitioner bears the burden of proving that he or she is incompetent by clear and convincing evidence. A finding of incompetence requires neither a stay of the post-conviction proceedings nor abeyance of individual issues. A trial court should appoint, if necessary, a “next friend” or guardian ad litem to pursue the action on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal stems from a negligence action resulting from an automobile accident. A husband and wife filed suit against the defendant alleging personal injury and property damage resulting from the defendant’s alleged negligence that caused the automobile accident involving the wife and the defendant. In addition to the wife’s claims, the husband brought claims against the defendant for loss of consortium and loss of services. Additionally, the wife’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier was served but unnamed. Both Newsom and the uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. The circuit court granted the defendant’s and the unnamed but served uninsured motorist insurance carrier’s Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. The order adjudicated the wife’s personal injury claims only. On appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the circuit court erred when it granted the defendant’s and the unnamed but served uninsured motorist insurance carrier’s Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. However, because we find that the circuit court failed to execute a final order disposing of all of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

I concur in much of the judgment and rationale of the majority opinion. I agree with the majority’s statement “that the five payments made directly to the child totaling $2,740 were gratuitous or otherwise should not be considered as a credit against Father’s child support obligation.” I also agree with the majority’s treatment of Father’s issues pertaining to (1) the trial court’s refusal to permit Father to testify regarding child support payments made by him “when he had no documentary evidence supporting the amount of those payments,” and (2) the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. However, I disagree with the majority’s judgment that Father should be granted credit against his general $60 per week child support obligation to Mother for payments made by him “at the direction of [Mother].” 

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The employee appeals the trial court’s finding that the preponderance of the
evidence failed to prove that the work accident caused the injury to her lower back. The judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Kenneth Lyle Davis, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of two years. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the Employee a 50 percent vocational disability for
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The Employer appeals asserting that the award is excessive. Thejudgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In 1985, the Petitioner, Sedley Alley, was convicted of aggravated rape, kidnapping, and first degree murder. For the capital crime of first degree murder, the jury imposed the sentence of death.  Petitioner Alley’s execution was scheduled for May 17, 2006; however, on May 16, 2006, the
Governor, upon recommendation of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, granted a fifteenday reprieve to allow the Petitioner the opportunity to petition the trial court for DNA testing of “those additional items that were not included in his 2004 petition.” On May 19, 2006, Petitioner Alley filed a petition to compel testing of evidence under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition on May 31, 2006. Our supreme court, on June 2, 2006, rescheduled Petitioner Alley’s execution for June 28, 2006. See State v. Sedley Alley, No. M1991-00019-SC-DPE-DD (Tenn., at Nashville, June 2, 2006) (order). The Petitioner sought and was granted expedited review by this Court. Upon review of the record and the responses by both parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, James B. Sanders, appeals from his conviction for third offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (D.U.I.) and from the resulting sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that a prior facially valid judgment of conviction for a previous D.U.I. was insufficient to sustain enhanced punishment when the written waiver of counsel was not introduced and the defendant testified that he was not represented by counsel. We conclude the prior certified judgment of conviction is facially valid and is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225 (e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Plaintiff has appealed the action of the trial court, which determined that the Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations and by failure to provide notice timely in accordance with the law. Upon our consideration of all of the evidence, we find that the evidence preponderates in favor of the findings of the trial court, and we affirm.

While I agree with Ford, that Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2, comment f, requires:  “To establish a prima facie case of defect, the plaintiff must prove the availability of a technologically feasible and practical alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff’s harm . . .”, unless and until Tennessee adopts Restatement (Third) of Torts on this issue, Judge Lee in my view, has correctly summarized the state of Tennessee law on this issue.  Accordingly, I concur in her Opinion in affirming the Trial Court.

While traveling on a rain-slick road at a moderate rate of speed, Betty Potter lost control of her 1997 Ford Escort which spun around and crashed into a tree. Her seat back collapsed into the rear seat and her spinal cord was severed. Betty Potter was rendered a paraplegic. She and her husband sued Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) for the enhanced injuries Ms. Potter received as a result of the collapse of her seat back. The jury found Ford to be 70% at fault, Ms. Potter to be 30% at fault, and determined Ms. Potter’s compensatory damages to be ten million dollars. Judgment was entered for Ms. Potter in the amount of seven million dollars. The primary issues Ford raises on this appeal are (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant Ford a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of intervening cause.  We hold that Ms. Potter presented material evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the Ford Escort was defective, and that the trial court correctly found the intervening cause doctrine inapplicable in a case such as this one, where the alleged intervening cause is the negligent conduct of the plaintiff. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a negligence suit arising from an automobile accident. At trial, the circuit court entered two separate orders dismissing the case. One order dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations. The other order dismissed the case for a failure to prosecute based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a previous court order awarding discretionary costs to the defendant that was granted when the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her first filing of the instant suit. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the circuit court erred when it dismissed her claims because the applicable statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to section 28-1-106 of the Tennessee Code as she was of “unsound mind.” The defendant has also asserted that the circuit court properly dismissed the case for a failure to prosecute based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order. We affirm.

This is an appeal by a minor from a decision of the Circuit Court for Marion County declaring him a delinquent based upon a finding he was guilty of aggravated arson. The sole issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of guilt of aggravated arson beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.