APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Germaine McKenzie, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offense of second degree murder. As a result of the conviction, the appellant was sentenced to twenty-four years, to be served at one hundred percent incarceration. The appellant appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Memphis Alcohol Commission denied Plaintiffs/Appellees’ Kardoush’s application for a certificate of compliance over 80 days after the application was filed, and Kardoush appealed to the chancery court. The trial court determined that, under Tennessee Code Annotated 57-3-208(e), the Memphis Alcohol Commission would have been deemed to have granted the application where the Commission had failed to either grant or deny the application within 60 days of submission. Thus, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-208(f), Kardoush was not required to submit a certificate of compliance with its application to the Tennessee Alcohol and Beverage Commission. We affirm.

Plaintiff Gloria Mastilir filed a tort action against Defendant The New Shelby Dodge arising from the Defendant’s alleged faulty repair of Plaintiff’s motor home. Plaintiff subsequently took a voluntary non-suit and later failed to refile her action within the one-year savings statute under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. As a result, the general sessions court and circuit court held that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals arguing that the lower courts erred in  not finding that Defendant was equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitation defense and also asserts that Defendant revived Plaintiff’s suit by promising to repair or pay for repairs to Plaintiffs vehicle. We affirm.

This case arises from alleged defamatory statements made by Defendants David Smith, Vanessa Smith, and Charles Pagett, Jr. against Plaintiff Dempsey Ausley. The alleged statements were made subsequent to Ausley's termination as Pastor of Parker's Chapel Missionary Baptist Church in Portland, Tennessee. Plaintiff sued the three Defendants asserting claims of slander. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's claims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) after finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims because they were too closely entangled with Plaintiff's termination as pastor, which is an ecclesiastical matter of the church. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse and remand.

This appeal involves a dispute between the surviving spouses of five disabled city employees and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County over the amount of life insurance benefits payable after the employees died. The surviving spouses filed three separate lawsuits asserting that the city had breached their spouses' employment contracts as well as its fiduciary duty and had committed fraud by concealing information and by knowingly providing false information regarding a waiver of premium benefit that would have greatly increased their death benefits. These suits were consolidated in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court granted a summary judgment dismissing all the surviving spouses' intentional tort claims because they were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The remaining breach of contract claims of three of the surviving spouses were tried to a jury, and the trial court directed a verdict for the city at the close of the plaintiffs' proof. Thereafter, the trial court granted a summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims of the other two surviving spouses. All the surviving spouses have appealed. We affirm the summary judgment orders dismissing the surviving spouses' intentional tort claims and the breach of contract claim of one surviving spouse. We reverse the directed verdict with regard to three of the remaining surviving spouses' breach of contract claims, as well as the summary judgment dismissing the other surviving spouse's breach of contract claim.

The Appellant, Israel Allen Jackson, appeals the order of the Dickson County Circuit Court revoking his suspended sentences. In November 2004, Jackson received an effective eight-year sentence, which was suspended following his guilty pleas to three counts of Class C felony sale of cocaine. The eight-year sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a two-year term of probation, stemming from a prior drug conviction which Jackson was still serving at the time of his guilty pleas. In December 2004, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Jackson had violated numerous conditions of probation. Following a revocation hearing, Jackson was found in violation of probation, and his effective eight-year suspended sentence was revoked with reinstatement of his sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his effective eight-year sentence as the sentence had not yet "begun to run." Additionally, he argues that the trial court erred in finding him in violation of probation. Finding these assertions without merit, the order of revocation is affirmed.

A Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, David Bartley Bell, of driving under the influence, third offense, and violation of the implied consent law. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing the stop was not based on reasonable suspicion. After a suppression hearing, the trial court dismissed the charges against the defendant because the arresting officer was not present to testify. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against the defendant. After our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Randall K. Bishop, was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony. A jury convicted the defendant of facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced to three years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. After careful review, we find the evidence sufficient and affirm the conviction.

This is a mother’s appeal of the termination of her parental rights to her oldest son and daughter.  Because we find that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s termination on three (3) alternative grounds and that termination is in the children’s best interest, we affirm.

The Appellant, Terrance Dwain Norton, appeals the imposition of certain conditions of work release following his commitment to the Lincoln County Jail. Norton's jail confinement stems from a revocation of probation. On appeal, Norton argues that work release conditions imposed by the Lincoln County Circuit Court are "onerous" and will impede his ability to maintain his current employment. We find this argument without merit. The sentencing decision of the trial court is affirmed.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. It is my view, however, that the trial court erred by giving the nature of circumstances definition of "knowingly" and the result of conduct definition of "intentionally" in its instructions to the jury. As indicated by the majority, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
 

Knowingly means that a person acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. The requirement of knowingly is also established if shown that the defendant acted intentionally.

Intentionally means that a person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or the result of the conduct when it's the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct.

This case involves a dispute over whether Tennessee courts have personal jurisdiction over two Michigan corporations regarding an alleged violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.  The trial court found that Tennessee had personal jurisdiction over the Michigan corporations and the corporations filed an interlocutory appeal. We find that the Tennessee Long Arm Statute provides Tennessee with personal jurisdiction over the corporations and that the decision comports with the requirements of due process; therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The petitioner, Mitchell Bowers, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1997. He appeals the denial of his post-conviction petitioner in which he asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to advise him that he was not required to testify in his own behalf at trial, and (2) failing to disclose that counsel had previously represented the victim.  Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court; therefore, we affirm.

In July of 2002, Miracle Kaa Nichols ("Wife") sued James Virgil Nichols, Jr. ("Husband") for divorce. The case was tried and a Final Decree was entered in September of 2004 awarding, inter alia, Wife a divorce, and finding and holding that the real property located at 24766 Martel Road in Lenoir City, Tennessee ("the Farm") was marital property and should be divided with each party to receive "one-half the value of the land and mobile home." Husband appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in classifying the Farm as marital property, or, in the alternative, that the Trial Court erred by failing to divide the marital estate equitably. Wife also appeals the marital property division. We affirm.

This appeal involves post-divorce criminal contempt sanctions. The former wife filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to hold her former husband in contempt for failing to pay spousal support and to maintain a life insurance policy and a club membership. The trial court determined that the former husband was guilty of eighteen separate acts of criminal contempt and sentenced him to 180 days in jail. After the former husband appealed the contempt sanction, the trial court stayed its order pending appeal. We have determined that the former wife failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her former husband had willfully failed to pay spousal support or to discharge his other financial obligations.

Aggrieved of the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition because the petitioner did not pay the court costs due upon filing the petition. The state has filed a response, conceding that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for failure to pay a filing fee. However, we disagree and affirm the order of dismissal.

The petitioner, Torris Benson, was convicted in 1987 of robbery and aggravated assault and sentenced to life in prison as a habitual criminal. In a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed his habitual criminal sentence is illegal and void because the prior judgments on which the sentence was based were unsigned. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal.

The Appellant, Terrance Dwain Norton, appeals the imposition of certain conditions of work release following his commitment to the Lincoln County Jail. Norton's jail confinement stems from a revocation of probation. On appeal, Norton argues that work release conditions imposed by the Lincoln County Circuit Court are "onerous" and will impede his ability to maintain his current employment. We find this argument without merit. The sentencing decision of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Young Bok Song, a/k/a Mike, was convicted by a jury of seven counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective sentence of sixty-five years, to be served at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by: (1) not appointing an interpreter; (2) not providing the defendant with a copy of a forensic interview tape; (3) allowing the State to ask the defendant numerous argumentative questions; and (4) not granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Shawn Peele, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court.  Peele pled guilty to facilitating aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to three years incarceration. On appeal, Peele argues that the trial court erred in denying a suspended sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal as of right from convictions on a jury verdict for burglary and theft of property. The Defendant, Jeffrey Lee Scales, was sentenced to concurrent sentences of four years for his Class D felony burglary conviction and two years for his Class E felony theft conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues only one issue: there is insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the two offenses for which he was convicted. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Alan E. Monday, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for reckless homicide, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney advised him not to testify and failed to call a favorable witness. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court denied the State’s petition for child support and retroactive child support for Respondent/Father’s two minor children. We reverse.

The petitioner, Wayne Michael Fuller, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief. His post-conviction petition attacked his 1998 guilty-pleaded convictions and sentence for seven counts of statutory rape and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The petitioner received maximum two-year sentences for each statutory rape conviction and 11 months, 29 days for the contributing to the delinquency of a minor conviction. The court ordered five of the statutory rape sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years. The post-conviction petition, amended on multiple occasions, alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and violations of Blakely v. Washington and of the petitioner's right against self-incrimination. The post-conviction court denied relief, and we affirm.

The appellant, William A. Hawkins, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's evidentiary rulings, and the jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the correct date of the judgment.