APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal by the trial court of his action under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act challenging the calculation of his prison sentence. Holding that his petition to review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County was untimely under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(b)(1), the trial court dismissed the action. We affirm the trial court.

The state appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court's suppression of statements made by the defendant at the defendant's second sentencing hearing. It claims that despite its failure during discovery to give the defendant notice of his statements, the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing the state's evidence, which it contends is the most drastic measure available and should only be employed when no other appropriate remedy exists. The state argues that granting the defendant a continuance would have been an appropriate remedy. We conclude the trial court erred in suppressing the statements and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, William Chase, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the post-conviction court erred by concluding that it was without jurisdiction to consider the petition, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.

This appeal involves an action brought by Lieutenant Stace Thompson of the City of LaVergne Police Department under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Lt. Thompson alleged he was demoted as a result of investigating the alleged sexual harassment of a police officer within the department by the administrative assistant to the Chief of Police. After a trial by jury, judgment was rendered in favor of Lt. Thompson in the amount of $300,000.00 for embarrassment and humiliation and $4,000.00 for loss of benefits. The City of LaVergne has appealed. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Robert Roysden, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Sheriff of Lawrence County filed an application in the circuit court pursuant to section 8-20-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code seeking, among other things, funding for new vehicles, an additional administrative assistant for his investigators, two additional corrections officers for his jail, and increased salaries for his employees. The trial court granted the sheriff additional funding for these items. Regarding the salary increases, the trial court ordered that they be retroactive to the beginning of the prior fiscal year. The county appealed the trial court's decision regarding the aforementioned items to this Court. We reverse in part and affirm in part the decisions of the trial court.

There is no question the Board could sanction Ms. Robertson for her undisputed violation of the ethical rules of conduct. While the severity of the sanction may appear disproportionate to the violation itself in view of all the circumstances, courts will generally refrain from reviewing the relation of a sanction to the violation, as long as it is within the range of authorized sanctions.

Aggrieved of the Davidson County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation, the defendant, James Edward Long, appeals. He presents two issues on appeal: (1) whether the state adequately informed the defendant of the factual basis for the revocation and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the order of the Criminal Court.

The Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure appeals from the decision of the ChanceryCourt to set aside its disciplinary ruling revoking a licensed clinical social worker’s license for two years for engaging in a dual relationship with a client. The Chancellor set aside the Board’s ruling on the grounds the sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion and were arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and reinstate the Board’s order of revocation.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in awarding $12,360 in temporary total disability benefits for the period between April 5, 2000, and September 19, 2000. We conclude that the evidence presented more appropriately supported a finding that the employee was entitled to temporary partial benefits in the amount awarded by the chancellor and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court as so modified.

The petitioner, Randolph Jennings, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentence of seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) his trial counsel failed to raise the issue that the state suppressed favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); (2) his trial counsel failed to explain his constitutional right to testify pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999); and (3) his appellate counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court in a timely manner. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, grant a delayed appeal, and stay further proceedings pending the delayed appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the grant as to defendants Blue and Vista Radiology, arguing the Trial Court erred in granting judgment on grounds that the statute of limitation had run. We vacate and remand.

In this action against the County, which sold plaintiff’s properties at a back tax sale, plaintiff charges sheriff failed to comply with process statutes before returning the process “not to be found” and county improperly relied on publication to give notice to plaintiff. The Trial Court held sheriff exercised due diligence and constructive notice was proper. On appeal, we reverse.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, employee, argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the employee was 100% permanently partially disabled and seeks an award of permanent total disability benefits. The appellees, the employer and the Second Injury Fund, argue that the trial court was correct in finding that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled. For the reasons stated below, the panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed as modified.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Tom Anderson, of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon and animal cruelty. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of one year for the reckless endangerment conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the animal cruelty conviction. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve forty-five days in confinement on consecutive weekends and the remainder of his sentences on probation. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to testify about two prior incidents in which the victim's dog acted aggressively. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Eastman Chemical Company ("Eastman") and Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc. ("Cryotech") entered into an agreement whereby Cryotech would purchase non-food grade feedgas from Eastman which was roughly 78% carbon dioxide ("CO2"). Cryotech then would purify the feedgas and sell it as food grade CO2. Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc. ("Messer") purchased the CO2 from Cryotech. Messer in turn sold the CO2 to soft drink manufacturers. The CO2 sold to Messer was contaminated with cyanide and resulted in property damage to Messer and Messer's customers. In the third appeal arising from this litigation, we must determine whether the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Eastman on Messer's claims for breach of warranty, products liability, and negligence, and whether the Trial Court properly refused to allow Messer to amend its complaint to assert a claim for negligence per se. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, John Whittington, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be suspended to probation after the service of 120 days of confinement. As part of the plea agreement, the
defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The stated question is "whether belching during the [twenty] minute observation period invalidated the results of the breath test." The judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Germaine McKenzie, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offense of second degree murder. As a result of the conviction, the appellant was sentenced to twenty-four years, to be served at one hundred percent incarceration. The appellant appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Patricia Ann Starkey, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but seven days suspended. As a condition of her guilty plea, she sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the trial court erred in denying the evidence obtained as the result of her allegedly unlawful arrest. However, upon review of the record, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly preserve a question of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights to her three children. Mother suffers from a cocaine addiction. She has had numerous opportunities for rehabilitation but failed to stay drug-free. At the time of trial, the children had been in foster care for two years during which time Mother only exercised token visitation. The juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, and substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan. We affirm.

The petitioner, Waldo Wiggins, Jr., was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court of first degree murder. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court denied both petitions, and the petitioner now appeals.  Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Lucille Richardson, with the trial court’s permission, filed an interlocutory appeal, and, pursuant to the appellant’s Rule 9 application, this Court agreed to review the appellant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of pretrial diversion. After reviewing the record as a whole, we
conclude that the trial court erred in denying pretrial diversion. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Malinda L. Mason, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fifth offense, and sentenced to twenty-one months in the county workhouse as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant's sole issue on appeal challenges the trial court's denial of her request for a mistrial. When this case was originally before this court, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Subsequently, Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court. On August 22, 2005, the supreme court granted the application and remanded to this Court for reconsideration in light of Walsh v. State, 166 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2005). After reviewing this case in light of Walsh, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the circuit court erred when it granted a defendant doctor’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff asserts, as she did at trial, that there was a genuine issue of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The plaintiff filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm.

This appeal involves the enforceability of the parties' oral settlement agreement. The parties, who were next-door neighbors, were involved in a lawsuit over their common boundary line. The parties appeared for depositions, but before depositions commenced, they allegedly reached a settlement and cancelled the depositions. A dispute later arose as to whether there had been a settlement of all issues in the case; the Defendants filed a motion seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs responded that there was no enforceable contract because there had been an agreement as to some, but not all, of the issues in the case. The trial court determined that there had been a settlement agreement as to all issues and ordered enforcement of the agreement. After careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the parties had an enforceable agreement to settle all claims. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.