APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Donald E. Smith had suffered a number of injuries prior to and after his employment with Fleeman’s Transport, Inc., but none of these incidents resulted in a disability impairment rating or job restrictions. On November 9, 2000, Mr. Smith suffered a work-related accident which caused him to be permanently and totally disabled.  The trial court determined that Mr. Smith reached maximum medical improvement from his injuries on October 23, 2003, and based on the court’s assessments of prior work injuries, apportioned the award of workers’ compensation for the November 9, 2000 injury to both the employer and the State Second Injury Fund. Fleeman’s appeal contends that the trial court erred in assigning the date of maximum medical improvement past the date of the employee’s actual maximum recovery. The Second Injury Fund appeal contends that the trial court erred in assigning it any liability because the employer failed to establish actual knowledge of a prior disability. We find that the proof fails to preponderate against the judgment of the trial court on the date of maximum medical improvement and affirm this portion of the trial court’s decision. We also find that Fleeman’s Transport, Inc. did not establish actual knowledge of disability required for assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund.  Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s apportionment of liability for this work-related injury and modify that determination and assign all responsibility and liability for this work-related injury to Fleeman’s Transport, Inc.

The Defendant, Denny Finney, pled guilty to misdemeanor simple possession of a schedule VI substance, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended, except for six months to serve in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's sentence.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and consecutive nature of his sentences on three counts of sexual battery. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the enhanced sentences were justified based upon the defendant's prior criminal behavior; (2) the mitigating factors, even if applied, would not have lessened the enhanced sentence; and (3) the defendant's consecutive sentence was proper based upon the predatory nature of his conduct and the residual psychological effects incurred by the minor victim. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Dickey L. Cotton, appeals the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his Pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court and the district attorney general erred in failing to comply with the Post Conviction Procedure Act, which caused him prejudice. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

I agree that if the allegations and assertions contained in the petition are correct, the Defendant’s sentences appear to be in direct contravention to Tennessee’s sentencing act and are therefore illegal and void. However, because the Defendant’s habeas corpus petition was summarily dismissed without a hearing, I would remand the case to the habeas court for a determination of whether the sentences are indeed void.

The Defendant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted for one count of stalking his former wife, Kimberly McClinsey. The Defendant subsequently submitted an application for pretrial diversion on this charge, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion. The Defendant sought review by the trial court, and the trial court found no abuse of discretion by the district attorney general. The Defendant now appeals from the trial court’s ruling. Finding that the district attorney general abused his discretion in analyzing the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration.

The defendant, Jeffery Scott Sherrill, pleaded guilty to second degree murder. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve a 25-year sentence as a Range I violent offender. Aggrieved of his sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging his sentence as excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel and that the trial court erred by charging the jury with reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The mother has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application for an extraordinary appeal from an ex parte Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order entered by the Chancery Court for Lawrence County on September 6, 2005. The mother asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because it had transferred the case to the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2001. The father now agrees that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. We grant the application for an extraordinary appeal and vacate the Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order.

The Petitioner, Xavier S. Todd, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner is statutorily prohibited from seeking state habeas corpus relief as he is in federal custody and is being restrained under an order of a federal court. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., was indicted for second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to seventeen years in confinement. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the sequential jury instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter are unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by failing to consider all mitigating factors; and (4) the State committed Brady violations with regard to a witness.  Upon review, we find no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

This is a petition to modify alimony. The divorce decree required that the husband pay the wife alimony of $1,500 per month for ten years or until she remarries. The husband filed this petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that there had been a material change in circumstances. The wife maintained that the alimony award was alimony in solido and, therefore, not subject to modification. The husband filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the alimony award was modifiable. The trial court held that the alimony award was alimony in solido, not subject to modification. From that order, husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the award was alimony in futuro and, therefore, subject to modification.

The defendant, Darnell Lavelle Welch, was indicted for premeditated first degree murder. A jury convicted the defendant as charged, and he was sentenced to life in prison. The defendant now appeals his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction in two
respects: (1) that self-defense was not rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that premeditation was not proven. Upon review, we conclude that the jury was justified in rejecting self-defense and in finding that the defendant acted with premeditation in killing the victim. Therefore,
the defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

The petitioner, Aaron T. Burton, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a Department of Correction term of ten years as a Range I offender, the defendant, Bobby Shane Hurley, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the severity of his sentence, and the failure of the trial court to grant a sentencing alternative to incarceration.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court

The defendant, Eric Rice, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and applied for judicial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. The trial court denied the application for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant as a standard offender. On
appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Darrell Toomes, was convicted of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to seven years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Capital Defendant, Robert Hood, appeals as of right his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death resulting from the 2001 murder of Toni Banks. A Shelby County grand jury charged the defendant by indictment with one count of felony murder, one count of premeditated murder, two counts of misdemeanor theft of property, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. On May 6, 2004, a Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of both counts of homicide and guilty as to both counts of misdemeanor theft. The jury acquitted the defendant on both counts of aggravated kidnapping. After a separate sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, that the defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony offense. The jury further determined that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. The defendant appeals presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s request to proceed pro se, (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit defense counsel to withdraw, (3) whether the presence of uniformed detention response team members sitting on either side of the defendant throughout trial was prejudicial error, (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of premeditated murder, (5) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence involving prior bad acts of the defendant, (6) whether the trial court’s instruction that the defendant’s prior offenses were offenses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution, (7) whether the death penalty imposed in this case violated due process because the indictment failed to allege the aggravators relied upon by the state, and (8) whether Tennessee’s
death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence of death.

This appeal arises from a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant, a police officer, accidently discharged his gun while standing behind the plaintiff, startling the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the defendant was immune from suit pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-310(b) (2000). The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that section 29-20-205(2), which retained immunity for governmental entities for the "infliction of mental anguish" caused by its employee applied to both negligent, as well as intentional infliction of mental anguish. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendant.

The juvenile court granted Appellee’s Rule 60.02 Motion to vacate its prior order of legitimation.  We reverse.

This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the husband argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable division of the marital estate. Specifically, the husband challenges the trial court’s treatment of certain real property as the wife’s separate property, and he challenges the valuation placed on their vehicles. Finding the appeal meritorious, we reverse and remand for a new division of the marital estate.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Christopher Lynn Hoosier, of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of twenty years for the cocaine conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor convictions. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in sentencing him by finding enhancement factors that were not submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt and by failing to apply a factor in mitigation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree as to the rights Dr. Russell had with regard to notice of non-renewal.

Plaintiff, a college professor, appeals the dismissal of her breach of employment contract action upon
summary judgment. She was employed by Meharry Medical College for thirty-three (33) years but was not tenured because the tenure program, adopted in 1984, was never implemented. She is seeking entitlement to formal tenure, or de facto tenure. She also seeks damages, claiming she was entitled to but did not receive twelve (12) months notice her contract of employment would not be renewed. The trial court found plaintiff had not attained de facto tenure and had waived her claim for tenure. It also held plaintiff’s employment contract entitled her to six (6) months notice her employment would not be renewed and she received the requisite notice. We affirm.