APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jeffery Allen Hopkins, appeals his Tipton County convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, arising from the December 20, 2003 shooting death of Ricky Lumpkin. The defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction and 20 years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support these convictions. Unpersuaded that the state’s evidence was legally insufficient, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The trial court found the defendant, Michael N. Smith, guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an investigatory stop. Following our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Wayne E. Mitchell, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Antowan Antonio Williams, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated robbery. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a 2.7 year probationary sentence as a mitigated offender but denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion. The defendant now brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court's denial of judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Shane Holt, pled guilty to three counts of money laundering and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three concurrent terms of eight years. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were constitutionally infirm and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his pleas. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Rodney Buford, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for especially aggravated burglary and six years for aggravated burglary for an effective thirty-one year sentence. On appeal, Buford argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars; and (2) that his sentences are excessive, and the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences.

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mr. Hopper injured his back February 19, 1996 while working in the warehouse of his employer. On November 17, 1997 Mr. Hopper settled this claim for 20% vocational disability. All told, Mr. Hopper initiated four workers’ compensation claims during his employment with OshKosh resulting in 100% vocational disability. Several years later, after he lost his job with OshKosh, Mr. Hopper filed a motion to reconsider his earlier settlement of the February 19, 1996 claim against the Second Injury Fund only. The trial court granted this relief, increased Mr. Hopper’s vocational disability by 30%, and assigned liability to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals on the grounds that the employee’s motion was untimely, that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the employee had suffered subsequent injuries, and that the evidence preponderated against increasing the employee’s vocational disability. After carefully reviewing the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a jury conviction of aggravated rape and criminal exposure of another to HIV. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-five years and six years, for an effective sentence of thirty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant raises only one issue: there is insufficient evidence to find him guilty of the two offenses for which he was convicted. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Originally indicted for second degree murder, Defendant, Jermaine Nelson, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve ten (10) years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a Range II offender. We agree, and affirm the conviction, but reverse the sentence and remand for an amended judgment imposing a Range I sentence of six (6) years.

The defendant, John Thomas Bingham, was convicted by jury of possession of contraband (marijuana) in a penal institution, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years six months for this conviction. The trial court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Maurice Garrett, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Garrett argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mr. Hopper injured his back February 19, 1996 while working in the warehouse of his employer. On November 17, 1997 Mr. Hopper settled this claim for 20% vocational disability. All told, Mr. Hopper initiated four workers’ compensation claims during his employment with OshKosh resulting in 100% vocational disability. Several years later, after he lost his job with OshKosh, Mr. Hopper filed a motion to reconsider his earlier settlement of the February 19, 1996 claim against the Second Injury Fund only. The trial court granted this relief, increased Mr. Hopper’s vocational disability by 30%, and assigned liability to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals on the grounds that the employee’s motion was untimely, that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the employee had suffered subsequent injuries, and that the evidence preponderated against increasing the employee’s vocational disability. After carefully reviewing the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Richard A. Childress, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant does not challenge the length of his sentence. In this appeal,
Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated robbery; (2) that the indictment fails to state an offense; and (3) that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged offense occurred prior to the return of the indictment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Montea Wilson, aka Marcus Floyd, was convicted by a jury of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery in 2000. The jury sentenced the petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, and the trial court merged the
attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction. This Court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Montea Wilson, No. W2000-00748-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 925255 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 4, 2002). The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things. The petition was amended by counsel. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court refused to let the petitioner’s attorney question trial counsel about his requests for jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, determining that the issue was waived or previously determined. At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the post-conviction court improperly concluded that several of the petitioner’s issues were waived or previously determined, denying the petitioner a full and fair hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we remand the matter for a full and fair hearing on the issues presented in the post-conviction petition.

Ford vehicles leased by its dealers are simultaneously purchased by Ford Credit, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company. Ford Credit is subject to a franchise tax which is determined by the book value of its tangible personal property owned or used in Tennessee. If the leased vehicles are finished goods inventory, their value is excluded from the calculation of franchise taxes. The trial court ruled that the leased vehicles were not held by Ford Credit for sale, and thus did not qualify as finished goods inventory. Ford Credit appeals. The judgment is affirmed.

Aggrieved of her convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver and of simple possession of marijuana, the defendant, Gloria A. Porter, appeals. Because we have determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for dismissal of the charges.

This is a defamation case. After listening to a local talk radio show, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants, asserting that the defendants had broadcast defamatory material on the radio show concerning the plaintiffs’ business practices. There was no recording of the talk radio show. In a bench trial, many witnesses testified about statements made on the show. After the trial, the trial court found that there were so many different versions, there was no way to determine what was actually said on the radio program. The trial court concluded that, assuming unflattering statements were made, they did not damage the plaintiffs’ reputations. The trial court also concluded that, even if the statements made were defamatory, the plaintiffs did not prove any injury. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

The defendant, James Rowe Hudson, was declared a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender in Carroll County by default judgment. Several weeks later, he was charged in Henry County with driving while a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616(a).  The defendant then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in Carroll County to set aside the original order. The motion was denied. Ultimately, the defendant was convicted in Henry County and received a Range I, two-year sentence. In this appeal of right, the following issues have been presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court of Carroll County properly denied the motion to set aside the order declaring the defendant to be a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction in Henry County for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act; and (3) whether the trial court of Henry County imposed an excessive sentence. The judgment of the Carroll County Circuit Court denying the defendant's motion to set aside the order declaring him to be a Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender is reversed and the order is set aside. Because the conviction in Henry County is based upon the Carroll County order, the conviction must be reversed and the charge dismissed.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and consecutive nature of his sentences on three counts of sexual battery. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the enhanced sentences were justified based upon the defendant's prior criminal behavior; (2) the mitigating factors, even if applied, would not have lessened the enhanced sentence; and (3) the defendant's consecutive sentence was proper based upon the predatory nature of his conduct and the residual psychological effects incurred by the minor victim. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The defendant, Edward M. Patterson, pled nolo contendere to possession of drug paraphernalia and criminal trespass and received respective sentences of sixty and thirty days, both suspended. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law as to whether there was adequate reasonable suspicion to support a seizure of his person. Because we find the certified question is not dispositive of the charges, we dismiss the appeal.

This is the third action between Stanley Morrison and Citizen State Bank concerning a series of promissory notes and security agreements. In the first action, Citizen State Bank filed a civil warrant in General Sessions Court against Stanley Morrison to recover a deficiency judgment and repossess a truck that was collateral on a series of loans. The bank obtained a default judgment against Morrison and repossessed the truck when Morrison failed to appear in court. Morrison failed to timely appeal the default judgment. Thereafter, Morrison and his wife filed this action challenging the validity of the default judgment and seeking damages for fraud, misrepresentation, and conversion of property, contending four of six promissory notes and security agreements that the judgment was based upon were forgeries. The trial court held this action was barred by res judicata and dismissed it on summary judgment. We affirm the dismissal of this action on the basis of collateral estoppel.

The insurer of a general construction contractor brought an action for a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the contractor against the claims raised against the contractor in a demand for arbitration. The Chancery Court for Sumner County, Tennessee, Judge Tom E. Gray, granted summary judgment to the contractor, holding that the insurer, as a matter of law, had a duty to defend the contractor in the arbitration. The court reserved ruling on whether the insurer had a duty to indemnify the contractor for damages paid as a result of the arbitration settlement until after the arbitration proceeding. This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

This case is before the court upon the entire record including the Order of Referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dianna Gail Thompson suffered a work-related injury to her back and neck as a result of her attempt to move a wooden pallet during the course and scope of her employment as a relief operator. Ms. Thompson promptly reported her injury to her supervisor and sought medical care. The treating physician concluded that Ms. Thompson had a strained back and found no permanent impairment. Ms. Thompson thereafter sought other physicians who treated her condition. Thereafter a doctor performing an independent medical evaluation, assigned a 5% impairment to the body as a whole for her back injury. The trial court, in determining whether the employee’s injury was permanent, considered this conflicting medical testimony and after evaluating that medical testimony, awarded Ms. Thompson a 12.5% permanent impairment to the body as a whole and the benefits associated therewith. The employer in this appeal contends that the trial court erred in accrediting the independent medical evaluation over that of the treating physician’s evaluation of Ms. Thompson’s injury. The employer also contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the employer to pay 6.4 weeks of temporary total disability based on records submitted after the proof had closed. Therefore, this appeal is limited to whether the trial court’s award of permanent partial disability benefits was excessive and whether the award of 6.4 weeks of temporary total disability benefits was based on sufficient proof. After carefully considering the record, we affirm the trial court’s determination of 12.5% permanent partial disability and reverse the trial court’s award of 6.4 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, finding that the trial court impermissibly reopened proof and accepted inadequate evidence for a finding of temporary total disability award. We, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s determination.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prison inmate. The petitioner prisoner was found guilty on the charge of “failure to participate” in work as instructed by a prison official. He lost his prison job and was sentenced to a brief period of segregation and a $5.00 fine. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court, naming as respondents the warden and the disciplinary board. The trial court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner now appeals. We reverse and remand to the trial court for issuance of the writ.