APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The state appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s order suppressing drug-related evidence seized from the home of the defendant, Billy Dewayne Walker, pursuant to a search warrant. The state contends that the trial court erred in finding that the information contained in the affidavit accompanying the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. We agree and reverse the trial court’s ruling.

The defendant, Christopher Kirkendall, was convicted of facilitation of attempted second degree murder and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but modified the sentences, holding that enhancement factors (3), (10), and (21) were applied in violation of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The state filed an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The supreme court granted the state's application and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration as a result of its opinion in State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, ___S.W.3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2005). Based upon the Gomez decision, the judgments of the trial court must be affirmed.

The petitioner, William P. Livingston, Jr., appeals the dismissal by the Hamblen County Criminal Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. After review of the record, we affirm.

Purchasers of real property filed suit for breach of contract, negligence per se, intentional misrepresentation, breach of warranty of title, and emotional distress against various parties, alleging that purchasers had purchased the subject property in reliance upon misrepresentations by defendants as to the merchantability of title to the property, only to discover later that the property had been illegally subdivided by defendants. Purchasers contended that they suffered catastrophic pecuniary and other loss as result of alleged misrepresentations, due to extremely limited legal uses that could be made of illegally subdivided parcel. At trial, jury found that each of the defendants had committed intentional misrepresentation, and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $170,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. Defendants appeal on numerous grounds. Finding that the trial court erred, we vacate and remand.

The petitioner challenges the denial of his habeas corpus petition, in which he contended that his absence from voir dire violated his constitutional rights and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) because he did not personally waive the right to be present. We initially note that, at the time of the petitioner's trial, a personal waiver of the right was not required. We conclude that there is no jurisdictional defect apparent from the record. Therefore, we affirm the denial of habeas relief.

The petitioner, Walter Earl Preston, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his sentences are illegal, thereby rendering his judgments of conviction void. We affirm the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Eddie Hatchett, of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient because the state failed to negate his claim of self-defense. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Brian Carl Lev, appeals the denial of judicial diversion following his guilty pleas to two counts of statutory rape. After review, we reverse the sentencing decision of the trial court and remand for deferment of the proceedings as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (2003).

This is a direct appeal of the sentence imposed for an aggravated sexual battery conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). He now challenges his
sentence, raising three issues: 1) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a witness at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing who had not been sequestered during prior testimony, 2) the trial court erred in applying one enhancement factor because it was also an element of the offense, and 3) the sentence was improperly enhanced in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Giles County Jury convicted the Petitioner, Kendrick F. Love, of multiple felony cocaine offenses, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, James T. Brackins, pled guilty to robbery. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant received a six (6) year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve the sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Demarcus O'Shea Walker, pled guilty to various offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years, which it ordered the Defendant to serve on probation. While the Defendant was on probation, a probation violation report was filed and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered that the Defendant serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Appellant, Donald Wayne Joiner, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court following revocation of probation. In July 2001 and July 2002, Joiner was convicted of multiple felony and misdemeanor offenses, resulting in an effective thirteen-year sentence in confinement with the Department of Correction. On October 28, 2003, while still an inmate in the Sullivan County Jail, Joiner escaped from confinement. At the time of Joiner's escape, in addition to the thirteen-year sentence, he was also under an effective eighteen-year suspended sentence, which was imposed consecutively to the thirteen-year sentence of confinement. Based upon Joiner's escape, his eighteen-year suspended sentence was revoked. On appeal, Joiner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering confinement of the eighteen-year sentence instead of reinstating his probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of this case. I have very little dispute, if any, with the law as set forth in the majority’s Opinion.  Likewise, I have no dispute with the majority’s statement that “[t]he determinative issue, as we perceive it, is whether the action was correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.” I, however, respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of the law to the facts of this case.

Alma Edna Smith ("Wife") sued Don Edward Smith ("Husband") for divorce. The Trial Court entered its Final Decree on July 20, 2004, finding and holding, in part, that both parties were entitled to a divorce and that Wife was to be awarded various items of personal property and the marital home with Husband to assume the indebtedness on this property. Husband received two other parcels of real property and certain items of personal property. Husband appeals the division of property. We modify the Trial Court's property division in this short duration marriage as it concerns the marital home, and we affirm as so modified.

This is an action to enforce a foreign judgment. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. Because the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants was proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified to clarify that the dismissal is without prejudice.

The Appellant, John A. Judkins, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the DeKalb County Criminal Court following termination of his judicial diversion. Judkins was indicted for aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property and was granted judicial diversion and placed on supervised probation for a period of three years. Simultaneously with the entry of an order of judicial diversion, a negotiated plea agreement was presented and approved by the court to the indicted offenses which provided that Judkins would receive two three-year sentences and one eleven month and twenty-nine day suspended sentence for the three crimes. The agreement further provided for concurrent sentences to be served on "straight probation." A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued alleging that Judkins had committed additional offenses. Following termination of judicial diversion, in the absence of a sentencing hearing, Judkins was sentenced to three years confinement in the Department of Correction. Judkins argues on appeal that the trial court erred by not imposing the effective three-year sentence of "straight probation" as provided in the plea agreement. After review, we conclude that the Sentencing Act does not contemplate the coexistent grant of judicial diversion and service of a sentence imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement as the two are inconsistent in purpose. Accordingly, the trial court's consideration of the terms of the plea agreement in the sentencing decision was error. The case is, therefore, remanded to the trial court for a sentencing hearing.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order designating Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father less than equal parenting time. We affirm.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court's suppression of various statements allegedly made by the defendant, Michael D. Street. At the suppression hearing, the trial court excluded the statements based solely upon the fact that the State failed to comply with discovery Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring notice to the defendant. The trial court did not reach the constitutionality of the statements or otherwise recite its reasoning for admission of some statements and exclusion of others. In consequence, we remand this matter to the trial court for further consideration and additional findings.

The petitioner, Kelvin A. Lee, appeals pro se from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief without a hearing. Specifically, he alleges that he was improperly transferred from juvenile to criminal court and that the trial court failed to comply with the terms of his plea agreement. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner has not presented any claims that justify habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of his petition.

Appellant, Mitchell D. Strong, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humphreys County Circuit Court following the revocation of his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This court granted Defendant’s petition to rehear to consider the impact of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) on Defendant’s sentence. Since that time, the Tennessee Supreme Court has considered the impact of Blakely on Tennessee’s sentencing scheme and concluded that the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989and its procedures do not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a jury as described in Blakely. See State v. Edwin Gomez, ____ S.W.3d _____, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 WL 856848, at *22 (Tenn. Apr. 15. 2005). In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gomez, this court determines that Defendant’s argument that his sentence is improper under Blakely has no merit. This court’s previous opinion is affirmed in all respects. Costs are assessed against the State.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to fifteen years for the cocaine conviction and three years for the marijuana conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The Defendant argues two issues on appeal: 1) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty on both charges, and 2) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief, specifically contending that trial counsel was ineffective in guaranteeing that he would be sentenced to a boot camp program when he was statutorily ineligible for it. Upon review, we agree with the post-conviction court that counsel did not guarantee boot camp but stated that it was a possibility, based upon the judge’s recommendation that the petitioner be admitted to the program. Moreover, the petitioner’s responses during the plea colloquy indicated that the petitioner understood the charges he pled to and the nature and consequences of his pleas. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Christopher T. Starnes, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of ten years with one year to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on intensive probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's revocation of his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.