APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to fifteen years for the cocaine conviction and three years for the marijuana conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The Defendant argues two issues on appeal: 1) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty on both charges, and 2) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief, specifically contending that trial counsel was ineffective in guaranteeing that he would be sentenced to a boot camp program when he was statutorily ineligible for it. Upon review, we agree with the post-conviction court that counsel did not guarantee boot camp but stated that it was a possibility, based upon the judge’s recommendation that the petitioner be admitted to the program. Moreover, the petitioner’s responses during the plea colloquy indicated that the petitioner understood the charges he pled to and the nature and consequences of his pleas. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Christopher T. Starnes, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of ten years with one year to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on intensive probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's revocation of his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a petition to establish visitation filed by the paternal grandparents on behalf of themselves and the father of the minor child. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order wherein it found that the grandparents had failed to establish the statutory requirements for grandparent visitation. The juvenile court granted the father shared parenting time. However, the order provided that, if the father was unable to exercise his visitation for one full month due to his service in the military, the grandparents were granted the power to exercise the father’s visitation for the last full weekend of any such calendar month. From this order, the mother appeals. For reasons stated herein, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the judgment of the juvenile court.

The defendant, Christopher Lance Shockley, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to eight years at 100% on each count and ordered that two of the sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the record supports the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition, contending that: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas; and (2) the judgments and sentences violated his right to due process. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner's classification as a multiple rapist is an operation of law and does not require any notice to the petitioner or any further proceedings post-trial. As such, the convictions and sentences are not void, and we affirm the denial of habeas relief.

The appellant, Stephen Anthony Scott, has filed a petition for rehearing, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to have this Court reconsider its opinion previously filed in this case on June 7, 2005. Specifically, the appellant urges this Court to revisit its ruling that
the trial court properly applied sentence enhancement to count seven of his convictions. In his petition, the appellant contends that this Court misconstrued or “overlooked” his argument, though he admits that his argument was inartfully drawn in his appellate brief, stating, “the issue is not as precisely stated as it should have been.”

The defendant, Julio Cesar Hernandez Salinas, was convicted of conspiracy to deliver more than 70 but less than 300 pounds of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress on the basis that he lacked standing; (2) not allowing defense counsel, during voir dire, to ask prospective jurors about their involvement in religious and social organizations; (3) permitting the State to question a trial witness as to the defendant's prior bad acts; and (4) imposing a sentence of eleven years. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Avis N. Neal, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He seeks relief from his jury conviction for rape of a child and resulting sentence of twenty years in confinement. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a legal malpractice case. The plaintiff sued his former lawyer, claiming the lawyer was negligent in his representation of the plaintiff in a case involving alleged racial discrimination. Upon our finding that the defendant supported his motion for summary judgment with expert proof that he did not violate the applicable standard of care in his representation of the plaintiff and our further finding that the plaintiff submitted no expert proof that the defendant did violate the applicable standard of care, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted by the Carter County Grand Jury for two (2) counts of third offense DUI and one (1) count driving on a revoked license. The defendant filed a motion to suppress which was denied by the trial court. The defendant later agreed to a guilty plea subject to a certified question of law. The certified question, which is presented on appeal to this Court, is: whether the trial court erred by failing to hold that the defendant was unlawfully arrested without a warrant, for a misdemeanor (driving under the influence 2nd offense, and driving on a revoked license first offense), not committed in the presence of an officer, and not subject to an exception allowing warrantless arrests under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103, thereby rendering any evidence gained from such unlawful arrest inadmissible, which would result in the dismissal of the indictment. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case, and we do not have jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

On July 10, 1997, Edward A. Miller ("Father") was designated the primary residential parent for the parties minor child. Kerry L. Kelk ("Mother") was not ordered to pay any child support at that time as that order was silent on the issue of child support. No order requiring Mother to pay child support was entered until May 26, 1999. In the May 1999 order, the Trial Court refused to award Father any retroactive child support back to when he was awarded custody. The Trial Court in a later order also held Father responsible for all of the health insurance premiums covering the child from November of 1999 through March of 2002. The Trial Court held each party responsible for one-half of the health insurance premiums from that date on. We conclude that the Trial Court erred in refusing to award retroactive child support to Father for the period from when he was designated the primary residential parent up until May 26, 1999. We further conclude that the Trial Court erred by refusing to hold Mother responsible for all of the child's health insurance premiums.

We granted review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order supplementing the appellate record in the defendant's case with the transcript of co-defendant Courtney Mathews' trial. We conclude that the trial court properly supplemented the record. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We order supplementation of the appellate record with the Mathews transcript for consideration in the defendant's related Rule 11 appeal pending in this Court.

The petitioner challenges the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to call requested witnesses; and (2) failing to adequately communicate with him. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings; therefore, we affirm.

Petitioner, Miqwon Deon Leach, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to testify and that his rights under the Interstate Compact on Detainers were violated. Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance (1) by failing to follow the procedures set forth in State v. Momon; (2) by failing to object to the State’s failure to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Compact on Detainers, and (3) by failing to file a motion for a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an action by the mother of a child, in which she is joined by her husband, to terminate the parental rights, if any, of the apparent biological father of her child. Prior to the commencement of this action, a separate action was filed by the apparent biological father to establish parentage. That parentage action was tried and appealed, the result of which was a ruling that the apparent biological father was not the "legal" father of her child, TKY, that the legal father of TKY was the husband of the child's mother, and the apparent biological father had no parental rights or responsibilities. That ruling renders the issue of the apparent biological father's parental rights, or lack thereof, moot. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights as being moot.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a 14% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for a work related shoulder injury. The employer contends that the trial court erred in accepting the evaluating physician’s higher impairment rating over that of the treating physician who gave the employee a 6% permanent partial impairment rating. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Edward Johnson, was convicted of Class E felony theft, and was sentenced to serve six years imprisonment as a Range III career offender. In this appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by requiring him to go to trial in this case
after he had requested a continuance. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. However, under the particular facts of this case as set forth in the record, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by denying Defendant's request for a continuance. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

The petitioner, Roland Bennett, is currently serving a life sentence imposed in 1984. In 2001, the petitioner's counsel filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now brings this appeal challenging that action. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The husband filed for divorce after a marriage of over twenty-three years. The trial court granted the divorce to the wife on the ground of the husband's inappropriate marital conduct and divided the marital property equally between the parties. Because of the property division, and because the wife had more formal education than the husband, the court decided that she was not entitled to any alimony. The wife appealed. We modify the trial court's decree to eliminate the payment to the husband ordered as part of the property division. Because this modification serves the goal of self-sufficiency for the economically disadvantaged spouse, we affirm the denial of alimony. We also affirm the award of attorney's fees.

This appeal arises out of a divorce. The trial court awarded the mother a divorce on the stipulated ground of adultery, named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest child, named the father primary residential parent of the parties’ second oldest child by consent of the parties, set child support payments for both parties, divided the marital property, awarded mother alimony in futuro, and denied the mother’s request for attorney’s fees. The mother appeals the denial of her request for attorney’s fees, and the father cross-appeals the naming of the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest child, the child support amount set for the mother, the division of marital property, and the award of alimony in futuro. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty in case No. 03-01711 of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felony, involving victims Henry Skelton,MarkMears, and John Norris, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, involving victim Myron Raymond. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to thirty years for each aggravated robbery conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated assault conviction. Defendant was found guilty in case No. 03-01718 of one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, of Dr. Charles White, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to sixty years as a Range III, persistent offender, for this offense. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-01711 to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to his sentence in case No. 03-01718, for an effective sentence of one hundred and sixty-five years. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Defendant argues, however, that the trial court’s application of enhancement factors in determining the length of his sentences violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, and the imposition of consecutive sentencing.

The petitioner, Dustin Dwayne Davis, was convicted by a jury in 1998 of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, misdemeanor theft and two (2) counts of aggravated rape. As a result, the petitioner was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the petitioner's convictions and sentence. See State v. Dustin Dwayne Davis, No. 03C01-9712-CR-00543, 1999 WL 135054 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 15, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 1999). The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief in which he alleged, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was denied. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. Because we determine that the petitioner was afforded the effective assistance of counsel, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Raschad Donnell Simpson, pled guilty to possession of cocaine for resale. As a result of the plea agreement, the appellant was sentenced to serve eight (8) years in incarceration. During his incarceration, the appellant was accepted to and participated in a bootcamp program and on August 29, 2001 was released to probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued against the appellant alleging a violation of probation based on a new arrest and conviction. At a probation revocation hearing, the appellant pled guilty to the violation. As a result, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered him to serve the eight (8) year sentence in confinement. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the appellant's probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Elton Bowers, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.