APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this post-divorce case, Melody D. Dickson ("Mother") filed a complaint against her former husband, Roger Lee Dickson ("Father"), seeking to modify an order of the trial court awarding her $876 per month in child support. Mother sought an increase in child support and an award of her attorney's fees. In addition, Mother requested that Father be required to pay "the educational expenses of the minor children," who she had recently enrolled at a private school. Following a bench trial, the court ordered that Father's child support obligation be increased to $913.50 per month; ordered Father to pay the children's private school tuition; and ordered Father to pay Mother's attorney's fees. Father appeals. As modified, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Laranda Conner, pled guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but forty-eight hours suspended. As a
condition of her guilty plea, she sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the trial
court erred in overruling her motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test taken without her consent but pursuant to medical treatment, which allegedly constituted an illegal search and seizure. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly reserve a question of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Quentin L. Hall, pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Approximately eight years later he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. Because the facts of this case do not warrant tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

This matter finds its genesis in a divorce action filed by John D. McMahan ("Husband") against his wife, Katherine C. McMahan ("Wife"). The parties agreed to mediate their differences. At the time of the mediation, the parties ostensibly reached an agreement as to the division of their property and spousal support. Their agreement was reduced to longhand and, in that form, signed by both parties. Shortly after the mediation, Wife repudiated the writing, arguing that it was not a binding agreement because of (1) duress; (2) Wife's lack of mental capacity to enter into a contract; and (3) the parties' intention that the longhand document would be followed by a more formal document in which the parties would express their final agreement. Husband filed a motion to enforce the document in longhand form. The trial court granted Husband's motion, holding that the writing was a valid and enforceable contract. Wife appeals. Husband seeks damages for a frivolous appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but decline to award damages for a frivolous appeal.

The defendant, Jeffery Lynn Anderson was convicted by a jury of one count of burglary of a motor vehicle. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted on two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). After a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of both counts, but the trial court merged the counts into one conviction for DUI. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be suspended after serving forty-eight hours in jail. The trial court also revoked the defendant's license for one year and imposed a three hundred fifty dollar fine. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) the test results from the breath-alcohol test were inadmissible because the officer failed to observe him for the requisite twenty minutes prior to the administration of the test; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melissa Barnett, appeals the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is barred by the statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This application for an interlocutory appeal arises out of a condemnation action filed by the City of South Pittsburg. The sole issue on appeal concerns the landowners' use of an unrecorded and unapproved plat of a proposed subdivision to establish the fair market value of the property. The City filed a motion in limine to disallow the use of the plat. The trial court, relying on Davidson County Bd. of Ed. v. First Am. Nat. Bank, 202 Tenn. 9, 301 S.W.2d 905 (1957), determined that the landowners could not introduce the plat into evidence nor could their expert use the plat in his testimony to establish fair market value. The trial court subsequently granted the landowners an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that this is an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal. We also conclude that the plat may be introduced and used in ways consistent with Davidson County Bd. of Ed., and we thus vacate the trial court's order categorically prohibiting its introduction and use.

Plaintiffs driver and passenger sued the estate of deceased Defendant driver for negligent operation of his vehicle. The jury found in favor of Defendant as to both Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiff passenger appealed after the trial court denied her motion for a new trial. We affirm the decision of trial court.

The defendant, Gabrial Ayuel, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to twenty years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant raises five issues: (1) juror misconduct; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) erroneous evidentiary rulings; (4) improper disclosure of unrelated, outstanding warrants; and (5) sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we accepted this interlocutory appeal from the Chancery Court of Sumner County in which the defendant, Nashville Electric Service, seeks dismissal or, in the alternative, transfer of this workers' compensation case to Davidson County, its county of residence, on the grounds, inter alia, of sovereign immunity and the common law local venue rule. We hold that the defendant is subject to the venue provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act because it voluntarily entered into the workers' compensation system pursuant to an express grant of authority from the General Assembly, which thus effected a waiver of its sovereign immunity. We further hold that the specific venue provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act control venue and apply to the exclusion of the common law local venue rule. Accordingly, the defendant may be sued in the plaintiff's county of residence, Sumner County.

The defendant, David M. Olvera, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of life and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (3) the trial court erred in allowing an intern from the district attorney general's office to participate in reading the defendant's statement to the jury; and (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury on flight. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terry Penny, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his motion for a corrected judgment and his petition for post-conviction relief arguing his 1976 judgment should be corrected pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 and his post-conviction petition was not time- barred by the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Charles Edward Greer, was convicted of three counts of sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine and three counts of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the three convictions for delivery of cocaine into the accompanying convictions for the sale of cocaine and imposed concurrent, Range I sentences of eight years on each. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgments are affirmed.

The Appellant, Romelus Caraway, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated perjury.  On appeal, Caraway argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we conclude that the proof fails to establish that Caraway’s perjurious testimony was material to the proceeding at which the testimony was presented. Because materiality is an essential element of the offense of aggravated perjury, we reduce Caraway’s conviction to reflect a conviction for the lesser included offense of simple perjury.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the incarcerated father of a seven year old boy. The father argues on appeal that he was deprived of due process because he was not notified of an earlier dependency and neglect proceeding and because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during the termination proceeding. He also claims that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in his son's best interest that his parental rights be terminated. We affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Joseph Hough, appeals from the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief because the petition did not include a proper verification under oath. After a thorough review, we conclude that the circumstances in this case warrant allowing Petitioner the opportunity to amend his petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(d). The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

The defendant, Claude Francis Garrett, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree felony murder, which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he claims that (1) the convicting evidence was insufficient; (2) three prosecution witnesses presented false testimony; (3) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony; (4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on various points of law; (5) the trial court erred in failing to require a witness to answer defense counsel's questions on cross-examination; (6) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for the payment of travel expenses for a non-resident witness; (7) the state withheld exculpatory evidence; and (8) he was denied due process of law. Following our review, we affirm the conviction.

The defendant, Kenneth Ray Brasher, was convicted of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. His sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of the Davidson County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner, Danny Ray Meeks, appeals. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition because the petitioner did not make a partial payment of the filing fee as required by Code section 41-21-807. Although we believe that the court acted precipitantly, we affirm the order of dismissal on the basis that the petition fails to establish a claim for habeas corpus relief.

This appeal concerns a dispute among six siblings over the validity of their father's will. One month after his father's death, the youngest child filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Williamson County to probate a will his father had executed in July 1998. The testator's five older children contested this will on the grounds that their father lacked testamentary capacity and that the youngest child had procured the will by undue influence. Following a three day trial, a jury determined that the July 1998 will was invalid. After the trial court denied his post-trial motions, the youngest child appealed, taking issue with several evidentiary rulings, the adequacy of the instructions, and the evidentiary foundation for the verdict. We have determined that the trial court did not commit reversible error during the trial and that the record contains material evidence that the youngest child procured his father's July 1998 will by undue influence. We have also concluded that the trial court erred by requiring the estate to pay the youngest child's attorney's fees.

We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in vacating the defendant’s conviction. The defendant, Thomas Poston Studdard, was indicted for three counts of rape of a child. To this original indictment he entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the charge of incest and was sentenced to a term of eight years as a Range II multiple offender. Pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, he filed a motion seeking correction or reduction of his sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled the motion, and he appealed. Without addressing the defendant’s stated concern, the Court of Criminal Appeals, ostensibly using the plain error doctrine, vacated the judgment of conviction on the grounds that incest is not a lesser included offense of child rape and because the record failed to reflect that the indictment had been amended. The intermediate court reinstated the original indictment and remanded the case. Because we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to accept the plea and because the criteria for plain error have not been met, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstate the conviction for incest, and remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of the defendant’s sentencing issues.

The Petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This is a Title IV child support case. The State appeals from the trial court’s Order forgiving  Father/Appellee’s child support arrears because Father/Appellee allegedly made support payments directly to the mother. The trial court made no findings to support a deviation from the child support guidelines as required by T.C.A. §36-2-311 (Supp. 2004). Consequently, we reverse and remand.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleges that his employment subjected him to heavy metal dust which decreased his pulmonary function. The defendant says that the decreased pulmonary function, if any, was caused by smoking forty cigarettes a day for forty-five years, and pleads the statute of limitation of one year, and lack of proof of causation. The trial court awarded benefits based on a finding of 40 percent permanent partial disability. We reverse and dismiss.