APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that the employee’s lung condition was causally related to his employment, by ignoring evidence that the employee omitted his pre-existing condition on his employment application and failed to give proper notice of his work related injury, and by finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled and holding that the employer was liable for both the employee’s pre-existing sarcoidosis and aggravated asthmatic condition. For the reasons set out below, the Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs assessed against the employer.

The defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery (a Class B felony). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of robbery (a Class C felony) and was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. Upon the grant of a delayed appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the identification evidence; and (2) whether his confession was sufficiently corroborated so as to establish the corpus delicti. After careful review of the record, the briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Raymond A. Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition/petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Gregory Christopher Fleenor, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and fifteen years respectively. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant was indicted for evading arrest, a Class E felony, in count one; for carjacking, a Class B felony, in count two; for reckless endangerment of Officer Billy Moyer, a Class E felony, in count three; for reckless endangerment of Officer Joe MacLeod, a Class E felony, in count four; for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, subsequent offense, a Class A misdemeanor, in count five; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, in count six. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of Class E felony evading arrest, carjacking, reckless endangerment of Officer Moyer, and driving on a revoked license in counts one, two, three and five. Defendant was found not guilty of reckless endangerment of Officer MacLeod and resisting arrest in counts four and six. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to two years for the felony evading arrest conviction, twelve years for the carjacking conviction, two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for carjacking and reckless endangerment, and that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on robbery and theft of property as lesser included offenses of carjacking. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, Joe Kelly, the employee, insists that the trial court erred in finding that he sustained no permanent disability from his work-related injury. The Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. Further, the Panel finds that Mr. Kelly has sustained a vocational impairment of 16% to the body as a whole due to his injury and that Mr. Kelly should receive future medical expenses in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204.

The defendant, Wesley Earl Brown, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twenty-five years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, and ten years for each sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the rape convictions, for a total effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury found the appellant, LeShaun Norwood, guilty of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his confession to police, and (3) that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a will construction case. The decedent died testate in May 2002. In his will, he left certain properties in trust for the benefit of his spouse during her lifetime. The will detailed how the properties were to be distributed in the event his spouse predeceased him. The will did not state how the remainder interest in the properties was to be distributed in the event his spouse survived him.  The decedent was survived by his spouse. The co-executors filed a declaratory judgment action to interpret the will. The trial court ruled that the decedent died partially intestate, with the remainder interest in the specific properties passing through the laws of intestate succession. The co-executors of the trust appealed, arguing that the there was an error in the drafting of the will and that the decedent would have wanted the properties to be distributed in the same manner, regardless of whether his spouse predeceased him. We affirm, finding that, under these circumstances, the will Ccannot be reformed and the property must pass through the laws of intestate succession.

This appeal involves the ownership of a parcel of real property held by tenants-in-common. After reviewing the trial court’s order and the record, we have determined that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final judgment. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. It is my view, however, that the petitioner is not attacking the revocation of his probation, which, as the majority correctly points out, is not permitted. It is my understanding that the petitioner claims that he would not have entered guilty pleas to the two misdemeanor charges if he had known that he was not eligible for boot camp. He also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine in advance of his plea that it was the policy of the Department of Correction to arbitrarily exclude from boot camp those offenders who had originally been charged with aggravated robbery by the use of a deadly weapon.

Petitioner, Cedrick Konard Mitchell, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation and entry of Petitioner's best interest guilty plea to the charges of assault and driving on a suspended license, and that his guilty plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered into. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his suit to contest a will and contends that the trial court should have held the case in abeyance instead. Upon motions of the Plaintiff, the trial court had continued trial of the will contest on two prior occasions to times requested by the Plaintiff. Given this finding and further findings that the Plaintiff never requested that the case be held in abeyance and that the Plaintiff neither filed a motion that the case be continued from the date of trial nor notified the trial court beforehand that he would not be present at trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in awarding to the employee eighty-five (85%) percent permanent partial disability to the right and left hands as a result of an injury sustained during the course of his employment with Aerostructures Corp. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Two members of a homeowners' association, the governing body of a planned unit development, filed this complaint alleging that the association, a corporation, was in contempt of the court for its refusal to allow the plaintiffs to inspect corporation records. The trial judge declined to find the corporation in contempt. We affirm.

The Defendant, William E. Pewitt, pled guilty to one count of theft over $1000.00, one count of burglary, and one count of theft over $500.00. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of two years, and the Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied him alternative sentencing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mario Antoine Leggs, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In addition, he asserts that the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), renders his sentences invalid. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, a Metropolitan Nashville police officer was seriously injured in an on-duty automobile accident when Defendant's vehicle crashed into the rear of his patrol car. Defendant was uninsured. Metropolitan Nashville was self-insured and did not provide uninsured motorist coverage for its patrol officers. Plaintiff named Nationwide as a defendant in an effort to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy issued to him insuring his personal vehicle. Nationwide defended under a policy exclusion involving non-insured vehicles made available for his regular use. The trial court granted summary judgment to Nationwide, and we affirm the action of the trial court.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her lawsuit as being time barred. Plaintiff timely filed an action for wrongful discharge of her employment. Summons was issued but never served on Defendant. Plaintiff then took a voluntary dismissal but did not serve, nor attempt to serve, a copy of the notice of voluntary dismissal, the order of dismissal or a copy of the initial complaint on Defendant as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01. Plaintiff filed this action to revive her claim of wrongful discharge within one year of the voluntary dismissal of her first action but more than one year after termination of her employment. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that Plaintiff's claims were time barred, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

The defendant, Mark Ray Delashmit, entered pleas of guilt to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug, and to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The trial court imposed concurrent, four-year sentences in a community corrections program. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The question that has been certified for review by the trial court is "[w]hether the search warrant executed upon Defendant’s residence was supported by probable cause. Specifically, whether there is an adequate showing of the reliability and credibility of the informant." The judgments are affirmed.

This case is about fraud and negligent misrepresentation. In the fall of 2000, the plaintiff employee accepted an offer for employment with the defendant's internet company. Approximately three months after the employee began work, the company became insolvent and closed. The employee sued the defendant owner of the internet company, asserting that the company owner made false statements to him regarding the financial strength of the company. The employee sought damages for breach of contract and for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The employee received a judgment against the company for contract damages related to the employment contract. The company owner then sought summary judgment on the remaining claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court granted the company owner's motion for summary judgment, finding that the employee could not, as a matter of law, establish that he had relied on the company owner's statements that were the basis for the claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The employee appeals. We reverse, finding that the employee's reasonable or justifiable reliance on the statements was a genuine issue of fact and thus summary judgment was not proper.

Karen Ann Walton ("Mother") and William Arthur Tice ("Father") are the parents of a minor child ("the Child"). Mother and Father never married, but joined in filing a Petition for Legitimation averring that Father was the Child's natural parent. In 1994, the Trial Court entered an order finding the child support guidelines inapplicable due to the extensive amount of co-parenting time the Child spent with each parent. In 2003, Mother filed a petition seeking, in part, to modify Father's child support obligation. The case was tried and the Trial Court entered an order finding inter alia, that Father, although unemployed, "has the ability to earn substantial income in the amount of One Hundred and Sixty-Two Thousand Dollars ($162,000) per year and child support shall be set in the Guidelines amount of Two Thousand and Fifteen Dollars ($2,015.00) per month." Father appeals. We affirm.

Wife appeals a trial court judgment finding that she is not entitled to rehabilitative alimony, back child support, a portion of the husband's "paid time off" accumulated during the marriage and attorney fees. We reverse the trial judge's ruling that the wife is not entitled to rehabilitative alimony and remand the alimony issue to the trial judge to conduct a hearing to ascertain her need for rehabilitation and the husband's ability to pay. We affirm on all other issues.

This case is about termination of parental rights. The father was incarcerated, and the mother lived in a mobile home in abysmal conditions, with no telephone and no transportation. The child was born on the floor of the mobile home and hospitalized shortly thereafter. Due to the poor living conditions, the State took custody of the child. Over the next three years, the mother and father worked with the Department of Children’s Services in an attempt to remedy the conditions that prevented the child’s return. These conditions included alcohol and drug abuse and domestic violence. The juvenile court found that the parties continued to engage in physical abuse, and that the mother nevertheless continued to live with the father, creating unsafe living conditions for the child. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding that the conditions that precluded the child’s safe return to the home still persisted after three years and would likely continue. The mother appealed. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of persistent conditions.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in awarding to the employee a 55% permanent partial disability to the left arm and a 45% permanent partial disability to the right arm as a result of her employment with Pacific Coast Feather Company and in awarding discretionary costs including the amount of $500.00 for an independent medical evaluation. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court but modify the judgment to exclude the award of the expense for an independent medical examination as a discretionary cost.