APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Augustine John Lopez, III, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree felony murder and theft of property over $1000 and subsequently received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and five years for the respective convictions. On appeal, Lopez raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions: (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony by a police officer concerning fingerprint evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay statements of a witness which indicated her possible involvement in the murder; and (4) whether the trial court's sequential jury instruction was error. After review of the record, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The Appellant, Kenneth Hayes, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Davidson County Criminal Court. In 1997, Hayes pled guilty to felony possession of cocaine and was sentenced to a term of eight years with service of one year in confinement followed by supervised probation. In 2004, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Hayes violated probation by possessing cocaine. At the revocation hearing, Hayes sought suppression of the cocaine upon grounds that it was illegally seized. The trial court found that the police search was valid and revoked Hayes' suspended sentence. After review, we conclude that the cocaine was illegally seized. Notwithstanding, we further conclude that in the absence of police harassment or that the evidence was obtained in a particularly offensive manner, the exclusionary rule is not applicable to probation revocation proceedings. Accordingly, the order of revocation is affirmed.

The petitioner, Archie L. Miller, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his three 2002 convictions of selling cocaine. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition, and the court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the court found that the petitioner failed to establish the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and denied post-conviction relief. We affirm the action of the post-conviction court.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Darrell Toomes, of robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him as the perpetrator, (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence relating to a photograph array and a subsequent in-court identification of him, and (3) that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Norris Ray, was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a handgun; one count of first degree felony murder; and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to forty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender, to four years for the felony possession of a handgun conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus forty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator of the offenses; (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing the impeachment of the testimony of the victim of especially aggravated kidnapping with evidence of the victim’s misdemeanor drug convictions; and (3) that the trial court erred in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jason Allen Ruiz, appeals the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court denying his motion for suspension of his sentence. Following a guilty plea to Class B felony sale of cocaine, Ruiz received an eight-year sentence with service of one year in confinement. At the sentencing hearing, Ruiz refused to name his drug sources. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court informed Ruiz that after serving 120 days in jail, the remainder of his incarceration period would be suspended if he revealed the names of those who supplied him drugs. Ruiz petitioned for suspension of his sentence after serving 120 days in confinement. He persisted, however, in his refusal to identify his drug sources because he feared retaliation. Ruiz's motion for suspension of his sentence was denied. After de novo review, we conclude that the trial court improperly considered Ruiz's refusal to reveal his drug sources. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the balance of the Appellant's sentence of incarceration is suspended.

This is a claim against an estate for personal services rendered to the decedent. The decedent's stepson and his wife provided personal services to the decedent for several years prior to her death. The decedent died intestate, leaving no issue. The decedent's nephew was appointed as administrator of the decedent's estate. The stepson and his wife filed claims against the estate on the theory of implied or quasi contract, seeking reimbursement for the expenses incurred in providing the personal services for the decedent. The decedent's estate filed an exception to those claims. After a hearing, the trial court granted a portion of the stepson's and his wife's claims for personal services, finding that an implied contract existed with the decedent as to those items. The estate now appeals. We reverse, finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of an implied contract between the decedent and the claimants that the claimants would be paid for their services at the time the services were rendered.

We granted this appeal to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available when: (1) the trial court imposed concurrent sentences for two offenses committed by the petitioner while on parole; and (2) the trial court failed to order these new sentences to be served consecutively to the remaining sentence for the paroled offense. We conclude that the sentences are not illegal under either claim and that the petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Petitioner, Robert Howell, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the
State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

A Wilson County jury convicted the defendant, Lorenzo Malone, for first degree felony murder under the theory of criminal responsibility. The trial court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to strike a potential juror for cause; (2) admitting photographs of the victim and a videotape into evidence; and (3) failing to grant a mistrial based upon impropriety in the State's closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Ronald Benjamin Irwin, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. As a result, the appellant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a nine-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence as excessive. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to serve nine (9) years in incarceration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case comes before us on appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner sought relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, raising several claims including that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial because of an improper communication by a court officer to the jury during deliberations. During the hearing on the post-conviction petition, the court heard testimony from a juror regarding the content of the communication and also the subjective effect of the officer’s statement upon the juror. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that the improper communication had not influenced the verdict and therefore denied the petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In this Court, the petitioner challenges admission of the juror’s testimony relating to the effect of the court officer’s statement on the juror. After thorough consideration, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We hold that Tennessee Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits introduction of juror testimony concerning the effect on the juror of an improper communication by a court officer during jury deliberations.

This case involves codicils to a will. The decedent died testate. His will included one typed codicil and two handwritten codicils. The typed codicil, pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement, granted the decedent’s former spouse a life estate in his real property with the remainder to their children, and devised all of the personal property to the children as well. The decedent later handwrote two codicils addressing the disposition of certain personal property and debts. After his death, the devisee under the handwritten codicils intervened in the probate proceedings to enforce the codicils. The trial court ruled that the handwritten codicil addressing the personal property violated the marital dissolution agreement and was therefore invalid. It held that the codicil addressing the debt did not violate the marital dissolution agreement and that the estate should pay for the debt, as set forth in the codicil.  Other matters remained outstanding, and the trial court, under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02, made the order final. Because the outstanding matters could render this Court’s ruling moot, we find that the order was improvidently made final and dismiss the appeal.

On March 25, 2002, the defendant, Michael Ricardo Martin, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury on two (2) counts of rape for an incident that occurred on November 27, 2001. A jury trial was held and the defendant was convicted of one (1) count of rape and one (1) count of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of ten (10) years for the rape conviction and two (2) years for the sexual battery conviction. On appeal the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal, by granting the State's motion in limine regarding evidence concerning a prior hymenal injury sustained by the victim and by sentencing the defendant to a ten (10) year effective sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case arises out of the sale of a used car which Plaintiffs, the buyers of the car, maintain was damaged prior to sale despite Defendant’s denial of damage. A jury found for Plaintiffs, the buyers, on their claims for both common law intentional misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-101 et seq. (1995). Plaintiffs elected to receive the punitive damages awarded by the jury under the common law claim in lieu of treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. When Plaintiffs then requested attorney’s fees under the Act, the trial court held that they could not receive both punitive damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court also held that the election of remedies made by Plaintiffs had become final before the entry of judgment and before Plaintiffs were informed of the amount they might have received in attorney’s fees under the Act and that Plaintiffs could not amend their election of remedies. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. We reverse, holding that Plaintiffs can receive both punitive damages under the common law misrepresentation claim and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We remand to the trial court for award of appropriate attorney’s fees and costs.

The appellant, Kevin Bufford, pled guilty to one (1) count of aggravated robbery and one (1) count of carjacking while reserving a certified question of law for appeal. In that certified question of law, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of what the appellant argues was an illegal arrest. Because we determine that the certified question is not dispositive, we dismiss the appeal and remand the matter to the trial court for any further proceedings which may be necessary.

The petitioner, Anthony D. Forster, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The appellant, Thomas Wray, appeals from the denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus wherein he alleges that his guilty pleas and sentences in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two (2) offenses committed while he was a juvenile are void. For the reasons stated below we find that the habeas court properly denied habeas corpus relief and we therefore affirm the decision of the lower court.

Petitioner, David Johnson, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to interview or call a witness who could have provided an alibi for Petitioner on the night of
the offenses. After a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Robert Gamble, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, and one count of theft of property over five hundred dollars. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal,
and Petitioner’s Rule 11 application was denied by the Supreme Court. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed Petitioner’s amended petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the court erred when it dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the lower court properly dismissed the petition. As such, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Allen Jean Stephens, was convicted of one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to twenty-three years for the felony drug conviction, and eleven months, twenty nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentences or the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Defendant argues however, that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the crack cocaine found at his house during the execution of a search warrant; and that the trial court erred in ruling admissible certain evidence about a prior sale of crack cocaine, an offense for which Defendant was not charged.  Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Carlos Weeks, was indicted in Shelby County for four counts of aggravated robbery. Two of the four counts were alternative charges. The defendant was convicted of all four counts and the trial court merged the alternative counts into two convictions. The trial court imposed a concurrent, Range I sentence of ten years for each of the two offenses. In this appeal as of right, the defendant asserts that there is a material variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial and that the evidence is insufficient to support either conviction. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Anthony Crowe, entered a plea of nolo contendere to facilitation of first degree murder and received an eighteen-year sentence. After imposition of the sentence, but before the judgment became final, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea alleging that the plea was not supported by a factual basis and that the plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw. Although we conclude that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) does not mandate that a plea of nolo contendere be supported by a factual basis, we also conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw because the defendant established that his plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. Thus, permitting withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, vacate the conviction of facilitation of first degree murder, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of pretrial jail credits. We conclude that Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 does not provide an appeal as of right from the trial court's action. Moreover, because the sentence is neither illegal nor void, the appeal cannot be treated as a writ of certiorari. Therefore, because this matter is not properly before us, we dismiss the appeal.