APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted in case no. 03-05457 of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of evading arrest, a Class D felony . Defendant was convicted in case No. 03-05459 of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, against victim Christopher Bridges. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to six years for each of his Class C and Class D felony convictions. The trial court merged Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions in counts one and two in case No. 03-05459, and
sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to ten years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-05457 to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-05459 to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to Defendant’s sentence in case No. 03-05457, for an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Defendant does not challenge the length of his sentences. Following our review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.  We remand for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to make specific findings justifying the imposition of consecutive sentencing, failed to identify and support the enhancement factors used to enhance Defendant’s sentences for his Class D and Class B felony convictions; and failed to identify which specific convictions it was relying upon to classify Defendant as a multiple offender for sentencing him for his Class D and Class C felony convictions.

The defendant appeals his conviction for reckless endangerment, contending specifically that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he placed anyone in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. Upon review, we conclude that because the defendant fired the gun in the air, away from any person or potentially occupied building, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Therefore, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charges.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in awarding to the employee a 30% permanent partial disability to the whole body as a result of his employment with Clinton Home Center. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge with regard to the extent of the disability sustained but find that the employee refused a reasonable offer of return to work and is subject to the maximum benefit set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-241(a)(1). In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(2), we affirm the judgment of the trial court but modify the award to the employee to provide for a 17.5% permanent, partial disability to the whole body.

The Defendant, Alice Smotherman, pled guilty to possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance for resale, a Class D felony, after the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. As part of the plea agreement, she reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question reserved for review was "whether or not the affidavit in the search warrant is sufficient to establish truthfulness, reliability and veracity of information that [an] unnamed third party conveyed to affiant which established probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant; and whether or not the search warrant complied with Rule 41(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure." Because the record on appeal is incomplete, we must conclusively presume the ruling of the trial court was correct. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Daylon Roberts, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Patricia Marie Jenson,² was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of child neglect and possession of drug paraphernalia. She received a total effective sentence of four years, to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for child neglect and the sentence imposed by the trial court on that offense. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the issue is which of the multiple insurance carriers is responsible for paying the workers’ compensation benefits of Ms. Gina Gunn, the injured employee. The trial court ruled that Hartford Insurance Company, the insurance carrier when Ms. Gunn underwent surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, was responsible for payment. On the basis of recent developments in the law, the Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and that Realm National Insurance Company, the insurance carrier when Ms. Gunn filed the notice of her injury, is liable for payments of Ms. Gunn’s benefits.

Defendant, Qawi Nur, a/k/a/ Darrius James, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder and one count of first degree premeditated murder. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder in count one and second degree murder in count two. The trial court merged Defendant’s second degree murder conviction into his first degree felony murder conviction. The jury sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his first degree murder conviction. The sole issue raised on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s upholding the conviction. I do not believe the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of child neglect as that offense is described in State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 2001). In Mateyko, our supreme court held that “a mere risk of harm” was insufficient and that the state was required to show “that the defendant’s neglect produced an actual, deleterious effect or harm upon the child’s health and welfare.” Id. 53 S.W.3d at 671-72.

The defendant, Daniel Blake, stands convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, attempt to leave the scene of an accident, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, and he is serving an effective sentence of 25 years. He has appealed his aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood-alcohol content was above .20 percent and that he had previously been convicted of DUI. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and affirm
the judgment.

The petitioner, Clarence Carnell Gaston, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his 2001 convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and conspiracy to commit second degree murder. See State v. Clarence Carnell Gaston, No. W2001-02046-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Feb. 7, 2003) (affirming the petitioner’s convictions and sentences), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2003). After appointing counsel, the post-conviction court conducted a hearing on May 24, 2004. Following the hearing, the court denied post-conviction relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Daniel Blake, stands convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, attempt to leave the scene of an accident, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, and he is serving an effective sentence of 25 years. He has appealed his aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood-alcohol content was above .20 percent and that he had previously been convicted of DUI. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and affirm the judgment.

Blount County -In this boundary dispute between two lot owners in adjacent subdivisions, the trial court relied on an old fence line to establish the boundary and award plaintiff damages for trespass. Given that the deeds and surveys were inconclusive, it is appropriate to look to the most reliable monumentation to establish the line. We affirm.

This case involves a dispute over compensation for property taken by eminent domain. The Knoxville Community Development Corporation insisted that the property was worth only $19,500 and deposited that amount into the court. The landowner claimed it was worth much more. Following a trial, the jury found the fair market value of the property to be $25,700. The landowner appeals, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that they could consider the tax assessment figures in their valuation of the property. We agree, and we reverse the trial court.

The Chancery Court granted Rule 11 sanctions against James Saffles and Connie Saffles (“Plaintiffs”)1 based upon their actions and the resulting delay that occurred after the filing by Roger Watson and Tammy Watson (“Defendants”) of a motion seeking Rule 11 sanctions. We hold that the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds relied on by the Chancery Court was error, vacate the grant of Rule 11 sanctions, and remand for a reconsideration of Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions and a determination of whether the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is proper based on the grounds raised in the Rule 11 motion.

The Juvenile Court reduced the monthly amount of child support the father was obligated to pay from $345 to $130. The State of Tennessee, acting under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, appealed the trial court's determination. The State argues that the court should have either maintained the father's support obligation at the presumptive level of $345 or deviated downward from the guidelines in accordance with the method enunciated by this court in the case of Casteel v. Casteel. Although the trial court impermissibly used the mother's income as a factor in calculating support, father was entitled to a downward deviation, and the amount awarded was within guiding legal principles. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant was held in criminal contempt of court for failure to pay alimony. We affirm the action of the trial court and find the appeal to be frivolous.

The petitioner, Kent Ousley, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed. The judgment is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff’s right hand was drawn into a machine and squeezed. She suffered a minor laceration with perhaps soft-tissue injury. She had no apparent serious injuries, and lost no time, not even one day, from her job. Expert testimony focused on a loss of grip strength. The trial judge found 65 percent permanent partial disability, and 65 percent permanent impairment. Reduced to 27.5 percent.

The petitioner, Rickie Reed, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Eddrick Johnson, originally charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a Range II sentence of seven years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Patrick John Marshall, entered pleas of guilt to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of marijuana in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served on community corrections. The trial court later revoked the community corrections sentence and, after a sentencing hearing, imposed a Range II sentence of twenty years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that Cheryl Smith Graves ("Wife") is not entitled to post-judgment interest on alimony due her under her judgment of divorce from Richard C. Graves, Sr. ("Husband"), which judgment was entered December 3, 2001, nunc pro tunc August 24, 2001. The trial court premised its judgment on its finding that "[Wife] ha[d] been obstructive in the conclusion of this matter." We hold that Wife is entitled to interest on all alimony payments to the extent that those payments were not timely made. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tyrone D. Conley, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to second degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a "Constitutional Challenge to Vacate Invalid Sentence." The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that if the document was a petition for post-conviction relief, it was time-barred. Further, the trial court determined that if the document was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner did not allege that his judgment was void. On appeal, the petitioner contests the trial court's dismissal of his petition. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, Joe Kelly, the employee, insists that the trial court erred in finding that he sustained no permanent disability from his work-related injury. The Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. Further, the Panel finds that Mr. Kelly has sustained a vocational impairment of 16% to the body as a whole due to his injury and that Mr. Kelly should receive future medical expenses in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204.