APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Rickeena Hamilton, appeals her convictions for second degree murder and tampering with evidence and her effective twenty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder; (2) the State improperly introduced speculative and improper opinion testimony from fact witnesses; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Defendant declined to make a statement following her arrest; (4) the trial court issued multiple erroneous jury instructions; (5) the State made improper comments during closing arguments; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (7) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Carroll County jury convicted Zachary Frank Farris, Defendant, of six counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 12 years’ confinement. Defendant did not file a motion for new trial. In this direct appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State failed to prove that he was in constructive possession of the firearms. Additionally, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by allowing a witness for the State to testify when the State failed to give defense counsel notice of the witness. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, James D. Duncan, has appealed an order of the Hardeman County Chancery Court that was entered on December 15, 2021. We determine that the December 15, 2021 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The pro se petitioner, Stephen V. Walker, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Markreo Quintez Springer, appeals from the Davidson County’s post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we dismiss the petition as untimely.

The Defendant, Charles Lafayette Stinson, was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; two counts of simple possession of a Schedule IV drug, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2018) (simple possession); -425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia); -434 (2018) (possession with intent to sell). He received an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the State to introduce testimony regarding the Defendant’s prior criminal charges, (2) allowing the State’s rebuttal witness to testify regarding evidence beyond the scope of evidence presented in the State’s case-in-chief, and (3) failing to consider the required statistical information when sentencing the Defendant. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Benjamin Owen, filed a petition for the return of seized property pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-709. The Defendant, however, has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Because we have no subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

The defendant, Kevin D. Stodghill, appeals the trial court’s imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellants, board members and members of Appellee homeowner’s association, filed a pro se lawsuit against the homeowner’s association and other board members, who are also Appellees. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the ground that Appellants failed to bring a proper derivative action. Appellants filed voluntary nonsuits before the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. Despite the voluntary nonsuits, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the voluntary nonsuits. The trial court also awarded Appellees a portion of their attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-56-401(e), and, alternatively, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c). Because the trial court should have allowed Appellants’ nonsuits, we: (1) reverse the trial court’s denial of the nonsuits; (2) vacate the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss; and (3) vacate the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ attorney’s fees. The trial court’s order dividing the special master fees equally between the parties is affirmed.

This appeal involves a challenge to a circuit court’s award to a landlord for a deficiency in lease payments.  The landlord and tenant offered conflicting testimony regarding the terms of the parties’ agreement.  The circuit court judge found the landlord’s description of the agreement more convincing than the tenant’s and awarded the landlord a judgment in the amount of $9,800 as well as costs.  On appeal, the tenant insists the circuit court judge erred in his assessment of the conflicting testimony.  We find the trial court’s determination to be supported by the record and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child, upon the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and financially support the child. The Greene County Circuit Court (“Trial Court”) denied the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and financial responsibility for the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The Trial Court further found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We reverse the statutory ground for the termination of the father’s parental rights of abandonment by failure to visit, determining that the father had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to visit was not willful. We affirm the remaining ground for the termination of the father’s parental rights, as well as the trial court’s determination that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Appellant appeals the assessment of costs against him following the dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Charles Edward Meriweather, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argues that his judgments of conviction are void because the trial court was without jurisdiction to accept his 2011 guilty pleas. Following a thorough review, we affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of motions for recusal of the trial judge. Having carefully reviewed the record provided by the appellant, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motions.

This appeal arises out of delinquency proceedings that originated in the Madison County Juvenile Court. The State filed an initial delinquency petition, but the petition was unverified. The defect in the petition remained undiscovered by the State until the first witness was sworn at the adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court dismissed the petition and found that jeopardy attached. The State filed a second verified delinquency petition. However, the juvenile court dismissed the petition finding that it violated principles of double jeopardy. The State appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the petition finding that jeopardy attached on the initial petition. The State appeals. We reverse and remand.

The Defendant, Douglas Mac Richmond, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to nine counts of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective sixteen-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that he was denied due process at sentencing because the trial court allowed unreliable hearsay testimony, “infused” the court’s religious beliefs into the court’s sentencing decision, failed to consider required statistical information from the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”), and considered information outside the Defendant’s actual criminal conduct. The Defendant also claims that we should review the trial court’s sentencing decision de novo because the court did not follow the purposes and principles of sentencing and that we should grant his request for full probation or split confinement. Based on the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Defendant has not shown a violation of due process by the trial court but that a de novo review of the denial of alternative sentencing is warranted. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the trial court properly ordered that the Defendant serve his effective sixteen-year sentence in confinement.

In this divorce case, we do not reach the substantive issues concerning the trial court’s division of the marital estate due to the fact that the trial court failed to designate all property as either marital or separate, failed to assign values to all property, and failed to consider the factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c). As such, we vacate the trial court’s division of the marital estate and its denial of alimony. Because the trial court failed to resolve the parties’ dispute over the Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 statement of the evidence by providing this Court with one cohesive statement, we reverse the trial court’s order concerning the statement of the evidence.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights.  The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination existed as to the father: (1) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and (2) incarceration under a ten-year sentence.  The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the children.  The father appeals.  We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her three children on the grounds of: 1) abandonment for failure to support under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113-(g)(1); 2) failure to comply with the permanency plan under section 36-1-113(g)(2); 3) persistence of the conditions that led to removal of the children under section 36-1-13(g)(3); and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody under section 36-1-113(g)(14). Mother’s parental rights to her youngest child were terminated on the additional ground of severe child abuse under section 36-1-113(g)(4). After determining that Father had failed to legitimate his children, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) for failure to support; failure to visit; failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody; and a danger of risk of substantial harm. The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee appeals the trial court’s dismissal of two counts of animal cruelty on the basis that an emu met the statutory definition of livestock under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-201, that the animal control officer was not a statutorily qualified livestock examiner and that the animal control officer’s consultation with a licensed veterinarian failed to satisfy the requirements of the livestock examination statute. See T.C.A. § 39-14-211. We conclude that the emu was not livestock under the plain language of the statute and thus no livestock examination was required to proceed with charges under the animal cruelty statute. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of counts one and two and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Mark Brian Dobson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for: failing to investigate the facts of the case or interview witnesses; failing to “prepare cross examination of State’s proof;” failing to file pretrial motion to redact from jail phone calls statements made by Petitioner’s mother referring to a gun; failing to “preserve a defense pursuant to State v. White, 382 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012);” failing to discuss mandatory consecutive sentencing with Petitioner; advising Petitioner to plead guilty “to a single count during the trial” and by failing to inform Petitioner of the consequences of his plea; failing to preserve issues for appeal; and failing to advise Petitioner to testify at trial in support of his claim of self-defense. Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to the cumulative effect of the errors of counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Derrick Lakeith Brown, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on November 5, 2021. We determine that the November 5, 2021 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.