APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant stipulated that its employee was the at-fault driver in a motor vehicle accident involving Appellee. Appellee and his wife filed suit against Appellant for personal injuries and the issue of damages was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. Appellant appeals, arguing that the jury’s award of damages for loss of earning capacity, future medical expenses, permanent injury, and loss of consortium is contrary to the law and evidence. Because there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on same.

The father has appealed from an order designating the mother as the primary residential parent and adopting a permanent parenting plan. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal arises from proceedings in the Tennessee Claims Commission and follows a trial concerning care received by the decedent while at the Tennessee State Veterans Home.  The Claims Commission ultimately found that the claimants had failed to establish a health care liability claim and therefore dismissed the case.  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Defendant, Christopher Nichol Cox, was convicted by a jury of eighty-one counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of rape of a child, and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The trial court merged the convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child into the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child and imposed a sixty-year sentence as a Range III offender to be served at 100%, by operation of law, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that: the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance; the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify with the aid of a therapy dog without a hearing to determine the animal’s training or necessity to the victim’s testimony; the trial court improperly bolstered the victim’s testimony by allowing the victim’s entire forensic interview to be played to the jury; the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that Defendant had other cases and that there were other victims; the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child and thirty of the counts of aggravated sexual battery; the jurors did not make a unanimous decision as to which acts of sexual abuse it relied on to support his continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction; the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence by relying on an enhancement factor that is an essential element of the offense; and the cumulative effect of repeated constitutional errors denied him a fair trial. After hearing oral arguments and following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of aggravated sexual battery in counts sixteen through twenty-seven, counts forty-eight through fifty-four, and counts sixty-five through eighty-one and accordingly dismiss those counts and remand for entry of amended judgments. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A father filed a petition in Tennessee to domesticate and modify a Kentucky child-custody decree.  The court later entered an agreed order granting the petition, which was not appealed.  Three months later, the mother filed a motion to set aside the final judgment on the grounds of fraud and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The court denied her Rule 60.02 motion and her subsequent Rule 59.04 motion.  Because the court did not rule on the mother’s claims of fraud, we vacate the denial of the Rule 60.02 motion and remand for further proceedings.

This is an interlocutory appeal involving a discovery dispute. The plaintiff corporation initiated this action to enforce a non-competition provision in an employment agreement, naming as defendants the plaintiff’s former chief operating officer and his current employer. Central to the discovery dispute, the plaintiff averred that it had terminated the chief operating officer’s employment for cause based on having learned that he had been involved in a payment scheme involving benefits and favors to an employee of one of the plaintiff’s customers. The defendants averred that the employment termination had actually been due to the plaintiff’s corporate restructuring. Prior to the chief operating officer’s employment termination, the plaintiff had retained outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation, and the customer whose employee had been identified as the recipient of the scheme had likewise conducted an investigation. Upon the defendants’ motion to compel discovery of materials related to the plaintiff’s internal investigation, the plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the materials were entitled to protection pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, common interest privilege, and work product doctrine. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the defendants had established, prima facie, that the plaintiff had waived the asserted privileges and protections by placing the internal investigation materials at issue in the litigation. The trial court then conducted an in camera review of specific materials presented to the court during the final day of the hearing. At the time these materials were submitted, it was undisputed that the only attorney work product included in the materials was “fact” or “ordinary” work product with no “opinion” work product included. Following in camera review, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to compel specifically as to the materials it had reviewed. Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered an agreed order granting permission for application to this Court for an interlocutory appeal addressing the certified issue of whether the plaintiff had “waived the work product, attorney-client, and common interest privilege or protection by placing the internal investigation ‘at issue’ in this litigation.” This Court subsequently granted permission for interlocutory appeal.

The petitioner, Travis Seiber, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated robbery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Petitioner, Dennis Joshua Cooper, was indicted by the Henderson County Grand Jury in four separate cases for 15 drug-related offenses. Pursuant to two plea agreements, Petitioner pled guilty as charged in exchange for a total effective sentence of 20 years. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were not freely or voluntarily entered and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Upon careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. However, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for correction of the judgment forms to reflect the sentences as imposed by the trial court.

This is an action by a dairy on a sworn account against the former owner of a dairy distributor who signed a personal guaranty that obligated him to pay any past-due debts accrued by the distributorship to the plaintiff dairy. When the former owner signed the personal guaranty, he was the sole member/owner of the distributorship; however, he sold his membership interest in the distributorship in May 2015. At the time of the sale, the distributor owed $60,484.95 to the plaintiff dairy. One month later, when the plaintiff dairy learned of the sale, it created a new account for the distributor and sent both the distributor and the guarantor a demand for payment of the old account balance, the amount owing when the guarantor sold his membership interest in the distributor. Neither the distributor nor the guarantor paid the old account balance, and the dairy sued them both. The dairy later voluntarily nonsuited the distributor, with whom the dairy was continuing to do business under the new account number, leaving the guarantor as the sole defendant. Thereafter, the trial court granted the dairy’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the guarantor’s liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. After the hearing, the court entered a judgment against the guarantor for $130,102.12, including the principal debt, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the guarantor argues that the creditor breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by not seeking payment from the distribution company. We disagree. The personal guaranty obligated the guarantor to pay all amounts not paid by the distributor, whether or not the dairy sought payment from the distributor. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 1999, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, James R. Wilson, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery.  His convictions were affirmed on appeal, as was the subsequent denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner’s first habeas corpus petition was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal.  While this petition was still pending, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, which the court summarily dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal.  The Petitioner filed this, his second petition for habeas corpus relief contending that the he was entitled to relief based upon the State’s oral motion to amend the indictment to change the offense date from November 14 to November 13.  The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition.  Shortly thereafter, the Petitioner filed a “Motion for New Trial.”  Several months later, he requested a hearing on his motion.  The State opposed the motion, stating that there was no procedure by which the Petitioner could file a “Motion for New Trial” from the habeas corpus proceeding and stating the Petitioner’s claims were meritless.  The habeas corpus court agreed and denied the “Motion for New Trial.”  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred because it improperly dismissed his habeas corpus petition.  After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the Petitioner did not timely file his notice of appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.  

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights.  The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Macon County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Zackery B. (“Father”) and Anna H. (“Mother”) to their minor child Cora W. (“the Child”).  After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds of wanton disregard and severe child abuse were proven against both parents.  The Juvenile Court found further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest.  Mother and Father appeal.  Among other things, both parents argue that their pre-incarceration conduct was not part of a broader pattern sufficient to sustain the ground of wanton disregard.  Neither parent disputes the ground of severe child abuse, which was based upon the Child’s massive exposure to drugs including methamphetamine.  We affirm the Juvenile Court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ahren Presley, was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and theft, two counts of felony murder in the commission or perpetration of a robbery, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of felony murder in the commission or perpetration of a theft, one count of theft of property $10,000-$60,000, and one count of theft of property $1,000 or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103 (conspiracy to commit theft); 39-13-202(a)(2) (felony murder in the commission or perpetration of, relevantly, a robbery or theft); 39-13-403 (especially aggravated robbery); 39-14-103 (theft of property). He received a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that 1) the evidence was insufficient to support all of his convictions, and 2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrea Spencer, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 1983 guilty-pleaded convictions of robbery with a weapon, larceny from a person, and petit larceny. Discerning no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cortney R. Logan, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus.  The Petitioner is serving an effective thirty-one-year sentence for convictions for attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.  On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in denying his petition.  We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The trial court modified the divorced parties’ residential parenting schedule, increasing Father’s parenting time. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a Tennessee Public Records Act case. The trial court found that Appellant willfully denied two of Appellee’s twelve public records requests, but it awarded Appellee attorney’s fees and costs incurred throughout the entire litigation. We affirm the trial court’s findings that Appellant willfully denied two of Appellee’s public records requests. However, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Appellee costs and fees incurred throughout the entire litigation. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order and remand with instructions. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and Appellee’s request for appellate attorney’s fees and costs is denied.

In this dispute concerning the ownership of a parcel of unimproved real property, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to quiet title to the property at issue. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order ruling in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a collateral attack of a tax sale of real property. The action was commenced by a pro se plaintiff against various Shelby County government entities. The plaintiff and his siblings inherited real property from their father, who died in 1992, and subsequently failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The Shelby County Trustee’s office notified the plaintiff of the tax debt and an impending tax sale. The plaintiff did not pay the debt, and the property was sold. Several years later, the plaintiff commenced this action by filing an “‘Emergency’ Application for a Restraining Order” to prevent Defendants from “stealing” his property. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Application for a Restraining Order and dismissed the action with prejudice. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to involuntarily dismiss the action at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ presentation of their evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. The plaintiffs’ brief on appeal severely fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6. We, therefore, find that the plaintiffs have waived their issues on appeal.

The petitioner, Micah Ross Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2011 convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. Because the petitioner has established that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Valrie Hart, pleaded guilty in the Polk County Criminal Court to four counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, conspiracy to commit robbery or theft, a Class D felony, theft of property valued at more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-13-401 (2018) (robbery), 39-12-103 (2018) (conspiracy), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft). After the appropriate merger, the trial court imposed life imprisonment for two counts of felony murder, twenty-five years for each count of especially aggravated robbery, and three years for conspiracy to commit robbery or theft. The trial court ordered partial consecutive service, for an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences, plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying sentence enhancement factors related to treating the victims with exceptional cruelty and to abusing a private trust. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff Roger Baskin sued Pierce & Allred Construction, Inc. (“Defendant”) for breach of contract and breach of warranty, alleging Defendant failed to construct a house in Muscle Shoals, Alabama, in accordance with the parties’ contract. Plaintiff alleged that although he “paid construction costs totaling more than $1,700,000, [Defendant] failed to complete construction of the house and has left Plaintiff with a home riddled with construction defects that affect every major system of the home.” Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2) and (3), asserting that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, and that venue was improper in Davidson County. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. We hold that Defendant’s contacts with Tennessee, including its purposeful applications for a certificate of authority to transact business and for a contractor’s license in Tennessee, are such that Defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this state. Consequently, Tennessee courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. We further find that Davidson County is a proper venue for this action, and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A woman sued a homeowner for negligence due to injuries she sustained when a pot-bellied pig maintained on the homeowner’s property jumped on her and knocked her off of the homeowner’s front porch. The homeowner filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that he did not owe the woman a duty of reasonable care because she was a trespasser.  The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and the woman appealed.  Determining that genuine issues of material fact still exist because the homeowner failed to establish that the woman was a trespasser, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Isaac Martin, of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, .5 grams. or more of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender to fourteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Kentrel Ne’Air Siner, of simple possession of oxycodone, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, and he received an effective ten-year sentence. The convictions were the result of a search of the vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger and the discovery of marijuana and oxycodone in the center console, a marijuana cigarette on the passenger floorboard, and a weapon under the passenger’s seat. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that there was nothing beyond proximity to tie him to the items recovered. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to uphold his convictions for possession of oxycodone and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, and these convictions are reversed and the charges dismissed. The conviction for simple possession of marijuana is affirmed.