APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

At his first trial, the defendant, Steven A. Meyer, was convicted of first degree murder and the trial court, sua sponte, overturned the jury verdict, concluding that it was against the weight of the evidence. At the second trial, the jury again found the defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terry Shropshire, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction is void or his term of imprisonment has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Orlando Malone, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Randy Anderson, pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to manufacturing
methamphetamine and was sentenced to three years, with 180 days to be served in confinement and the balance to be served in the community corrections program. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with a previous sentence in Madison County. The trial court subsequently revoked the appellant’s community corrections sentence and resentenced the appellant to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to sentences imposed in Weakley and Dyer Counties. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jimmy Leslie Sluder, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is affirmed.

We granted review to determine whether the revocation of a community corrections sentence may be challenged in a post-conviction petition on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court found that the petitioner could not collaterally attack the revocation of his community corrections sentence in a post-conviction proceeding and dismissed the post-conviction petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that a petitioner may challenge the revocation of a community corrections sentence in a post-conviction proceeding and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petitioner's post-conviction petition. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The trial court awarded Appellee recision of a contract for purchase of an automobile. We affirm.

The petitioner, Billy David Grubb, pled guilty in 2001 to first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated burglary for which he was sentenced, respectively, to consecutive sentences of life without parole and twelve years. Subsequently, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by counsel, claiming, inter alia, that trial counsel had been ineffective by not seeking a pretrial mental evaluation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

This appeal involves an action for breach of an oral contract to pump out a swimming pool. The Circuit Court for Wilson County conducted a bench trial and awarded the plaintiff a judgment against both the owner of the pool and the affiliate real estate broker who requested the work. We have concluded that the evidence does not support the judgment against the property owner but affirm the judgment against the broker.

The appellant, Guy James Bonding, appeals the order of the Rutherford County Circuit Court denying its petition for reimbursement of a forfeited bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Valissa Granderson. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing at which the trial court shall determine to what relief, if any, the appellant is entitled.

This cause is a civil suit for damages against Gary and Cynthia Mann resulting from Cynthia Mann's embezzlement of funds totaling $550,000.00 from the law firm of Marks, Shell, and Maness. The trial court found Mr. and Mrs. Mann jointly and severably liable for the loss. Mr. Mann appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The appellant, Dee W. Thompson, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of three counts of aggravated rape. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of prior testimony, and the qualification of a witness to testify as an expert. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Orlando Fields, was found guilty by a jury in the Obion County Circuit Court of one count of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine within one thousand feet of a school zone. The petitioner was sentenced to thirty-three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner’s claims were waived and that regardless of waiver, the petitioner failed to prove prejudice. The petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the rights of a survivor in a joint bank account. During her lifetime, the decedent sold certain real property, put the proceeds in a separate bank account, and executed a will leaving half of the proceeds to her niece. The bank account in which the proceeds were deposited was a joint account between the decedent and her brother. The brother had power of attorney over the decedent's affairs and was the named executor in the her will. After the decedent died, the decedent's will was admitted to probate. The brother, as executor, filed a petition asking for instructions as to the proper disposition of the money in the joint bank account. The trial court held that, when the funds were placed in the joint bank account, the bequest to the niece was adeemed and the funds were no longer a part of the decedent's estate. Therefore, the trial court determined that the brother, as the joint account holder with a right of survivorship, was entitled to all of the proceeds. The named beneficiary now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the bank account was a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship.

The defendant, Jeffery Bowers, appeals his misdemeanor speeding convictions in the Fayette County Circuit Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his request for time to obtain an attorney and, therefore, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of automobile burglary and one count of theft under $500. The Washington County Criminal Court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of five years of incarceration as a Range II multiple offender. During the same hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation from numerous prior convictions and ordered the defendant to serve an effective three-year sentence on those cases. The guilty plea cases and the revocation cases were consolidated on appeal. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) upon revoking his probation for the prior convictions, the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his original sentences in confinement; and (2) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing regarding his new convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Ward, II, was convicted by a jury of attempted second degree murder, aggravated spousal rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises five issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his five convictions; (2) whether double jeopardy bars multiple convictions that all require proof of the element of serious bodily injury; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant's prior bad acts; (4) whether the Defendant was prejudiced by the State's failure to provide him with discovery items; and (5) whether the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mandrall Porter, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After a review of the record, this court determines that petitioner's claims must fail. Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that his sentence has expired or that his conviction for especially aggravated robbery is void. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, William Osepczuk, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and sentenced to confinement for twenty-five years. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel had been ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this timely appeal resulted. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Frank Sumner, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the procedures for returning a formerly disabled police officer to work. After the Employee Benefit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County determined that the former officer was no longer disabled, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department directed him to report to a 13-week training class. Fearing that he could lose both his disability pension and his job if he failed the training class, the officer filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department lacked the authority to require him to complete the training class before returning him to work. The trial court determined that requiring the officer to complete the training class before returning him to active duty was not inconsistent with Nashville's charter or ordinances. The officer perfected this appeal. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Department has the authority to require the officer to complete the training before returning him to active duty.

This appeal involves competing claims for breach of contract. J.W. Gibson d/b/a J.W. Gibson Company ("Defendant"), entered into an oral contract with Pratt Masonry Company ("Pratt Masonry") for Pratt Masonry to furnish masonry work on a house. When the work was completed, Defendant refused to pay, claiming the masonry work was so defective that all the bricks had to be removed and replaced. Pratt Masonry filed suit seeking payment for the work performed under the oral contract. Defendant counterclaimed for damages incurred in having to remove and replace the bricks. The Trial Court concluded Pratt Masonry breached the contract by performing  substandard masonry work, but Defendant failed to prove it was necessary to remove and replace all the bricks. Both parties appeal. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Marjorie Delapp, Mary Sherrod, and Elsie Caton ("Plaintiffs") sued their brother, Arthur David Pratt ("Defendant") claiming, in part, that Defendant exercised undue influence over their mother, Mary Armstrong Pratt ("the Deceased") to induce the Deceased to make a will in Defendant's favor. After a jury trial, judgment was entered holding the Deceased was competent to make the will, that a confidential relationship existed between Defendant and the Deceased, and that the will was not the last will and testament of the Deceased. Defendant appeals claiming, in part, that the Trial Court erred in allowing testimony regarding his alleged racial prejudice to be introduced and in failing to grant a mistrial after reference was made to his alleged sexual misconduct. Defendant also argues there is no material evidence to support the jury's verdicts of confidential relationship and undue influence and that the Trial Court erred in denying his objection to the entry of judgment. We affirm

The defendant was convicted in 1998 of a series of felonies, receiving an effective sentence of five years and six months. He was released on parole in 1999, and his parole was revoked in 2002, resulting in his reincarceration. Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his five-year-six-month sentence had expired. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition; and, following our review, we affirm the dismissal.

The petitioner, Charles William Jones, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the definition of "knowingly" as applied to second degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.