APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Weakley County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for manufacturing not less than .5 ounce or more than 10 pounds of marijuana. The Weakley County Sheriff’s Department found the marijuana pursuant to a search of the defendant’s home based on a search warrant. The sheriff’s department received the search warrant based on information garnered in a non-consensual warrantless search of a portable shed behind the defendant’s home. Due to previous drug-related charges which were later dismissed, the portable shed had been the subject of forfeiture proceedings in 2000. The defendant made no efforts to contest the forfeiture, but the sheriff’s department also made no efforts to remove the portable shed. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search of the portable shed. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a plea of guilty and purported to reserve this certified question for appeal: Whether or not the search of the storage shed predicated on a search warrant was preceded and based upon a prior warrantless search. Because of the ambiguity of the certified question as presented, we dismiss the appeal.

A Rhea County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Dewayne Jordan, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of incest, for which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly allowed the state to amend the indictment to charge a different date of commission of the offenses; and (2) the indictment failed to inform him of the charges with sufficient particularity. We remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The divorce judgment approved a MDA which provided that the minor children would reside with their father in Rhea County while mother was working in Atlanta. When not working, mother had custody. Two years after the divorce, father petitioned for custody, alleging that at the time of the divorce it was contemplated that mother would return to Tennessee and share equal parenting time. Mother counter-claimed for custody. Father was awarded primary custody. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for a hearing on the comparative fitness of each parent.

The appellant, Michael B. Laster, entered pleas of no contest in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to theft of property over $1,000, operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, resisting arrest, and felony failure to appear. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the appellant received an effective four year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant's request for alternative sentencing in the form of community corrections, and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court denied a Petition for Name Change. Among the allegations the Petitioner raises on appeal are that the master or special judge who denied his Petition was biased against him and that she was not authorized to act as a judge. We do not find sufficient evidence of bias in the record to justify reversal on that ground. We do find that the record is devoid of proper documentation of the basis of the master's authority to sit as a substitute judge. However, we need not determine whether reversal is required because of that deficiency, because we find that the trial court failed to articulate and the record fails to demonstrate any legally sufficient reason for denying the Petition. Therefore, the denial and dismissal of the Petition must be vacated.

In 1998, the defendant, George E. Ratliff, was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, for raping his six-year-old daughter and was sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. He subsequently filed a direct appeal and a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on the victim's recantation of her testimony. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely, and the defendant appealed. The direct appeal and the error coram nobis appeal were consolidated, and this court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the petition, remanded the matter for a hearing, and stayed the direct appeal pending the trial court's ruling on the error coram nobis petition. See State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 2002). On remand, the trial court denied the petition, and the defendant appeals. In his direct appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, in denying his request for individual voir dire of two prospective jurors, and in ruling that the amount of time that lapsed between the victim's complaint and his arrest was irrelevant. Additionally, he argues that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence and affirm the trial court's denial of the petition for writ of error coram nobis.

The defendant, Travis Lamont Williams, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to attempted carjacking, a Class C felony; burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony; and felony vandalism, also a Class E felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant received consecutive sentences of six years for the attempted carjacking, two years for the burglary, and one year for the vandalism, for an effective nine-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for enhanced probation and ordered that he serve his sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a child support and visitation dispute. Mother and Father, never married, have two minor children. The parties lived together from 1997 until March 2001, when Father was arrested for domestic assault. Father moved out of the residence. Mother filed a complaint seeking to be the primary residential parent, requested child support and arrearages and asked for temporary support and attorney fees. The juvenile court placed primary custody of the children with Mother, set visitation, and ordered Father to pay $4,000 a month in child support plus $31,586 in arrearages. Father appealed, taking issue with visitation, child support, arrearages, and the court's failure to make findings of fact regarding the alleged domestic assault. Mother appealed claiming the court erred by rejecting most of her claim for her attorney fees. We affirm the trial court's determinations concerning child support and visitation, modify the offset against the arrearage owed for child support, and reverse and remand Mother's request for attorney fees. Further, we find that the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact concerning the domestic abuse charge because the alleged domestic assault was not against a minor.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; and Remanded.
 

Wife filed the present divorce action seeking, inter alia, alimony. The trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro based upon a perceived need rather than a demonstrative need. For the following reasons, we reverse.

This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of property in a marriage of relatively short duration. Prior to marriage, the parties lived for a few months with the husband's parents before moving to a farm purchased by the husband with a down payment provided by his parents.The wife gave birth to the parties' child a few months after the move, and the parties  subsequently married. Twenty-two months later, the wife filed for divorce. Both before and during the marriage, the wife assisted the husband with his cattle farming operation as well as with improvements to the property. The trial court found the farm to be marital property under the doctrine of transmutation, assigned it a value of $100,000, and awarded it to the husband. The trial court awarded most of the farm equipment and forty-eight head of cattle to the husband as his separate property and divided the marital property between the parties, with the husband awarded the remainder of the farm machinery and all but eleven head of cattle, and the wife awarded a 1987 Chevrolet Cavalier, the remaining cattle, and a cash judgment of $27,000 for her "substantial contributions to the farm and farming operation." The husband was assigned sole responsibility for the marital debt. The husband appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly classified, valued, and distributed the property. We conclude that the trial court correctly found that the farm was marital property, but erred in its valuation of the farm and in its distribution of the marital property. Accordingly, we modify the trial court's cash judgment to the wife to $11,886.50, which represents one-half of the equity in the farm at the time of the divorce and one-half of the unaccounted-for proceeds from the husband's sale of cattle in violation of an automatic injunction in the case.

The appellant, Roger Murel Staples, was convicted by a jury of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years as a Range I, Standard Offender. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, his sentence, statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument, and the trial court's decision to admit evidence of activity at the appellant's residence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Husband filed present divorce action against Wife alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Wife answered denying the inappropriate marital conduct and subsequently counter-complained for divorce alleging adultery. Wife amended her countercomplaint to request a legal separation or in the alternative an absolute divorce. The trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce based upon its finding of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded Wife alimony by requiring Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance for three years and, thereafter, pay Wife $50.00 a month. The trial court ordered a property division and required Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of divorce, distribution of marital property and debt, and award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of alimony in the amount of $50.00 a month but vacate the award of health insurance and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The Defendant, Joy Kennedy, was found guilty by a jury of vehicular homicide, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and reckless driving. However, the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding that she had established the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. The State appealed on the ground that the trial court erred by granting the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The sole issue on appeal is whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that the defense of insanity had not been established by clear and convincing evidence. We hold that no reasonable juror could have failed to find that the Defendant was legally insane at the time of the crimes. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mary Murr Turner, pled guilty to accessory after the fact, and the Cocke County trial court sentenced her to one year incarceration as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Kenneth H. Laws, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and acquitted of false imprisonment. Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After reviewing the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed a petition to reduce his child support obligation following his loss of employment as a mechanical engineer and his inability to find other employment. Relief was denied, notwithstanding that two children had attained their majority, and the petition was dismissed. Judgment reversed and case remanded.

The issue in this case is whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. The plaintiff sued the defendants for, among other things, breach of contract, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On July 15, 2002, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Thirty-two (32) days later, on August 16, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiff now appeals. This Court, sua sponte, asked the parties for supplemental briefs regarding whether the appeal was timely. In light of the undisputed facts, we must hold that the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and, consequently, that the plaintiff’s notice of appeal was untimely. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
 

This case involves the timeliness of a grievance filed by Appellant, an employee of Roane State Community College. The hearing officer determined that such grievance was not filed within the limitations period. Appellant appealed this decision to the Chancery Court of Davidson County, which affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. Appellant now appeals to this Court and we affirm.

This is a zoning case. The property owner applied to re-zone the property from agricultural to business. The Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development and the county planning commission recommended that the County Commission deny the property owner’s application. The County Commission voted to deny the application. The plaintiff/appellant property owner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in chancery court, seeking to overturn the decision. The defendant/appellee County Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. The property owner now appeals. We affirm, finding no genuine issue of material fact and that the County Commission had a rational basis for its decision.
 

The Appellant, Brian Douglas Williams, appeals the decision of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In August 2002, Williams entered “best interest” pleas to stalking, harassment, and aggravated assault and received an effective eight-year sentence. These sentences were suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. On October 18, 2002, a warrant was issued, alleging that Williams had violated a condition of his probation by contacting the victim. After a hearing, Williams was found to be in violation of his probation, and his original consecutive sentences to the Department of Correction and the County Workhouse were reinstated. On appeal, Williams argues that the evidence fails to establish that he violated his probation. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Joann Mallinak Glassell ("Plaintiff") was represented by attorney James M. Crain ("Crain") throughout divorce proceedings she filed against Richard Lee Glassell ("Defendant"). After a trial, the Trial Court ordered the equity from the sale of the marital residence to be divided equally between the parties. The Trial Court then applied various off-sets to the amount awarded Plaintiff, thereby reducing the net amount of Plaintiff's recovery to $0.00. The Trial Court concluded that Crain's attorney's fee lien was lower in priority to the various off-sets. Crain appeals, claiming the Trial Court improperly subordinated his attorney's fee lien to the off-sets and that his lien should be given priority. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and affirm as modified.

The Defendant, Randy James, pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The issue before us is whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the fruits of a search where there were alleged false statements in the affidavit supporting the search warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.