APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a dispute over the payment for leased construction equipment used on two sewer projects for the City of Gallatin. The general contractor was required to take over and complete the work after a subcontractor and sub-subcontractor defaulted. Thereafter, the company that had leased three pieces of construction equipment to the subcontractor and sub-subcontractor submitted claims for payment to the general contractor and the contractor's bonding company. The general contractor declined to pay for the equipment and filed suit for breach of contract against the subcontractor in the Circuit Court for Sumner County. The contractor also sought a declaratory judgment regarding its rights, as well as those of its bonding company, the subcontractor, and the City, under the construction contract, the subcontracts, and the payment bond. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court awarded the equipment leasing company a $38,399 judgment against the bonding company and the sub-subcontractor and a $29,232 judgment against the subcontractor. The court also denied the equipment leasing company's request for pre-judgment interest because it had intentionally falsified documents during the collection process. The bonding company appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss all of the equipment leasing company's claims against the payment bond after expressly finding that the leasing company had committed fraud during the claims process. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against the contractor's surety.

The petitioner, James William Parsons, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 1999, he pled guilty to theft of property over $1000, arson, consuming alcohol while under the age of twenty-one, and possession of a weapon in the commission of an offense and was sentenced to an effective sentence of two years and one day, with all but 120 days to be served on probation. He was subsequently convicted on separate charges in federal court and sentenced to the federal penitentiary. The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Greene County Criminal Court, claiming that his state plea agreement was illegal and void and therefore it was improper for the federal court to use the state convictions to enhance his federal sentence. The trial court dismissed the petition without a hearing on the matter, and the petitioner appealed. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Tennessee Board of Examiners in Psychology received a complaint from the patient of a psychologist alleging the psychologist breached the ethical duty of confidentiality by disclosing information to the patient's sister. During the course of the investigation, the psychologist revealed that he had disclosed confidential information about the same patient to another psychologist romantically involved with the patient. The board filed charges against the psychologist alleging violations of the ethical rules governing confidentiality and documentation of therapy. Following an administrative hearing, the board placed the psychologist's license on probation for two years subject to two conditions: (1) he complete twenty hours of continuing education training and (2) his practice be supervised during the two year probationary period by another psychologist. In addition, the board assessed a $1,000.00 civil penalty against the psychologist. The psychologist appealed the board's decision to the Chancery Court of Davidson County which affirmed the board's decision. The psychologist appealed to this Court. We affirm.

The Appellant, Kenneth M. Holliday, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, Holliday argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his request for alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Laconia Lamar Bowers, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, see State v. Laconia Lamar Bowers, No. E1999-00170-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 15020 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 11, 2000), and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. See State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001). The petitioner now seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Appellant/Homeowner appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee/Homebuilder. Appellant/Homeowner sued Appellee/Homebuilder on theories of faulty installation and construction of Appellant/Homeowner’s roof and under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Appellant/Homeowner’s claims were time barred under both T.C.A. §28-3-202 and T.C.A. §47-18-110. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jeffrey A. Utley, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court found that the petition did not set forth grounds which would entitle the Defendant to habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case involves a lengthy and protracted attempt by the Department of Children's Services and numerous other social services agencies to assist the biological parents of five children with creating an acceptable environment for the children. After five years and repeated efforts, the Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of mother and father alleging the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans, and persistent conditions. The department also alleged that termination of the parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Following a hearing on the petition, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the natural parents. The mother of four of the children and the father of all five children filed an appeal to this Court. After reviewing the entire record, we affirm.

The City of Memphis promulgated an On-the-Job Injury Program to handle claims filed by city employees seeking benefits for on-the-job injuries. Thirteen firefighters and one police officer filed applications for benefits with the city. When the city denied the applications, the employees filed appeals to the On-the-Job Injury Appeals Panel which affirmed the city’s denial of benefits. Each employee appealed the panel’s determination to the Chancery Court of Shelby County by filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking review under a statutory writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a common law writ of certiorari. The chancellor reversed the panel’s decision and held that, pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, proceedings before the panel are subject to the contested case procedures set forth in the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. In addition, the chancellor held that, pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, judicial review of the panel’s decision is neither by common law or statutory writ, but review must be conducted in accordance with section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code. The city appealed the chancery court’s ruling to this Court arguing that the chancellor erred in applying section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to the panel. We reverse the chancery court’s ruling.
 

The Defendant, Leslie Carl Clark, pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, violation of the implied consent law and driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense, said sentences to be served concurrently in the local workhouse. It is from this order that the Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a child custody case. Father/Appellant appeals from the trial court's Order, which denied Father/Appellant's Petition to change custody from the minor children’s Mother to Father. Finding that there is not a material change in circumstances to warrant a change of custody, we affirm.
 

The Defendant, Romelus Caraway, was indicted for felony Escape. A Shelby County Jury convicted the Defendant of the indicted offense, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years, after it determined the Defendant was a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him a new trial because: (1) the indictment against the Defendant was fatally defective and the trial court allowed the State to use this defective indictment to prove essential elements of the offense for which he was charged; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father to their children. After a hearing, the Lauderdale County Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights over W.N. and C.N. on the grounds of abandonment for failure to support and severe child abuse. Further, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother now seeks review by this Court, and we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Miko T. Burl, was convicted of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the Petitioner’s aggravated assault conviction, but affirmed all of the Petitioner’s other convictions. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because the Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective.  Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Harry Jamieson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the  ial court. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant’s sentence for aggravated robbery to eight years and the sentences for aggravated assault to three years each, for an effective sentence of eight years incarceration. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves the construction of a will. The will established a trust for the benefit of the decedent's children that provided income for eleven years. At the end of the eleven year term, the trust was to be terminated and the trust assets distributed to the beneficiaries. During the eleven-year term, one of the decedent's children died, leaving no spouse, children or surviving parent. The beneficiary under the deceased child's will sued, seeking that child's share of the trust assets. At issue was whether the trust assets vested in the beneficiaries when the testator died or when the trust terminated. The probate court held that the decedent intended for the trust corpus not to vest in the beneficiaries until the trust terminated, and that the beneficiary under the child's will would not receive her share of the trust assets. We affirm, finding that the language of the will indicates that the testator intended for the corpus of the trust to vest when the trust terminated.

Lisa Karen Stowers Hoffer, formerly Smith ("Mother"), filed a petition against her former husband, Mark Edward Smith ("Father"), seeking to modify the provisions of the parties' judgment of divorce, which judgment required Father to pay $1,200 per month in child support. The trial court, finding that, in the most recent three years, Father had had an average annual income of $117,238, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring Father to pay child support of $2,803 per month. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

The appellant, John Whatley, was convicted by a jury in the Maury County Circuit Court of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's actions as thirteenth juror, the specificity of the indictment, the trial court's instructions regarding lesser-included offenses, the trial court's evidentiary rulings, sentencing, and the denial of his motion for new trial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, in light of Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant's sentence to eleven years.

Plaintiff sued for breach of employment contract. The Trial Court found a breach and awarded damages. On appeal we hold the employer had just cause to terminate, and reverse Judgment.

The Defendant, Steven Frederick Brinkley ¹, was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI"), second offense, and violation of the implied consent law. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI because: (1) he was not in "physical control" of his vehicle; and (2) the parking lot where his vehicle was located was not a premises frequented by the public at large. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the court's authority to order a parent to pay support for an adult disabled child. The parties were married with two severely disabled adult sons. In 1995, while the parties were still married, the probate court established them as co-conservators for their sons. In June 2001, the mother filed a petition for divorce in circuit court. Neither party informed the divorce court of the conservatorships that had been established for their sons. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce which incorporated a parenting plan, submitted by the father, which provided for joint custody of the sons. The divorce decree required the mother to pay child support to the father. The divorce decree was not appealed. The mother later filed a motion requesting that the decree requiring her to pay child support be vacated pursuant to Rule 60.02(3), asserting that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require her to pay support for the adult sons. Rather than rule on the mother's motion, the divorce court transferred the case to the probate court, which had before it the conservatorship actions. The father then filed a motion in the probate court asking it to confirm the divorce decree entered by the divorce court. The probate court, in the same order, denied the mother's motion to vacate and granted the father's motion to confirm the decree adopting the parenting plan, determining that the divorce decree entered by the divorce court was valid. The mother now appeals that order. We reverse, concluding that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the parent to pay support for the adult disabled children, but finding that the probate court is permitted to consider requiring the parents to pay support in the context of the conservatorship proceedings.