APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Marjorie Delapp, Mary Sherrod, and Elsie Caton ("Plaintiffs") sued their brother, Arthur David Pratt ("Defendant") claiming, in part, that Defendant exercised undue influence over their mother, Mary Armstrong Pratt ("the Deceased") to induce the Deceased to make a will in Defendant's favor. After a jury trial, judgment was entered holding the Deceased was competent to make the will, that a confidential relationship existed between Defendant and the Deceased, and that the will was not the last will and testament of the Deceased. Defendant appeals claiming, in part, that the Trial Court erred in allowing testimony regarding his alleged racial prejudice to be introduced and in failing to grant a mistrial after reference was made to his alleged sexual misconduct. Defendant also argues there is no material evidence to support the jury's verdicts of confidential relationship and undue influence and that the Trial Court erred in denying his objection to the entry of judgment. We affirm

The defendant was convicted in 1998 of a series of felonies, receiving an effective sentence of five years and six months. He was released on parole in 1999, and his parole was revoked in 2002, resulting in his reincarceration. Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his five-year-six-month sentence had expired. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition; and, following our review, we affirm the dismissal.

On February 28, 2002, the defendant, Richard A. Siters, pled guilty to four counts of attempted  rape, a Class C felony; one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony; and one count of attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years, suspended, and placed him on intensive supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. We disagree and affirm the revocation.

A Campbell County jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence, third offense. On appeal, the defendant contends the state failed to establish venue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Darian Nigel Sparks, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to robbery and the attempted sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, Class C felonies. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received consecutive sentences of eight years for each offense, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentences and ordered that he serve his sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of the "knowing" mens rea for attempted second degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jon Brewbaker, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue on appeal is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Danny Williamson, pled guilty in the Cocke County Criminal Court to possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court held that the need for deterrence warranted the defendant's serving his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. We affirm the defendant's sentence but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment.

The Defendant, Jonathan W. Susman, pled guilty to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial judge and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The question is whether there were sufficient specific and articulable facts to justify a police officer detaining the Defendant in order for him to perform field sobriety tests. We conclude that there were, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether and under what circumstances grandparents may intervene in proceedings brought to terminate the parent-child relationship. In this case, the grandparents filed a motion in the juvenile court to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The juvenile court denied the motion, and the grandparents moved for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The trial court granted the motion. Following the Court of Appeals' denial of the grandparents' application for permission to appeal, they filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court; we granted the application. After a thorough review of the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that the motion filed in juvenile court seeking intervention in the termination of parental rights case is to be analyzed under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Using this analysis, we find no error and affirm the denial of the motion to intervene.

The trial court denied Appellants’ petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights and returned physical custody of children to Mother. We reverse and remand for determination of whether termination is in the best interests of the children. We vacate the order returning physical custody to Mother.

The defendant, Joe King, appeals the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for theft and the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court. After review of the entire record in this cause, we conclude that the evidence amply supported the defendant's conviction. The issue of restitution is waived pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The juvenile court entered an order declaring Appellant the father of T.S.R. and ordered child support. Appellant failed to pay child support and incurred an arrearage of $27,051.68. Appellant petitioned the court for Rule 60.02 relief from the final order and requested a blood paternity test. The DNA test indicated that Appellant was not the father. The trial court relieved Appellant of his ongoing child support but required him to pay the child support arrearage. For the following reasons, we affirm

An inmate who was convicted and sentenced for passing worthless checks filed suit against six officers of the court for conspiracy, violation of his constitutional rights, and various derelictions of duty. The plaintiff asked the trial court to sanction the defendants by impeachment and/or disbarment. He also asked for $33 million in monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm.

This case involves the interpretation of certain provisions of a Trust Instrument. The trial court found a latent ambiguity in the Instrument, allowed extrinsic evidence, and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, in this appeal of right, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) and disorderly conduct. After a careful review of the record, we affirm both convictions. The disorderly conduct conviction is remanded for modification of judgment to conform to the statutory maximum sentence.

The employee, a retired police officer, filed suit seeking workers' compensation benefits. He alleged that his job duties caused him to develop hypertension resulting in permanent partial disability. The employee relies on the statutory presumption of causation for law enforcement officers found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201(a)(1), and concedes that if the employer has rebutted the presumption, there is insufficient evidence establishing a causal relationship between his hypertension and his employment. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable legal principles, we conclude that the City of Knoxville has rebutted the statutory presumption of causation, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Raymon Haymon, was convicted by a jury in the Dyer County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder. Upon conviction, the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that one of the witnesses at his trial had recanted his testimony. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to produce newly discovered evidence. The petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Rhea County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Dewayne Jordan, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of incest, for which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly allowed the state to amend the indictment to charge a different date of commission of the offenses; and (2) the indictment failed to inform him of the charges with sufficient particularity. We remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An inmate filed a claim with the Claims Commission contending negligence on the part of the Tennessee Department of Correction in miscalculating his sentence credits. The Commission dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the inmate appealed, and we affirm.

The defendant, James Ray Bartlett, appeals the trial court's denial of his request for credit for time served in community corrections. Because the defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the cause is dismissed.

The defendant, John Lemont Pierce, indicted for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, and simple assault, entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering a maximum sentence of 15 years and requiring consecutive service. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner was convicted by a Giles County jury for several drug-related offenses and was given an effective sentence of 72 years. In his direct appeal to this Court, his conviction was affirmed, and his sentence was reduced to 46 years. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals the decision of the post-conviction court and argues three issues on appeal: (1) Whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that trial counsel was effective; (2) whether the post-conviction court erred in its decision with respect to the trial judge's presence in the jury room; and (3) whether newly-discovered evidence of officer/witness's wrong doing and character mandates a new trial. We affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the wrongful payment of funds by Defendant over Plaintiff’s forged signature. The lower court found that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by former Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-4-406, which places a one-year limit on certain claims by bank customers seeking to recover losses occasioned by unauthorized signatures. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.