APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns opposition by the City of Cleveland, Tennessee (“the City”) to an application by Middle Tennessee Treatment Centers, LLC, d/b/a Cleveland Comprehensive Treatment Center (“CCTC”) to operate a nonresidential, substitution-based treatment center for opiate addiction within the City.  The City filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency (“the Agency”) seeking to have the certificate of need granted for CCTC revoked on grounds that CCTC failed to provide proof of service upon the City by certified mail, return receipt requested, in contravention of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1607(c)(9)(A).  CCTC intervened in the case.  CCTC and the Agency (“Defendants,” collectively) filed motions to dismiss.  After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The City appeals.  We hold, inter alia, that the purpose of the notice provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1607(c)(9)(A) is to afford the relevant officials an opportunity to participate in an Agency hearing on whether a certificate of need is granted; proof of receipt is required.  We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

The Defendant, Jeremiah Warren, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s revocation of his fifteen-year community corrections sentence for his arson conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-14-301 (2018) (arson). On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in revoking community corrections and ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A property owner sued a neighboring property owner for breach of an easement agreement.  The defendant filed a countercomplaint alleging that the plaintiff committed the first material breach.  The trial court found that the defendant had violated the agreement, but the violation did not rise to the level of a material breach.  The court also found that the defendant had not proven that the plaintiff breached the agreement.  So the court dismissed both the complaint and the countercomplaint.  But the court also granted detailed declaratory relief.  On appeal, we conclude that the court erred in failing to award attorney’s fees as mandated by the easement agreement.  The court also erred by imposing a construction deadline on one party that was not included in the easement agreement.  In all other respects, we affirm.

A woman sued a homeowner for negligence due to injuries she sustained when a pot-bellied pig maintained on the homeowner’s property jumped on her and knocked her off of the homeowner’s front porch. The homeowner filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that he did not owe the woman a duty of reasonable care because she was a trespasser.  The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and the woman appealed.  Determining that genuine issues of material fact still exist because the homeowner failed to establish that the woman was a trespasser, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Williams, of first degree premeditated murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted his confession into evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal follows several related cases involving a now-adopted child. The first case was a surrender proceeding filed in chancery court, the second case was a termination of parental rights proceeding filed in chancery court, and the third case was a proceeding for termination of parental rights and adoption filed in circuit court. Upon the filing of the petition for adoption, the chancery court matters were transferred to circuit court. Three individuals who were parties to the chancery court proceedings jointly filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding, which the circuit court denied. The circuit court also dismissed the claims that had been filed by those three parties in chancery court. The three would-be intervenors appeal the dismissal of their claims filed in chancery court. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Justin Richard Norton, pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated assault, theft of property, evading arrest, resisting arrest, and violating an order of protection. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); -13-113 (2018) (subsequently amended) (violation of order of protection); -14-103 (2018) (theft of property); -16-602 (2018) (resisting arrest); -16-603(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest). The Defendant received an agreed three-year, splitconfinement sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the pleas were made under duress and that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted Robert Alexander Grisham, Petitioner, of observation without consent, unlawful photography, and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. State v. Robert Grisham, No. E2015-02446-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1806829, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017). On appeal, a panel of this Court modified Petitioner’s especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction to attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and affirmed the two misdemeanor convictions. Id. at *26. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied relief and Petitioner appealed. Petitioner died while his appeal was pending. Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal should be dismissed.

This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children upon the juvenile court’s finding the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and financial responsibility for the children. The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We vacate the statutory ground of persistent conditions because we are unable to verify that this finding was the independent judgment of the juvenile court. We affirm the remaining grounds for the termination of the mother’s parental rights, as well as the juvenile court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

This is a mandamus action in which the plaintiffs seek to compel the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-108(e), to complete the plans of services arising from a 1972 annexation and to publish annual reports of its progress pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-108(c). Two areas of the 1972 annexation are at issue: (1) an area known as “Tiftonia” or “Area 4” and (2) an area known as “Wauhatchee–Williams Island” or “Area 12.” The plaintiffs also seek a declaration that all annexations by the City since 1981 were void due to the City’s violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-102(b)(5), which prohibits a municipality from annexing additional territory while in default on a prior plan of services. After three years of trial preparation, but prior to trial, the court imposed monetary sanctions against the City under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.03 in the amount of $263,273.08 for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses caused by the City’s failure to supplement discovery responses. Thereafter, the case was tried in three phases. Following the first phase of the trial in 2017, the court found the City complied with its obligations as to Area 4; however, it found the City “materially and substantially failed to comply” with its obligations to provide street paving, street construction, and sanitary sewers in Area 12. Following the second phase of the trial in 2019, the court found the City’s failure to comply with its obligations as to Area 12 was not excused in that it was not caused by “unforeseen circumstances.” As a consequence, the court ordered the City to submit a proposed scope of services to be provided, which would, inter alia, be the subject of the Phase 3 trial. After the third and final phase of the trial in 2020, the court found the City’s proposed scope of services was insufficient and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the City to bring all streets up to current standards and install, inter alia, a gravity-fed sewer system for Area 12 within 48 months. The court also ordered the City to publish annual reports of its progress and enjoined the City from further annexations until the services were provided. Finally, the court found the plaintiffs were not entitled to additional relief for the City’s past violations of §§ 6-51-102(b)(5) and - 108(c). Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the trial court erred 01/25/2022 - 2 - by finding the City complied with the plan of services for Area 4 and by denying their request for additional relief under §§ 6-51-102(b)(5) and -108(c). The City contends that § 6-51-102(b)(5) and § 6-51-108(c) and (e) do not apply to the annexations of Area 4 and Area 12 because the statutes were enacted after the annexation ordinances were passed. The City also contends that the plaintiffs lack standing, and that their claims are barred by the doctrine of laches and the applicable statute of limitations. In the alternative, the City asserts that the trial court erred by finding it failed to materially and substantially comply with the plan of services for Area 12. The City also appeals the trial court’s award of sanctions for noncompliance with discovery under Rule of Civil Procedure 37.03. Following a thorough review, we reverse and modify the trial court’s judgment regarding the standards that apply to the City’s provision of street paving and construction in Area 12; vacate its judgment regarding the City’s provision of sanitary and storm sewers in Areas 4 and 12; and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the court’s judgment in all other respects.

The Appellant, Jimmy Heard, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

This appeal involves a United Postal Service (“UPS”) worker who was injured when her foot went through the porch of a residence at which she was delivering a package. The UPS worker sued the property management company who leased the property, alleging it was liable for her injuries. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, finding the property management company had no duty to the UPS worker. Because the record on appeal does not contain the lease agreement the trial court relied upon in granting the property management company’s motion for summary judgment, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court.

The Appellant, Michael Brown, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective six-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence, including his request for judicial diversion. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied diversion and ordered that he serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his requests for judicial diversion and full probation. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Phillip Daniel Morton, of first degree premediated murder.  The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction.  The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  The post-conviction court denied relief.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. 

Following their divorce, both parents sought modification of a permanent parenting plan.  The parents agreed that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification.  But they disagreed over the parenting schedule and who should be the primary residential parent.  Among other things, the trial court retained the father as the primary residential parent and gave him sole decision making over major decisions.  And the court substantially reduced the mother’s parenting time.  Both parents also filed petitions for contempt against the other.  In part, the father sought to hold the mother in contempt for failure to make certain payments as required by the divorce decree.  Although the court dismissed all of the contempt petitions, it ordered the mother to pay the father for the missed payments anyway.  We vacate the modified plan and remand for a determination of the minor child’s best interest.  Otherwise, we affirm.

Parents sued a property owner after their child, while playing on the property, received an electrical shock from a downed power line.  The property owner moved for summary judgment.  Based on the undisputed facts, the trial court determined that the property owner was essentially a landlord and had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the downed power line.  So the court dismissed the parents’ claims against the property owner.  On appeal, the parents argue that the property owner was a
co-possessor of the portion of the property where the child was injured rather than a landlord.  And, as a result, they contend that the property owner owed a duty to inspect the property to discover dangerous conditions such as the downed power line.  At the very least, they contend that the question of constructive notice was for the jury.  We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

This is a negligence case arising out of an injury suffered by the plaintiff after she tripped over a sewer cleanout cap and fell on the sidewalk in a residential neighborhood.  She filed suit against the construction company that placed the cleanout cap and the City of Lebanon that assumed ownership of the sidewalk.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding, inter alia, that the applicable statute of repose barred the suit against the construction company and that the City was immune from liability.  The plaintiff appeals.  We affirm.

The Petitioner, Melvin Keith Black, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Upon our review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition.  

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to support; (4) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard; (5) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (6) persistent conditions; (7) severe child abuse; and (8) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the children. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home. We reverse the juvenile court in part and affirm in part.

During a previous appeal in this action involving issues of child support and custody, this Court awarded to the mother her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to determine the amount of such award. Following remand, the trial court conducted a hearing to consider evidence concerning the mother’s attorney’s fees. The trial court subsequently entered an order setting the mother’s award of reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $150,218.02. The father has appealed. Based upon our thorough review of the evidence presented, we modify the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the mother from $150,218.02 to $123,195.00. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified.

This negligence case arises from a one-car accident in which the Plaintiff Jason M. Peterson, a passenger in a car driven by Defendant Jodi L. Carey, was injured. Plaintiff filed his complaint more than one year after he was injured. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A), had run and the case was untimely filed. Plaintiff argued that because Defendant was given a citation for failure to exercise due care, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 104(a)(2), which provides for a two-year limitations period if “[c]riminal charges are brought against any person alleged to have caused or contributed to the injury,” applies. Defendant responded that because the police issued her citation under the Kingsport Municipal Code, the total fine was fifty dollars, a penalty that was civil and not criminal in nature. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action with prejudice, holding it was filed too late. Because no evidence of the citation was presented to the trial court, and there is no indication in the trial court’s final judgment that it considered the arguments regarding the citation, we vacate and remand for the trial court to consider the evidence and rule on the issue presented.

In 2019, the Defendant, Quinton Deshawn Mostella, pleaded guilty to facilitation of first degree murder.  The trial court imposed a twenty-two-year sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence in a 2009 case.  The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct the 2019 judgment contending that the judgment did not reflect 714 days of pretrial jail credit.  The trial court granted the motion, awarding the Defendant pretrial jail credit and amending his sentence to run concurrently to his 2009 sentence.  On appeal, the State contends that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to amend the Defendant’s judgment and sentence.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s amended judgment.

Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, a Tennessee company that services contracts with the United States government, procured business insurance from Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd., d/b/a The Hartford (“Sentinel”) and American National Property and Casualty Company (“ANPAC”) through insurance agent Steve Hardin. Vanquish later sought coverage for its payment of an arbitrated settlement with a subcontractor. Despite Mr. Hardin’s assurance that Vanquish would have coverage for the dispute, Vanquish’s claim was denied because it was outside the stated coverage of its insurance policies. Vanquish brought negligent misrepresentation and negligence claims against Mr. Hardin and against Sentinel and ANPAC on the basis of vicarious liability. The trial court granted summary judgment to Mr. Hardin, Sentinel, and ANPAC. Vanquish appeals. Because the unrebutted statutory presumptions of Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-135 effectively negate elements of each cause of action, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Rashawn Jones, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition seeking relief from his convictions upon his guilty pleas to three counts of robbery and one count of felony escape. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.