APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal of a termination of parental rights case. Appellant mother contends that the
petitioners have no standing to bring the petition and also that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination and that the termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.
 

The petitioner was indicted for first degree murder and subsequently pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years as a career offender with a 60% release eligibility date. The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief, arguing: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) his guilty plea was made unknowingly with respect to his release eligibility status as a career offender. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Ronnie M. Cauthern, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1988, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of felony murder and sentenced to death. He was also convicted of the related crimes of first degree burglary and aggravated rape. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court, but his death sentences were reversed and remanded for a new sentencing trial. Upon retrial before a jury in 1995, the petitioner received the death penalty for the murder of one victim and a sentence of life imprisonment for the second victim's murder. Those sentences were appealed and affirmed, following which the petitioner instituted a collateral proceeding seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions and sentences. Lengthy hearings were conducted on the petitioner's claims, the majority of which involved allegations that counsel representing him in his 1988 and 1995 trials rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel's services were deficient and prejudicial; (2) that the state suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights; (3) that the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona require that his death sentence be set aside; (4) that he was entitled to but was not notified of his right to seek German consular assistance pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (5) that the lower court erroneously concluded that some of his claims had been waived or previously determined; (6) that Tennessee's system of capital punishment is unconstitutional; and (7) that erroneous jury instructions impaired his right to a fair trial. After an extensive review of the record and consideration of applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a mistrial in August of 2001, the Defendant, Deji Ogundiya, was retried and convicted by a jury of three counts of sexual battery. In this appeal, the Defendant raises several issues, including whether the trial court erred by failing to charge misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of sexual battery. The State concedes that the trial court so erred. We agree that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense. Therefore, the Defendant's convictions are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Clark, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI") and assault. The Defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support her assault conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence exists and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shaun David Pierce, pled guilty to four counts of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony, two counts of theft over one-thousand dollars, a Class D felony, two counts of theft over five-hundred dollars, a Class E felony, four counts of theft under five-hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor, and two counts of vandalism under five-hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant received an effective sentence of sixteen years. The sole issue in this direct appeal is whether the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to serve his sentence in the community corrections program. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Basil Marceaux (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against “The Citizen David Norton.” David Norton (“Defendant”) is the Soddy Daisy City Court Judge. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit because Defendant had found him guilty of violating the Tennessee Financial Responsibility Law and imposed a fine. Plaintiff claims these actions by Defendant violated his federal constitutional rights. The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint after concluding, inter alia, that Defendant was judicially immune. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

The defendant, Greg Smith, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to increase the number of pretrial jail credits applied to his sentence. Because the defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellants, Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, were convicted by a Davidson County jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, facilitation of first degree felony murder, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and facilitation of aggravated robbery. Gomez and Londono were ordered to serve forty-nine years in the Department of Correction as Range I standard offenders. On appeal, Gomez presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the photographic line-up and subsequent in-court identification and (2) whether it was error to permit testimony concerning $19,600 found in Gomez's apartment. Londono argues that: (1) the trial court erred by admitting the statements of Co-defendant Bryant Guartos; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the statements of the victim as either an excited utterance or a dying declaration; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts. Both Gomez and Londono argue that the length of their respective sentences was excessive and that consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I agree with the result reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, I question the conclusion that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain a request to grant earned pretrial jail credits.

The petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief from her convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The petitioner has failed to show prejudice from any alleged ineffective assistance, and the issue concerning Leonard Rowe's testimony has been previously determined and is not cognizable for relief on post-conviction. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

On November 2, 2001, the Davidson County Grand Jury returned a three count indictment against the Petitioner, Darryl D. Jackson. He was charged with possession of a schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, possession of a schedule II controlled substance, and driving on a suspended license. On January 22, 2002, he pled guilty to possession of a schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver. The other two charges were dismissed. The appellant received a two year and one month sentence and was given a recommendation for the Department of Correction's Boot Camp program. On October 4. 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and an amended petition on November 14, 2002. A hearing was held on February 18, 2003 and on March 3, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying the petitioner's request for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and was not the result of trial counsel's ineffective assistance. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Charles William Young, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Young is currently incarcerated as a result of a jury conviction for aggravated assault. On appeal, Young presents two issues for our review: (1) whether he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and (2) whether the court erred in refusing to appoint "advisory counsel" at the post-conviction hearing. After review of the issues, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Allen Dale Cutshaw, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition presents no cognizable ground for coram nobis relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The State appeals the trial court's grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the court acted without jurisdiction because the petitioner's sentence has not expired. Because the record reveals a parole violation warrant was issued and the petitioner declared delinquent before the expiration of his six-year sentence, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner was indicted on charges of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. He pled guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder, and the other charge was dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, he received a sentence of forty years, to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Andrew Eakin Moore, entered an open plea of guilty to three counts of attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of resisting arrest. As a result of the guilty pleas, the petitioner received an effective sentence of ten years on all six counts, but the petitioner was ordered to serve 365 days in jail and then be placed on community corrections for the balance of the sentence. Following his release from the jail sentence, the petitioner violated his community corrections sentence and was ordered to serve the balance of the sentence. In this post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner attacks his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Anthony Veasley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a Range II multiple offender to nineteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner contends on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the trial of his case. In making his claim, the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance in three areas: (1) failure of counsel to effectively conduct voir dire, (2) inadequate preparation for and examination of witness Riggan, and (3) failure to prepare the petitioner to testify. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Based on the foregoing conclusions and the record as a whole, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Petitioner, James Dison, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted for rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years confinement. This Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. James Dison, No. 03-C01-9602-CC-00051, 1997 WL 36844, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, January 31, 1997), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1997). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was appointed counsel and subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, simple possession, and driving on a suspended license. The defendant contends on appeal that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and aggravated assault, (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of inactive marijuana metabolites found in the defendant's blood after the accident, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extrapolation of the defendant's blood alcohol concentration back to the time of the accident, (4) the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant to plead guilty to driving on a suspended license, (5) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extradition and instructing the jury on flight, and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant is an inmate of the Department of Corrections serving two life sentences for two first degree murder convictions with sentences imposed in 1978. He became eligible for parole, and on July 3, 2001, a hearing was held before the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. His application for parole was denied on July 3, 2001 and review of parole was set for July of 2011. Final disposition denying parole was entered October 2, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, which petition was dismissed by the trial court on January 10, 2003. We affirm the trial court Order of Dismissal relative to the merits of the denial of parole but hold that postponement of parole review until July of 2011 was an arbitrary exercise of power by the parole board and, therefore, reverse the Order of the trial court.

The defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to reckless homicide and agreed to a sentence of seven years as a Range II, multiple offender. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve one year in the county jail followed by six years in community corrections. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in requiring any confinement in this case. We conclude that the defendant is not eligible for community corrections and remand for re-sentencing.

Honnie Gunnoe and Virginia Ott Gunnoe ("Plaintiffs") sued their neighbors, Gerald Lee Lambert and Janice Lee Lambert ("the Lamberts") and L.D. Simerly and Geraldine Simerly ("the Simerlys") seeking, among other things, to quiet title to a parcel of land. After a bench trial, the Trial Court found, inter alia, that Plaintiffs did not own the land in question. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.