APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights. Based upon this Court’s decisions in prior cases, I believe that there was clear and convincing proof that Father has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.

This case involves a petition to modify a permanent parenting plan for two minor children. The children’s father filed the petition, alleging that there had been a material change of circumstances since the plan was entered and that, as a result, he should be designated as the children’s primary residential parent. The children’s mother denied that there had been a material change of circumstances and filed a counter-petition to modify the father’s child support obligation. After a hearing on the parties’ petitions, the trial court found that there had not been a material change of circumstances to justify modifying the plan. However, the trial court modified several aspects of the plan. The trial court further found that the father was voluntarily underemployed and that his child support obligation should be modified accordingly. Father appealed. We affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The petitioner, Ricardo Antonio Demling, was convicted by a jury of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, for his involvement in stealing two utility trailer vehicles (UTVs), and sentenced to fifteen years as a Range III persistent offender to be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences.1 He now appeals from the denial of postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following grounds: (1) upon receipt of the State’s amended discovery response containing a statement by the petitioner and the name Christopher Brown, the alleged owner of a UTV, trial counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the charge, failure to suppress the statement by the petitioner, and failure to file a motion to continue the trial; (2) failure to interview and secure the testimony of Christopher Brown; (3) failure to file a motion based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tenn. 1999), concerning the alleged destruction of a dash cam recording of the instant traffic stop; (4) failure to file a speedy trial motion to dismiss based on the sixty-seven month delay between the date of the alleged crime and the date of the arrest; and (5) failure to file a motion to dismiss based upon the sixteen month delay between the date of the arrest and the trial.2 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Edward G. Jameson, was convicted of three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and eight counts of incest. See §§ 39-13-532 (statutory rape by an authority figure); 39-15-302 (incest). The trial court classified the Defendant as a Range II offender and imposed a total effective sentence of fifty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that 1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions in Counts One through Four; 2) the indictments for Counts One, Three, Seven, and Ten are barred by the statute of limitations; 3) the State failed to elect a specific offense in Count Ten; 4) the trial court committed plain error in sentencing him as a Range II offender; and 5) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the convictions and sentences in Counts Five, Six, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen, and we reverse and vacate Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Seven, and Ten and dismiss those indictments. We finally remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mainor Canales, Petitioner, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration. State v. Mainor Celin Avilez Canales, No. E2017-01222- CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2084957, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2018). This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to investigate and present an expert witness; and (2) deprived him of his right to a Rule 11 application to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and reckless endangerment. Thereafter, the Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven that Counsel was ineffective, and that the Petitioner’s pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Dejavone Lee Woods, of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm in the attempted commission of a dangerous offense, and he received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the State failed to negate self-defense, that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, that the trial court erred in admitting testimony about a surveillance video, that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and that he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to appellate relief and affirm the judgments. 

The defendant, David Lee Richardson, appeals the revocation of the sentence of probation imposed for his convictions of false imprisonment and domestic aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of the total effective sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

We granted permission to appeal primarily to consider how, if at all, the economic loss doctrine, which generally precludes recovery for purely economic losses in tort actions, applies in Tennessee to claims of fraudulent inducement. We hold that when, as here, a fraud claim seeks recovery of only economic losses and is premised solely on misrepresentations or nondisclosures about the quality of goods that are the subject of a contract between sophisticated commercial parties, the economic loss doctrine applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim. We also affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the plaintiff’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) is barred as a matter of law because the trucks at issue are not “goods” as that term is defined by the portion of the TCPA on which the plaintiff relied. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(7) (2013 & Supp. 2020). We, therefore, set aside the plaintiff’s award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the TCPA. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the separate grounds stated herein.  

Pro se petitioner, Justin C. Howell, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we affirm.

In this divorce case, the wife appeals the trial court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement and valuation of her speech therapy practice, as well as the overall division of marital assets. As appellee, the husband raises a number of issues, all of which are without merit. We vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment addressing the husband’s military retirement and remand for recalculation of the wife’s share in the same. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. 

This appeal arises from an action for breach of a promissory note. After granting the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his claim against one of the defendants, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine damages. Following the hearing, the court entered a judgment for $1,628,074.27, which included interest and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the defendant contends that, in accordance with the terms of the promissory note, the plaintiff is only entitled to recover the principal sum of $14,194.43 plus interest. We have determined that the defendant failed to properly raise this issue in the trial court; therefore, it is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Jackson Chapman North, pleaded guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to two counts of vandalism valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, vandalism valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, a Class E felony, vandalism valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-408 (2018) (vandalism); 39-14-105 (2018) (grading); 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful weapon possession). The trial court ordered partial consecutive service and imposed an effective six-year sentence, with four years, sixty days in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the Defendant’s sentence, but as a matter of plain error, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand the case for proper restitution determinations.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of severe abuse by the mother and that termination was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother challenges whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s best interest determinations. In weighing the statutory best-interest factors, she contends the trial court did not properly consider her completion of permanency plan requirements and nearly fifteen months of drug-free tests. The mother also complains that she was denied contact with her children by court order shortly after their removal and, despite her progress, was thwarted in her efforts to reestablish contact. We affirm.

The Appellee, Michael Edward Cohen, was charged in the Davidson County Criminal Court with sexual exploitation of a minor involving more than one hundred images, a Class B felony. He filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that he turned over the images to a police officer involuntarily after the officer threatened to obtain a search warrant for his residence when the officer did not have probable cause for a warrant. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion, and the State appeals. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this delayed appeal, Mario Nathaniel Wade, Defendant, challenges his convictions for robbery and carjacking. Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election with respect to the carjacking charge, and that he was sentenced improperly. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and incest, the defendant, Vincent Parker Lee, appeals. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of rape of a child; that the trial court erred by permitting the State to ask leading questions of the child rape victim; that the State’s failure to make an election of offenses at the close of its case-in-chief resulted in plain error; that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of the right to a fair trial; and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. We find no deficiency in the State’s proof and no error in either the trial court’s ruling with regard to the State’s examination of the child rape victim or the consecutive alignment of the sentences. The State’s failure to elect offenses at the close of its case-in-chief was error, but, because the error can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not rise to the level of plain error. Consequently, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Property owners sued lessees for possession and back rent. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging anticipatory breach, fraud, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in conjunction with a purchase option. Property owners moved for summary judgment on their claim for possession, arguing that lessees never exercised their option to purchase. In response, lessees asserted anticipatory breach. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to property owners. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the remaining counterclaims. On appeal, lessees challenge both decisions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
 

Ernesto Perez Aguirre, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a school bullying lawsuit. Doug Zukowski and Aimee Zukowski filed suit in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) on behalf of their son Taylor Alexander Zukowski (“Alex,” who later joined the suit in his own right after turning 18) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) against the Hamilton County Department of Education (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs alleged that Alex was bullied while a student at Chattanooga’s Center for Creative Arts (“CCA”), a public fine arts magnet school, and that Defendant breached its duty of care to protect Alex. Plaintiffs appeal, raising a number of issues. We find that the record does not contain the requisite clear and convincing evidence necessary to overturn the Trial Court’s credibility determinations. We also find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Defendant’s employees responded appropriately when Alex reported to them that he was bullied. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

A patient died after a fall at a state-owned rehabilitation facility. The administrator of the deceased patient’s estate filed a monetary claim against the State of Tennessee for negligently creating or maintaining a dangerous condition on real property. The State moved for summary judgment arguing that the claimant lacked sufficient evidence of causation. The Claims Commission agreed and granted summary judgment to the State. Because the claimant lacked sufficient evidence that the State’s conduct more likely than not caused the patient’s fall, we affirm.

The defendant, Dwaquille Raheem Jabal, appeals the dismissal of his motion for sentence modification, arguing that he continued to serve his sentence beyond the date he was supposed to be placed on probation and that “[i]t would be inequitable for [him] not to be credited with the probation date that he was given.” Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Sterling Lamarr Cooper, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Quinton Cage, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Also before us is the petitioner’s motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 14, to consider post-judgment facts. Because the petitioner’s claim of a double jeopardy violation is not cognizable in a Rule 36.1 motion, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the motion to correct an illegal sentence. Furthermore, because the post-judgment facts posited by the petitioner do not relate to actions that occurred after the judgment in this case, we deny the petitioner’s motion to consider post-judgment facts.

Petitioner, Darrell Wayne Bumpas, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.