APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Benton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Lester Lee Doyle, for second offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”) (Count One), violation of the implied consent law (Count Two), failure to illuminate the registration plate of his vehicle at all times when the headlights are illuminated (Count Three), and failure to maintain his vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane of a roadway divided into two or more lanes for traffic (Count Four). Following trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of DUI in Count One and not guilty of the traffic offenses in Counts Three and Four. On appeal, Defendant argues that because the jury found Defendant not guilty on Counts Three and Four, there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and therefore Defendant is entitled to a new trial or a reversal of the DUI conviction. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

Petitioner, Kevin Farrell Wells, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court applied the incorrect burden of proof in evaluating his claims, erroneously denied him relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and entered its order beyond the sixty-day statutory deadline. After hearing oral arguments and following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Urshawn Eric Miller, of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder for fatally shooting a convenience store employee during an attempted robbery of the store. The jury also convicted the defendant of the attempted second-degree murder of another store employee and of attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest, and resisting arrest. The jury imposed the death penalty for the first-degree murder convictions. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction and the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second-degree murder conviction, and it imposed an effective thirty-year sentence for the remaining convictions to run concurrently with the death sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences but vacated the application of the felony murder aggravating circumstance as to the felony murder conviction. Upon our automatic review, we conclude: (1) the trial court properly ruled on challenges to certain jurors for cause during individual voir dire; (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator and his guilt of the convicted offenses; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce a video recording of the defendant’s prior aggravated robbery during the penalty phase; (4) the death penalty generally, and lethal injection specifically, do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; and (5) the death sentence satisfies our mandatory review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence of death; however, we reverse the portion of the intermediate court’s judgment vacating the application of the felony murder aggravating circumstance.   

Sharon G. Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects all citizens, including Urshawn Eric Miller, from being subjected to punishment that is cruel and unusual. A sentence is cruel and unusual, and thus constitutionally prohibited, when it is excessive or disproportionate as compared with sentences imposed in similar cases. Miller was sentenced to death for shooting and killing a store clerk during an attempted robbery. The loss of the store clerk’s life is tragic, and Miller deserves to be punished. But Miller and the crime he committed do not fall into the rare category of the “worst of the bad.”When compared with other first-degree murder cases, including capital cases, Miller’s case is more like cases in which a sentence of life or life without parole was imposed rather than a death sentence.Thus, Miller’s death sentence is out of line with the punishment imposed in similar cases, making his punishment cruel and unusual.   

Miller’s convictions for first-degree murder and other offenses should be affirmed. Under the Eighth Amendment, Miller should not be put to death but should spend the rest of his life in prison.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case.  The trial court determined that three grounds for termination existed and that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.  We vacate one ground for termination relied upon by the trial court due to the application of an incorrect standard in the court’s order, but we affirm the court’s reliance on the remaining grounds for termination and its best interests determination.  The trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights is accordingly affirmed.

Defendant, Sean Mitchell A.K.A. Antwon Rainer, was indicted for rape and aggravated kidnapping, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant, pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute, to two life sentences without the possibility of parole and ran the sentences consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, (2) that the chain of custody for Defendant’s penile swabs was not properly established, (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and (4) that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The claimant has appealed from the dismissal of her claims against the State of Tennessee. Because the claimant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of this Court within the time permitted byTennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Appellee, Christapher Baumgartner, was charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court with vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He filed a motion to suppress his blood test results, arguing that he did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion, and the State appeals. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Perry Brent Lanham, pleaded guilty to burglary and theft of property valued $2,500 or more, and he received an effective eight-year sentence on probation supervised by community corrections. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce case, Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify the permanent parenting plan to designate her as the Child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A property owner whose property was destroyed by a lightning-induced fire filed suit against the State on the theory of negligence.  The Claims Commission dismissed the case after concluding that any negligence on the part of the State was not the proximate cause of the property owner’s injury.  Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

The defendant, Carl Dwayne Prince, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court Jury conviction of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel and permitting him to proceed pro se, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the State’s failure to disclose certain evidence violated due process principles as announced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Because the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry to support a finding that the defendant effectuated a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.  Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault but sufficient to support a conviction of simple assault, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on alternative counts of assault involving bodily injury and assault by offensive touching.

Defendant, Eric Boyd, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and four counts of aggravated rape. For his convictions, Defendant received an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences for the felony murder convictions and an additional 90 years for the remaining convictions. Defendant appeals his convictions, asserting that: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue, or in the alternative, a special jury venire; 2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce transcripts of a witness’s testimony from a federal court proceeding as substantive evidence against Defendant; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and 4) he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the record, we determine no error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, G’Wayne Williams, of numerous sexual offenses. State v. G’wayne Kennedy Williams a/k/a Kenney Williams, No. W2018- 00924-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 211546, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Jan. 14, 2020). The trial court imposed a sixty-four-year sentence. Id. On appeal, this court vacated and dismissed fifteen of the Defendant’s convictions and concluded that the trial court had improperly merged a number of the Defendant’s convictions. We remanded the case for entry of corrected judgments and resentencing where applicable and affirmed the Defendant’s remaining convictions. Id. On remand, the trial court dismissed the relevant convictions, merged the additional relevant convictions, and resentenced the Defendant on twelve of the convictions. The trial court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction as to the Defendant’s remaining convictions affirmed on appeal. On this second appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding it had lost jurisdiction on the convictions affirmed by this court. He further contends his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Tipton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Keith Lamont Brown, of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Keith Lamont Brown a.k.a. “Kee Kee”, No. W2018-00731-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2158103, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 16, 2019), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the issue raised on appeal by the Defendant. The majority, concluding that the Defendant’s contention is unclear, addresses the issue as one of pretrial jail credits or day-for-day service. I believe that, on the contrary, the Defendant asserts that his sentence is illegal or contains a clerical error because he was denied 128 days of sentence reduction credits which he earned prior to the imposition of his sentence. Because this type of claim must be addressed via the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, I would affirm the denial of relief on this basis.

A homeowner sued to stop a foreclosure on his home.  Most of the defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court orally granted.  But before written orders of dismissal could be entered, the homeowner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.  The court then entered an order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, as well as the orders of dismissal with prejudice.  Claiming that the orders were inconsistent, the homeowner filed a post-judgment motion for reconciliation of conflicting orders.  The court clarified that the order granting the voluntary dismissal without prejudice only applied to claims against defendants that did not file motions to dismiss.  But the dismissals with prejudice applied to claims against defendants that did file such motions.  Finding no error, we affirm.    

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights.  The trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s rights and one statutory ground for the termination of the father’s parental rights.  The trial court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in their child’s best interest.  After a thorough review, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the grant of an emergency conservatorship.  Specifically, the appellant, as the wife of the individual at issue, contends that the trial court improperly granted the emergency conservatorship, alleging that there existed no legal basis to do so.  She further contends that the assessment of attorney’s fees against her was improper.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to several drug offenses stemming from a 2006 arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to a fifteen-year sentence. The Defendant appealed, it was denied, and he filed multiple motions challenging his convictions. Most recently, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence or correct a clerical error, contending that he had not received 128 days of pretrial jail credits. The trial court denied the motion, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to amend his sentence and that any alleged error in calculating time should be directed to the Tennessee Department of Correction. It is from that judgment that the Defendant now appeals. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her twins. The juvenile court terminated on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. The court also determined that termination was in her children’s best interest. Mother argues that she lacked notice of the grounds and consequences of abandonment and the procedures for terminating her rights. She also argues that the evidence of the grounds for terminating her parental rights and of her children’s best interests was less than clear and convincing. We conclude Mother waived her notice argument. And while we agree that the evidence of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was less than clear and convincing, clear and convincing evidence does support the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and the court’s best interest determination. So we affirm termination of Mother’s parental rights.

An out-of-state resident filed a petition for declaratory judgment to challenge the constitutionality of certain amendments to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-39-201 et seq., as applied to him.  The petition named the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation as respondents.  The respondents moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted their motions on several grounds.  Because the petitioner did not appeal all of the trial court’s grounds for dismissal, we affirm.

This appeal concerns easement rights. The Park Place Community Association, Inc. (“the PPCA”) and the Park Place Boat Dock Association, Inc. (“the PPBDA”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) filed suit in the Chancery Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”) against Gary Phillips Construction, LLC and Gary Phillips (“Phillips”). Plaintiffs sought access to a certain boat dock and sun deck on Boone Lake over a strip of land previously owned by the community’s developer that Phillips bought at a bankruptcy auction. After a trial, the Trial Court found Plaintiffs had proven the elements of an easement by implication and an easement by necessity over the property at issue. Phillips appeals raising a number of issues, including whether Plaintiffs have standing. We find, inter alia, that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action. We further find that lake access has been, and is, essential for Plaintiffs’ use and beneficial enjoyment of Park Place, in some instances representing the exclusive reason why people bought their homes in the community. Plaintiffs have proven the elements of an easement by implication and an easement by necessity. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing only that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to continue the trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court’s denial of the motion to continue. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds on which the mother’s rights were terminated and to support a conclusion that termination was in the children’s best interest; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court terminating the mother’s parental rights.