APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Travis Griffith, of three counts of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of three years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court: (1) erroneously allowed the State to present evidence outside the scope of the indictment, as well as evidence of his transmission of hepatitis B to the victim, which should have been excluded pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) erroneously failed to declare a mistrial after the State’s motion to amend the indictment in the presence of the jury; and (3) erroneously failed to grant his motion for judgments of acquittal. He lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors violated his right to a fair trial. After review, we conclude that errors occurred during trial; however, consistent with our conclusion that those errors were harmless, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

The issue in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  The Plaintiff originally filed suit against the Defendant in the Circuit Court for Shelby County in May 2014.  Unbeknownst to the parties, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the lawsuit for failure to prosecute.  Upon learning of the dismissal over ten months later, the Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal.  The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s request to set aside the dismissal but, articulating an erroneous reading of Rule 41.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, entered an order that stated the dismissal did not bar the Plaintiff from refiling its lawsuit.  When the Plaintiff refiled its lawsuit in August 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res judicata.  Despite language to the contrary in its prior order, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, holding that the dismissal of the original lawsuit operated as an adjudication on the merits.  A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the second lawsuit.  We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and reinstate the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, James Yates, of aggravated robbery and assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of a judgment form in count 2.

After being denied parole and exhausting all administrative remedies, an inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The chancery court dismissed the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 because the inmate had unpaid court costs from previous litigation. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a personal injury action in which the defendant tortfeasor claims that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence concerning plaintiff’s claimed medical expenses. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence.

Defendant, Nathan Craig, pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to four years, suspended to a ten-year sentence of supervised probation. Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of the four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The Defendant, Derious Grandberry, was convicted at trial of carjacking and aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offenses, that the trial court erred by failing to weigh the evidence itself as the thirteenth juror, that the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit the victim’s photographic lineup identification of him into evidence, and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Casey L. Redmon, appeals from the McNairy County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his 2014 guilty-pleaded conviction of burglary. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily denying his petition for being untimely filed. Specifically, he argues that he is serving an illegal sentence based upon the Tennessee Department of Correction’s (TDOC) incorrect calculation of his sentence and that an illegal sentence can be remedied at any time. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Mario Norfleet, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

An insurance company denied coverage for an accident its insured had with an uninsured/underinsured motorist because the insured had a “non-owner’s” policy, and the car she was driving did not fit the definition of a “non-owned auto.”  The trial court concluded, following a bench trial on the bifurcated issue of coverage, that the insured’s policy did not cover the accident, and the insured appealed.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Gary Bush, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he challenged his life sentence resulting from his first degree murder conviction in 2008 for an offense that occurred in 1982. On appeal, the Defendant argues that he was sentenced under the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act rather than the law in effect when he committed the offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of several minor children. In the petition, the Department alleged five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children prior to incarceration; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. After a trial on the petition, the trial court found that the Department established all five grounds and that termination was in the best interest of the children. As a result, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand.

In this post-divorce dispute, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination that she was in contempt of the divorce decree for failing to return certain personal property to the husband. We find no error in the trial court’s contempt ruling or in its denial of the wife’s motion for Rule 60 relief. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Marcel Holbrook, of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a photograph of an SKS rifle and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this post-divorce visitation dispute, the father appeals the denial of his petition to modify the permanent parenting plan and require the mother’s visitation to be supervised “indefinitely.” Before the divorce, the mother’s visitation was suspended after she falsely accused the father of sexually abusing the parties’ minor son. The mother’s visitation was restored when she presented evidence that she was in mental health therapy for her “obsessive” fears. Two months later, in early 2016, the parties agreed to a permanent parenting plan that required the mother to, inter alia, continue her therapy. The parties also agreed for their son to attend counseling to help him remain psychologically healthy despite the parties’ contentious relationship. The mother did not, however, continue her treatment as agreed, and she soon resumed making allegations against the father. Thus, just three months after the parenting plan was entered, her visitation was suspended again. The mother’s visitation remained restricted for a year, during which she struggled to comply with various court orders. In April 2017, the parties agreed for the mother’s visitation to be restored after she presented evidence she was progressing again in her mental health treatment. The parties also agreed for the son to continue counseling for another 18 months. Then, in November 2018, the mother made additional false allegations against the father. The father then filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and restrict the mother’s visitation “indefinitely.” Finding the mother’s behavior endangered the children, the trial court significantly restricted the mother’s parenting time and allowed only limited supervised visitation pending a final hearing. Due to several procedural delays, the final hearing was not held until January 2020, by which time the mother’s visitation had been severely restricted for a year. After the hearing, the court denied the father’s petition and restored the mother’s visitation. The court was persuaded, in part, by evidence that the mother was progressing again in her therapy. The court credited the opinion of the mother’s clinical psychologist, who stated the mother had “gotten better,” understood “that she cannot say things that would alienate [the father from] the children,” was “a loving and devoted parent,” and would “now follow the rules.” The court also agreed with the psychologist’s opinion that the son needed more counseling because he needed “to be able to talk to somebody [he could] trust.” Based on these and other findings of fact, the trial court found no material change in circumstance existed; however, it ordered that the mother and the parties’ son continue therapy. The court also denied the mother’s request for an award of attorney fees as the “prevailing party” under the marital dissolution agreement and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Both parties appealed. Having determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that no material change of circumstance existed as of the time of trial, we affirm the denial of the father’s petition to modify the parenting plan. We vacate, however, the court’s order requiring the son to continue therapy because the issue was not before the court. We also affirm the denial of the mother’s request to recover her attorney’s fees.

The defendant, Chad M. Varnell, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original
eight-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new hearing.

As issues regarding contempt and attorney fees remain pending, the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The pro se Petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals the summary dismissal of his fourth “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.” Upon our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion.

This health care liability action arises from injuries suffered by a minor, Miyona Hyter, during her birth. Miyona Hyter, a minor by and through her next friend and mother, Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”) sued, among others, Dr. Michael Seeber who delivered the child via cesarean section and certified nurse midwife Jennifer Mercer who assisted with the birthing process. Plaintiff alleged that Nurse Mercer was negligent by failing to recognize concerning signs on the fetal monitoring strip and by failing to call Dr. Seeber for assistance sooner than she did. The Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), by agreed order, granted Dr. Seeber partial summary judgment on all claims of direct negligence against him; he remained in the case as a defendant only upon Plaintiff’s theory that he was vicariously liable for Nurse Mercer’s actions as her supervising physician. During his deposition, Dr. Seeber declined to answer questions that he argued required him to render an expert opinion regarding Nurse Mercer’s care during times that Dr. Seeber was not present and had no involvement in Plaintiff’s care. The Trial Court declined to require Dr. Seeber to answer questions that “call[] for an opinion by Dr. Seeber that asks him to comment on the actions of other healthcare providers and does not involve his own actions, as required by Lewis v. Brooks,” 66 S.W.3d 883, 887-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). After Nurse Mercer’s deposition, she submitted an errata sheet that substantively altered her answers to some of the questions. Plaintiff moved to suppress the errata sheet, arguing that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 30.05 does not allow a witness to make substantive changes to her deposition testimony. The Trial Court denied the motion but allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to reopen Nurse Mercer’s deposition and to fully cross-examine her at trial about the changes. The case proceeded to trial before a jury, which returned a verdict in Defendants’ favor. We hold that the Trial Court erred by refusing to order Dr. Seeber to answer the questions at issue in his deposition. Deeming this case distinguishable from Lewis v. Brooks, we reverse the Trial Court in its declining to compel Dr. Seeber to testify concerning the conduct of his supervisee, Nurse Mercer, and remand for a new trial.

I concur in the majority opinion on all issues except the compulsion of Dr. Seeber’s testimony. I believe the trial court correctly refused to compel this testimony in reliance on Lewis ex rel. Lewis v. Brooks, 66 S.W.3d 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

In this divorce case, Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision regarding custody of the parties’ minor children. Father contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it interviewed the minor children in camera without a court reporter or attorney present. In the absence of a transcript or a valid Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) statement of the actual evidence adduced in camera or at the hearing, and in view of the fact that the trial court’s order wholly fails to comply with the mandates of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s ultimate custody decision. Vacated and remanded.

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for discovery sanctions after granting a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Two cars collided at a four-way stop. One driver filed a personal injury action against the other. At trial, the two sides presented conflicting descriptions of the accident. The jury found the defendant driver was not at fault. And the trial court, as thirteenth juror, approved the jury verdict. Because the jury verdict is supported by material evidence, we affirm.

The Defendant, Amanda Dawn Freeman, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of probation for her aggravated burglary, theft, and drug-related convictions, for which she received an effective five-year sentence on probation. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Frederick Robinson, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.