APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a trial court’s modification of child support.  Father filed a petition to modify custody.  The trial court modified the parties’ parenting schedule but reserved its determination of child support for future adjudication.  Subsequently, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order requesting that the parties submit their own competing proposed orders concerning child support.  Ultimately, the trial court issued its final order setting child support based solely on the documents attached to Father’s proposed order.  Because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from which to make a ruling.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions for it to conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow the parties to put on their proof as to child support.

This case stems from the sale of a 2000 Mercury Sable (“the vehicle”) purchased by Amy Jennings from John M. Lance Ford, LLC, an affiliate of AutoNation, Inc. (“AutoNation” or “Defendant”), in 2017. Ms. Jennings signed all of the paperwork associated with the sale, including an arbitration agreement. In September of 2018, Ms. Jennings and her husband, Dorian Jones, filed suit against AutoNation in the Chancery Court for Washington County (the “trial court”) alleging multiple causes of action arising from the sale of the vehicle. Generally, Ms. Jennings and Mr. Jones alleged that AutoNation breached several warranties and fraudulently induced Ms. Jennings into the sale. Eventually, AutoNation filed a motion to compel arbitration which the trial court granted on August 10, 2020. Mr. Jones filed an appeal to this Court. Because an appeal from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration and staying litigation is nonfinal, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner, Donte R. Swainer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2018 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court improperly determined that the petition was time-barred.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Harry Pearson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises from an action before the Tennessee Claims Commission for personal injuries filed on behalf of a minor child who broke her arm when she fell from playground equipment at Tims Ford State Park. The complaint asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, and gross negligence per se. It alleged that the State was negligent by failing to adequately maintain its property, and by failing to discover, rectify, and/or warn against a dangerous condition, and allowing park visitors “to use the playground which did not have a safe surface area.” The State denied liability under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C), insisting it had no notice of any dangerous condition; it also raised the “Recreational Use Statute,” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101 to -105, as an affirmative defense. Following discovery, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the claims commissioner granted. The commissioner found the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on two grounds. The commissioner found that Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 70-7-102 of the Recreational Use Statute provided immunity to the State as a landowner against premises-liability claims and that the gross negligence exception under the statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104(a)(1), did not apply. The commissioner also held that the claimants failed to show that notice of the alleged dangerous condition had been provided to the State, which is an essential element of the Claims Commission Act. The plaintiffs appeal one issue, asserting a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether the State’s failure to maintain the playground was gross negligence. We affirm the Commissioner’s decision on both grounds.

An agency determined that a tour bus leasing company mischaracterized its tour bus drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, for the purposes of unemployment taxes. The company sought review in chancery court, which affirmed the agency’s determination. Because there is substantial and material evidence to support the agency’s determination, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, were convicted of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder and received life sentences on each count. On appeal, they raise the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions, specifically whether the co-defendant’s testimony was reliable and sufficiently corroborated; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s Ferguson violation by failing to preserve the photographic lineups shown to the witnesses and the co-defendant’s cell phone taken upon his arrest; (3) whether the trial court erred by not granting a new trial because the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose all inconsistent statements made by the co-defendant during proffer sessions; (4) whether the trial court committed error when it sua sponte prohibited the introduction of the printout of the co-defendant’s message to his girlfriend implicating himself in the murders, and in so doing, made an improper comment on the evidence; and (5) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury by including the language “or either of them” throughout the jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant Laronda Turner’s convictions and that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by co-defendant Demarco Hawkins. Because the record shows that Hawkins’ accomplice testimony implicating Defendant Turner was not sufficiently corroborated, I believe that Defendant Turner’s three convictions for first degree premeditated murder should be reversed and that these charges should be dismissed. In addition, because the record demonstrates that the State violated Brady in failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by Hawkins during several proffer sessions with the prosecution prior to trial, I am of the opinion that the trial court erred in denying a new trial to both Defendant Turner and Defendant Thomas on this basis. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the trial court, dismiss the charges against Defendant Turner, and remand the case for a new trial for Defendant Thomas.

The Defendant, William Jesse Clouse, pleaded guilty in the Putnam County Criminal Court to three counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-106 (2018) (subsequently amended).  The trial court imposed an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for split confinement.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

This appeal involves the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-105, the bad faith penalty statute, to automobile insurance policies. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-105 did not apply to automobile insurance policies. The insured appeals. We affirm.

A foreign corporation sought to have a default judgment entered against it set aside on the basis that service of process was ineffective, rendering the judgment void. Because the proof before the court at the time it entered the default fails to demonstrate that service by mail complied with Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the default judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Eugene Reed, was convicted by a Sequatchie County jury of theft of property valued over $10,000, to wit: a Jeep Wrangler, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103, and sentenced to seven years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for theft because the State failed to establish his intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property; and (2) the prosecution made improper comments during closing arguments which indirectly commented on his decision not to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this action for breach of a contract to purchase improved real property. Prior to the first appeal, the trial court, having found following a bench trial that the defendant buyers, Arnold Brush and Pamela Sue Brush, had breached the parties’ purchase and sale agreement, initially entered damage awards in favor of the plaintiffs, who included the sellers, Richard J. Hartigan and Leila R. Hartigan; the Hartigans’ realtor, James M. Henry d/b/a Coldwell Banker Jim Henry & Associates (“Coldwell Banker”); and a realty company, Lakeway Realty Group, Inc. (“Lakeway Realty”), with whom the Brushes had entered into a buyer representation agreement. Mr. Brush, by then acting individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Pamela Sue Brush, appealed to this Court, raising issues concerning the trial court’s calculations of damages and pre-judgment interest. This Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Lakeway Realty but vacated the award of damages and prejudgment interest to the Hartigans and the calculation of prejudgment interest awarded to Coldwell Banker. This Court directed that upon remand, the trial court was to enter additional findings of fact regarding the fair market value of the property, with further proceedings as necessary, and recalculate the amount of prejudgment interest awarded to Coldwell Banker.

The appellee, Linda R. Kerley (“Appellee”), filed a motion to dismiss this appeal alleging that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The defendant, Cassius Dominique Ivory, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, arguing that the State failed to disclose a preferential agreement with a witness, that the State failed to produce certain pretrial statements, that the trial court failed to merge certain offenses, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Because the record establishes that the State did not fail to disclose a preferential agreement or pretrial statements, the trial court properly merged the offenses, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lawrence County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Simon Dean Porter, for aggravated rape of a child and aggravated child abuse of his sixteen-month-old son. A jury convicted the Defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty-five years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-531, 39-15-402(a)(1). On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) proof connecting him to these offenses; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a petition to probate a handwritten instrument as a codicil to the decedent’s last will and testament. The parties stipulated that the purported holographic will was in the handwriting of the decedent and that she was of sound mind and disposing memory at the time the purported holographic will was written. Additionally, the trial court found that the writing expressed a testamentary intent on the part of the decedent. Nevertheless, the trial court denied the petition, holding that the writing did not satisfy the signature requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-105 because, inter alia, the decedent’s name, Micki D. Thompson, was not subscribed to the writing. Instead, she merely identified herself within the writing in the third person as “Micki.” The court found the word “Micki” was not the decedent’s signature. The petitioner appeals, contending the handwritten instrument satisfies Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-105 because a testator’s name need not be “subscribed” as long as the name, or a portion thereof, is “inserted in some part of [the writing]” and the other requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-105 are satisfied. We agree because the decedent’s name was inserted in the writing, it was established that she was of sound mind and disposing memory, and the writing expresses a testamentary intent on the part of the decedent. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to admit the handwritten instrument to probate as a codicil to the decedent’s last will and testament.

The petitioner, Clark Derrick Frazier, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns post-divorce residential parenting schedule matters and findings of criminal contempt. Corey L. Choate (“Father”) and Amanda Kay Choate (Ralston) (“Mother”), parents of daughter BC and younger son RC, divorced in 2015. Some years later, Father filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”), seeking to modify the most recently entered permanent parenting plan and to have Mother found in criminal contempt. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order regarding the children’s custody and Mother’s criminal contempt. As relevant, Father was granted complete custody of RC.Mother was found guilty of 573 counts of criminal contempt in connection with her failure to follow the parenting plan. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that she lacked adequate notice of the criminal contempt charges because the Trial Court failed to read the charges aloud to her in open court upon her request. We find, inter alia, that Father’s detailed Second Amended Notice of Criminal Contempt, as well as the Trial Court’s written order entered before trial specifically finding that Mother was on notice of the charges, reflect that Mother received adequate notice of the criminal contempt charges against her. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety and remand for an award to Father of his reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding filed by Wife in Tennessee.  Husband objected to the trial court’s divorce jurisdiction and any custody determination concerning the parties’ minor children.  Ultimately, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce, as well as any custody determinations.  In connection with granting the parties a divorce, the trial court awarded Wife an equalizing distribution of the marital assets and attorney’s fees.  The trial court also found Husband to be in contempt due to his alleged violation of the statutory restraining order set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d) and his failure to return one of the parties’ minor children to Wife’s custody following summer visitation.  Husband now appeals numerous aspects of the trial court’s findings.  Upon our review of the record before us, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

In this healthcare liability action, the plaintiff sued several medical professionals and facilities. Following an amended complaint, which had removed multiple parties from the action, the remaining defendants filed their answer to the amended complaint that included allegations of comparative fault against a doctor that the plaintiff had removed as a party to the action in the amended complaint. The defendants did not file a certificate of good faith in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122, which is required when a defendant alleges comparative fault against a “non-party.” Following a motion by the plaintiff, the trial court entered an order striking the defendants’ allegations of comparative fault. The trial court further found that the defendants had not demonstrated good cause to support an extension of time to file a certificate of good faith. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant challenges the chancery court’s order dismissing his petition for a declaratory judgment enjoining the State of Tennessee Attorney General, District Attorney General for the Tenth Judicial District, and an assistant district attorney general from enforcing his 2004 criminal convictions, which the appellant claimed had resulted in an illegal sentence. The chancery court dismissed Mr. Frazier’s petition because, inter alia, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. We affirm the chancery court’s order of dismissal.

A Monroe County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Robert Charles Atkins, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced the Appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, contending that the State failed to establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime or, in the alternative, that he acted with premeditation. The Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify regarding threats he received prior to trial to explain his nervous demeanor in court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. In addition to disputing the grounds for termination and best interest, Mother argues on appeal that she should have been appointed counsel in the termination proceeding and that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-401. We conclude that the record demonstrates that Mother expressly waived her right to counsel and failed to show that the waiver was ineffective. We further hold that section 33-6-401 was inapplicable in this case. Finally, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court.