APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jeremy Kyle Massey, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He challenges his conviction pursuant to a plea agreement with the state and contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was
involuntary and constitutionally deficient. He further complains that the post-conviction court erroneously excluded certain testimony as irrelevant. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Patrick Wingate appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He is serving sentences of life and 25 years in the Department of Correction as a result of his 1998 convictions of first-degree murder and arson. This court affirmed the convictions. See State v. Patrick Wingate, No. M1999-00624-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 25, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2000). Wingate's post-conviction petition challenged (1) the effectiveness of his trial counsel's assistance and (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. On April 30, 2001, the post-conviction court entered an order dismissing the petition on grounds that it contained mere conclusions of law and bare, unsupported factual allegations. Because we agree that the post-conviction petition was properly dismissed, we affirm.

After a Giles County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Robert S. Lutrick, of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, he applied to the court for an order of diversion. The trial court denied the request and sentenced the defendant to the minimum Range I sentence of three years, to be served on probation. The defendant now appeals the denial of judicial diversion. Upon review, we affirm.

The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for rape of a child alleging insufficient evidence and excessive punishment. The trial court failed to apply pre-July 1995 sentencing guidelines for this April 1995 crime, and the trial court erred in applying one enhancement factor. After careful review, we affirm the conviction and remand for a new sentence.

The Defendant, Rufus Steven Johns, entered a nolo contendere plea to illegally registering to vote, a class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to eighteen months to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, he raises three issues: (1) whether the district attorney general abused his discretion by denying the Defendant pretrial diversion, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant judicial diversion, and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terrance Burnett, appellant, pleaded guilty to two counts of felony murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated burglary. He received sentences of life without the possibility of parole, twenty years, and eight years, respectively. One year later, Burnett filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging several constitutional violations that he claimed entitled him to relief from the above judgments. After having appointed counsel, the trial court dismissed the petition without having conducted an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. On appeal to this Court, Burnett contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we are of the opinion that the trial court acted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

This appeal arises from Ernest Edward Wilson's conviction for second degree murder in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter; it did not instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. The jury convicted Wilson of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Wilson challenged the trial court's failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We granted review and now conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. Further, we hold that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.

This case arises from a proceeding to terminate parental rights. In that proceeding, the prospective adoptive parents sought a determination that the father of the child in their custody had abandoned him. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in terminating parental rights on the basis of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-13-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (failure to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days after notice of alleged paternity by the child's mother) when the father had been adjudicated the legal parent of the child at the time of the hearing. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) applies only to cases in which no legal relationship between the parent and child has been established.

The Petitioner was indicted for two counts of attempted first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the Petitioner was convicted of both counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for each count and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. The Defendant appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner then filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief. The trial court found that the Petitioner failed to state any grounds for which relief could be granted and ordered that the Petitioner respond within fifteen days. Receiving no response, the trial court dismissed the petition. Eventually, with permission from the trial court based on extenuating circumstances, the Petitioner filed an amended pro se petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky E. Pullen, was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury on one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and acquitted of child rape. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. Only one issue is raised on appeal: whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated sexual battery. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and affirm the conviction.

The dispositive issue in this workers’ compensation action is whether the Special Chancellor erred in finding the appellant, Steve Vinson, to be 100% permanently partially disabled, as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in the scope of his employment. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that no such impairment classification exists in the workers’ compensation statutes and cases of this state. After conducting our own de novo review of the record, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence supports the appellant’s claim that he is 100% permanently and
totally disabled and entitled to full workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). Additionally, pursuant to relevant workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that the trial court erred in allowing appellees a credit for temporary total disability benefits that have heretofore been paid to appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed, as modified herein, and the case remanded for enforcement of the judgment of this Court.

The Petitioner was indicted for first degree murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to second degree murder, and received a sentence of fifteen years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel resulting in an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. The trial court dismissed the petition based on its untimely filing. However, our Court reversed that finding. The Petitioner filed an amended petition, and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the request for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Alan L. Adler, was indicted for aggravated child neglect of a child under six years of age, a Class A felony. Following trial, a Fayette County jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Subsequently, the appellant, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101 (section 40-32-101), petitioned the trial court to expunge all public records pertaining to his indictment, prosecution, and trial for the aggravated child neglect charge. After the appellant's petition was granted by the trial court, the State of Tennessee appealed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) (Rule 3(c)) and argued that Adler was not entitled to expungement under section 40-32-101 because he was convicted of a lesser-included offense. We granted this appeal to determine if the State is authorized under Rule 3(c) to appeal a trial court's expungement order. After examining the facts and the law pertinent to this issue, we hold that the State is not permitted to appeal a trial court's expungement order as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c). Nevertheless, treating the State's appeal as a writ of certiorari, we also hold that the appellant was entitled in this case to expungement of all public records pertaining to the felony charge of which he was acquitted.

The petitioner was convicted in 1996 of aggravated rape and sentenced to confinement for twenty years as a Range I, standard offender. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and, subsequently, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and the petitioner timely appealed, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey settlement offers and to request jury instructions as to lesser-included offenses. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and we affirm that dismissal.

The petitioner, Steven D. King, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, who received the death penalty at his original trial in 1982, now appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, he contends the trial court should have granted relief based upon the recantation testimony of an alleged eyewitness and a newly discovered post-mortem x-ray of the victim. He further contends the trial court erred in prohibiting the testimony of an original trial juror who would testify that the recantation testimony and the newly discovered evidence would have affected the juror's verdict in the original trial. We conclude that the trial court's order reflects varying and sometimes inappropriate standards of review for coram nobis proceedings; nevertheless, the actual findings by the trial court are sufficient for this court to conclude that the trial court found no reasonable probability that the new evidence would have affected the jury's verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Alan Hawkins, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse to be served at 75%. In this appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the state's witnesses violated the rule of sequestration, and (2) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I write a separate concurring opinion to point out and review certain important facets of the appellate record in this case. The record reflects that the defendant’s guilty pleas were “open”; they did not contain any specified sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C). See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) (providing for an agreement between defendant and state “that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case”). Had the plea agreement contained specific, properly articulated sentencing provisions pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C), they may have survived the revocation of judicial diversion probation, depending upon the terms as accepted by the court. See State v. Hollie D. Campbell, No. E2000-00373-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 2, 2001) (Witt, J., concurring), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2001); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-203(b) (1997) (dispensing with requirement of sentencing hearing when sentence is agreed upon and accepted by trial court); accord id. § 40-35-205(d). However, the trial court, having apparently received and accepted open pleas made in conjunction with the diversion provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313(a), was positioned and obliged, after revocation of the judicial diversion probation, to resume the case at the pre-diversion point of departure. This means that, following the revocation, the court’s next task was to conduct a sentencing hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-203(a) (1997), -209(a) (Supp. 2002).