APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Prentis S. Lee, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for two counts of rape resulting in a ten-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to properly explain the elements of two additional counts of rape in a superseding indictment. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief.

This appeal concerns the administration of a husband and wife’s intestate estates, consisting of several tracts of real property that the husband and wife owned as tenants by the entirety. They were both found deceased in their home several days after they had died. The wife’s heir at law, her brother, filed a petition seeking a declaration that the husband died first, that the wife, as the survivor, owned the real property at her death, and it passed to her heir at law. The husband’s heirs at law responded to the petition, contending the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the couple died in any order other than simultaneously. The only witness at the trial was the medical examiner who conducted the autopsies. He testified that it was more probable than not that the husband died first based on the causes of death and medical histories of the spouses. After considering the expert witness testimony, the trial court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the husband and wife died otherwise than simultaneously. This appeal followed. Having determined that the trial court was not bound by the medical examiner’s speculative opinion as to who died first, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Petitioner, Myron Lorenzo Johnson, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced the Petitioner to life plus sixty years.  Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the
Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001.  The post-conviction court summarily denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jacobe Lamone Snipes, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of gang enhancement, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an Appeal by the State in which we are ask to conclude that a dismissal by a general sessions court for lack of probable cause is subject to de novo review by a circuit court, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-108. After the Madison County General Sessions Court dismissed the charge against Defendant, Earlesa McClellan, the district attorney general forwent a grand jury indictment and instead appealed to the Madison County Circuit Court. Finding that an appeal of a general sessions court’s probable cause determination to the circuit court is not proper procedure, the circuit court dismissed the appeal. The State now appeals to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The pro se Petitioner, Mario Bowles, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, that the post-conviction court judge was prejudiced against him, that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and that the trial and post-conviction courts lacked jurisdiction over the case. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Shaughn Walker, of robbery, and he was sentenced to serve ten years in the Community Corrections program. The Defendant appeals, asserting the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification from a photographic lineup; that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to sit at the table with counsel during trial; that the trial court erred in denying a continuance, additional funding, or other relief after eyewitness identification expert Dr. David Ross used the allocated funding prior to trial and refused to testify absent additional payment; and that he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a continuance and additional funding for an eyewitness identification expert. This case rested almost entirely on the victim’s identification of the Defendant as the perpetrator. Upon being notified by defense counsel the first day of trial that Dr. David Ross would not testify unless additional funds were provided, the trial court was understandably frustrated and concerned about further delay in this case. However, for the reasons that follow, I do not believe the trial court’s concerns about delay and expense warranted the severity of the sanction imposed on the Defendant. Because this case hinged on the victim’s identification and because the Defendant had already demonstrated a “particularized need” for state-funded expert assistance in the field of eyewitness identification, I believe the trial court erred in not granting a continuance and additional funds for a new expert. At the very least, I believe the trial court erred in not allowing testimony in some form from Dr. Jeffrey Neuschatz, who was available if the trial court had simply granted a one-day continuance. Because these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I would reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Brian Adams, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and the resulting ninety-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the victim and failed to object to hearsay evidence from hospital personnel. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief.

The Defendant, LaVonte Lamar Douglas, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because his involvement was based upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony and no direct evidence linked him to the offenses; (2) his right to confront a witness was violated when a police witness referenced a nontestifying co-defendant’s statement; and (3) his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional in light of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case.  Appellants, the children’s biological mother and father, appeal the trial court’s termination of their respective parental rights to the four children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) substantial non-compliance with the requirements of the permanency plans, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); (4) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(14).  Appellants also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of their respective parental rights is in the children’s best interest.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari.  Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

An inmate petitioned for a writ of certiorari after the Tennessee Board of Parole denied him parole. The Board moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court concluded that, in the absence of a verification attesting to the truth of the contents of the petition and proper notarization of the petition, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. So the court dismissed the petition. We affirm. 

Appellant sought an injunction to stop foreclosure on real property. Appellees, the lienholder, the lienholder’s law firm, and the substitute trustee, filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. After Appellant filed this appeal, Appellee lienholder filed a release of its lien on the subject property. As such, Appellant’s appeal is moot, and the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from an action for default on a promissory note. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as certificate trustee on behalf of Bosco Credit II Trust Series 2010-1 (“Plaintiff”), filed suit against Thomas S. Jackson (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (the “trial court”), alleging causes of action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a note executed in 2006. Defendant moved the trial court for summary judgment, alleging that he defaulted on the note in 2007 and that the property was foreclosed in 2008. Defendant averred that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when Defendant’s remaining debt was accelerated in 2008 and that Plaintiff’s cause of action was therefore time-barred by Tennessee’s six-year statute of limitations on breach of contract actions. Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion but failed to cite to any facts in the record that created a dispute as to Defendant’s statements and failed to produce any countervailing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and Plaintiff filed a timely appeal to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is but the latest appeal in what has been a prolonged course of litigation between the parties. In a prior appeal, this Court ruled in favor of Ms. Strong on all issues raised by the professional corporation and also held, among other things, that an injunction regarding disputed funds in the case should be dissolved. On remand, the trial court accordingly dissolved the injunction and ordered the court’s Clerk & Master to pay the disputed fund proceeds to Ms. Strong and her attorneys. The professional corporation now appeals from this decision. We affirm and hold that the funds should be immediately disbursed to Ms. Strong pursuant to the trial court’s order. Further, finding the professional corporation’s appeal to be frivolous under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122, we remand the case for a determination of Ms. Strong’s damages incurred on appeal.

Aggrieved of his Hickman County Circuit Court jury conviction of attempted domestic assault, the defendant, Zachary Smith, appeals, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed Count 1 of the indictment as duplicitous.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant brought a mandamus action in the trial court praying that the court would mandate certain actions related to other litigation involving Appellant. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm the court’s dismissal and, finding the appeal to be frivolous pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122, remand the case for a determination of Appellees’ damages incurred as a result of the appeal.

Following a trial, a jury convicted Briston J. Smith, Jr., (“Defendant”) of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective life sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting autopsy and life photographs of the victim; and (4) he is entitled to a new trial based on improper prosecutorial argument. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Kevin McDougle, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Appellant contends that we should remand the case for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing because his motion states a colorable claim. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Samuel O. McAlister, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his pleas to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a revoked license, violating the financial responsibility law, and failing to illuminate his license plate and resulting effective five-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which resulted in his pleas being unknowing and involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this action to contest a will, the trial court determined that the contestants were estopped from maintaining their action because they had received property from the decedent’s estate pursuant to the will’s provisions and were therefore bound by its terms. The will contestants have appealed. Determining that the elements of estoppel were not proven, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s final order and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court granted the cross-plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because this case is inappropriate for rendering judgment on the pleadings, we reverse.