APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because I have no difficulty concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery constitutes harmless error according to the standard enunciated in State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 191 (Tenn. 2002), I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the appellant’s convictions of rape. As acknowledged by the majority, our supreme court emphasized in Allen that, “[w]hen a lesser-included offense instruction is improperly omitted, . . . the harmless error inquiry is the same as for other constitutional errors” and entails an examination of both the evidence adduced at trial and the defendant’s theory of defense. Id. As also acknowledged by the majority, RB unequivocally testified at trial that the appellant’s sexual assault upon her included three separate acts of sexual penetration, and her testimony was uncontradicted with the exception of the appellant’s statements to the police denying any sexual activity whatsoever between himself and RB. In other words, the appellant’s defense in this case did not hinge upon the nature of the sexual activity between himself and RB but rather upon whether any sexual activity occurred. Accordingly, with respect to the evidence underlying each count of rape, the appellant was either guilty of the charged offense or entirely innocent. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery should not afford the appellant relief.

The petitioner, William R. Diaz, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that his trial attorney was ineffective for (1) failing to file a motion to suppress his statement to the police on the grounds that it was coerced and (2) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence that the police took from his garage without a search warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The opinion and judgment entered June 24, 2002, are hereby VACATED and WITHDRAWN. A corrected opinion and judgment will be filed in due course.

The defendant, Patsy Webster, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court's ordering her to serve one year of her effective two-year sentence in continuous confinement. She claims that the trial court erred in requiring her to serve a full year in jail because she was eligible as a Range I offender with only a two-year sentence for release after serving thirty percent of her sentence. The state agrees. We hold that the defendant was improperly sentenced and remand the case for resentencing.