APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Harold D. Arnold, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant and failure to maintain an accurate log book after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the results of a breath analysis test. The Defendant properly reserved a certified question of law for this Court to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jermaine Driver, appeals his conviction of attempted first-degree murder, which was based on an assault by the defendant and two other men upon the victim. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the assault was a premeditated and intentional attempt to kill the victim. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Maurice LaShaun Nash, was found guilty by a Tipton County jury of possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to deliver, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Nash, as a Range I standard offender, to eighteen months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Nash raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the search warrant was issued upon probable cause; (2) whether introduction of Nash's presence during a prior drug sale at the same residence constituted evidence of a prior bad act in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; and (3) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find the issues presented are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. Defendant appeals on three grounds: (1) that insufficient evidence exists to uphold the conviction, (2) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of theft, and (3) that the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's guilty plea. We conclude there was no error and affirm.

The Appellant, Maurice LaShaun Nash, was found guilty by a Tipton County jury of possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to deliver, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Nash, as a Range I standard offender, to eighteen months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Nash raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the search warrant was issued upon probable cause; (2) whether introduction of Nash's presence during a prior drug sale at the same residence constituted evidence of a prior bad act in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; and (3) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find the issues presented are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The petitioner, Alan Dale Bailey, appeals the Coffee County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner sought relief from his 1999 Coffee County convictions of aggravated burglary and sexual battery on the basis that his guilty pleas to those charges were unknowing and involuntary and were prompted by ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner's primary complaints focus upon trial counsel's failure to inform the petitioner about the impact of a conviction of a sexual offense, including the risk that parole might not be granted. The trial court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Mathews, is currently serving a life sentence as an habitual criminal as a result of a larceny conviction. He filed for post-conviction relief, which petition the post-conviction court dismissed because of its untimeliness. The petitioner now appeals this ruling, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding the petition to be time-barred because the petitioner is serving an illegal sentence. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Javon Webster, was convicted of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in the Department of Correction for the felony murder conviction. The trial court merged the Defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the deceased, (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's request for a special jury instruction on duress, and (4) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police. The State also raises an issue on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by merging the Defendant's conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery into his felony murder conviction. We affirm the felony murder conviction and reinstate and remand for sentencing the especially aggravated robbery conviction.

The Defendant, George Langford, was convicted of first degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to life without the possibility for parole for the murder and to concurrent sentences of four, five, and two years for the other crimes respectively. The Defendant appealed his convictions and this Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences. Our supreme court granted the Defendant's application for appeal and also affirmed his convictions and sentences. The Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Defendant now appeals to this Court alleging that the trial court erred in denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff married her co-worker, and one of them was forced to resign pursuant to the company's anti-nepotism policy prohibiting concurrent employment of spouses. Plaintiff resigned and brought this action for wrongful discharge alleging her dismissal violated public policy favoring marriage and was due to her exercise of the fundamental right to marry. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Because Plaintiff has failed to show that a policy prohibiting concurrent employment of spouses violates a clear mandate of public policy, we affirm the trial court.

The petitioners, Hugh Peter Bondurant and Kenneth Patterson Bondurant, appeal the summary dismissals of their petitions for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal of right, each alleges that his sentence was illegally imposed. Because the judgments are facially valid, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of three counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and one count of simple possession of cocaine. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-six years. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentences were excessive and the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3.

We granted this appeal to determine the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, in reviewing the denial of pretrial diversion, erred by considering evidence presented at trial and failing to limit its review to evidence considered by the district attorney general; and (2) whether the trial court applied the correct standard in reviewing the district attorney general’s denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authority, we hold that in reviewing the denial of pretrial diversion, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to limit its review to the evidence that was considered by the district attorney general and any factual disputes resolved by the trial court. We also hold that in considering the petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of review, which requires that it determine whether the district attorney general has considered and weighed all of the relevant factors and whether there is substantial evidence to support the district attorney general’s decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court to apply the appropriate standard of review.

Petitioner, Anthony Richardson, was convicted of first-degree murder in the Shelby County Criminal Court. This Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. Petitioner challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court's comments during a witness' testimony deprived him of his sixth amendment right to a jury trial; (2) whether Petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to a jury trial when the trial court "forced" counsel to proceed to trial; (3) whether the prosecutor's biblical reference at trial constituted reversible error; and (4) whether there was a conflict of interest when the same judge presided at both his trial and post-conviction hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 12, 1996, the petitioner, James P. Stout, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner elected not to pursue a direct appeal of his conviction and instead filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An abuse of discretion in denying pretrial diversion should be found only when the record
shows an absence of any substantial evidence supporting the district attorney general’s decision.
State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 356
(Tenn. 1983). When the reasons cited by the district attorney general are sufficient to support the
denial of pretrial diversion, I would hold that there is no abuse of discretion in the district attorney
general’s failure to make specific reference to every non-statutory, judicially-imposed factor. I
continue to adhere to my separate opinion in State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1999), and
therefore must respectfully dissent.

The Appellant, Donald Mays, appeals the verdict of a Shelby County jury finding him guilty of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Mays was sentenced to 30 years for aggravated robbery and to 60 years on each count of kidnapping. The kidnapping sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, but consecutive to the aggravated robbery sentence, for an effective sentence of 90 years. On appeal, Mays raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof; and (3) whether Mays' two convictions for kidnapping constitute double jeopardy. After review, we find Mays' multiple convictions for kidnapping violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, one count of kidnapping is dismissed. In all other respects, the remaining judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The defendant, who was charged with vehicular homicide and failure to yield right of way, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review district attorney's denial of pretrial diversion. The trial court found that district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.