APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Damon Johnson, of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, argues the trial court improperly commented on his right not to testify, and asserts the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Adam Moates, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-111 provides that when an insured property owner’s home or other structure sustains more than $1,000 in damages, the property or casualty insurance company shall name the general contractor of an uncompleted construction contract as a payee when issuing payment to the owner for the loss. Here, an insurance company issued a check to the insured owner but did not name the general contractor as a payee. The general contractor sued the insurance company, alleging noncompliance with section 56-7-111. We accepted three certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, one of which requires us to determine whether a general contractor has a private right of action against an insurance company for violating section 56-7-111. We hold that section 56-7-111 does not expressly grant a private right of action to the general contractor, and the general contractor failed to prove that the legislature intended to imply a private right of action. Thus, the general contractor has no right to sue the insurance company for noncompliance with section 56-7-111.

The Defendant, Javarius Deshawn Baugh, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first-degree premeditated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In post-divorce proceedings, a former husband petitioned to reduce or terminate his alimony in futuro payments to his former wife. The trial court denied the former husband’s request, ruling that he failed to show that a substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred since the alimony was awarded. The former husband appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The trial court granted a wife’s motion to alter or amend a final decree of divorce. The ruling modified the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. On appeal, the husband contends that there was no basis for setting aside an agreement that the parties entered into voluntarily and knowingly. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

A local government cited a property owner for operating his property as a short-term rental without a permit. A general sessions court found the property owner violated the shortterm rental ordinance and enjoined him from committing further violations. The government later brought two criminal contempt actions against the property owner, claiming that he violated the court’s injunction by continuing to run a short-term rental without a permit. The first time, the property owner acknowledged his violations, and the general sessions court entered an agreed order. The second time, the court found the property owner guilty of contempt after a hearing. The property owner appealed that finding to the circuit court. The circuit court found that the property owner was in contempt of the general sessions court’s order on eighteen occasions. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a residual beneficiary’s objection to an estate administrator receiving any fees based upon the latter’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. David Ramey (“Ramey”) is a beneficiary under his late father’s will. However, Ramey was in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy at the time of his father’s death, and Ramey’s inheritance became part of the bankruptcy estate. Dustin Crouse (“Crouse”) was appointed administrator of the probate estate. Michael Fitzpatrick (“Fitzpatrick”) is the Chapter 7 Trustee. Ramey filed an objection alleging Crouse breached his fiduciary duty by selling the estate’s primary asset, a house, below market value in a private sale. The General Sessions Court for Loudon County, Probate Division (“the Trial Court”) ruled against Ramey, although it found he had standing to bring his claims. Ramey appeals, objecting to fees paid to Crouse. We hold that Ramey lacks standing as any such claims of his to the probate estate belong to the Chapter 7 Trustee rather than him. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court, although on different grounds. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed as modified.

The Petitioner, Jarod Marges Phillips, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because his claim was based on a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court that established a new rule of constitutional law. Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

A mother and father of three children were divorced in 2018, and both parties filed petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan later that year. Both parties also asked the trial court to hold the other party in contempt for violating the parenting plan and engaging in other objectionable conduct. The trial court found the father guilty of two counts of contempt and the mother guilty of three counts of contempt, and it ordered them to spend two days in jail for each count. The court granted the husband’s petition to modify the parenting plan and changed the designation of the primary residential parent from the mother to the father. The mother appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1- 113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(A)(ii); (3) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(3). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Courtney Allison West, stated that appellant was appealing the judgment entered on January 7, 2021. As the parenting plan entered on January 7, 2021 does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A wife obtained an ex parte order of protection from her estranged husband. After a hearing, the trial court found that the wife had proven the allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. So the court extended the order of protection for one year. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s abuse finding, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Marvin Maurice DeBerry, of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”) and of three misdemeanor offenses not presented for appellate review. After his conviction but prior to his sentencing, an amendment to the statute that was the basis of his MVHO conviction went into effect, so that the Defendant’s conduct was no longer criminalized and, concomitantly, triggered no penalty. The trial court, after initially sentencing the Defendant to serve five years, modified the Defendant’s judgment to reflect that he was to be subjected to no penalty. On appeal, we are called to determine whether the Defendant may benefit from the savings statute in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112. We hold that the savings statute applies because Legislature’s act of removing punishment for the offense constitutes a lesser penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment reducing the Defendant’s sentence.

The Petitioner, Stephen Gerard Smith, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, and three counts of domestic assault for offenses committed against his wife, and he received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. He sought and was denied post-conviction relief based on numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he alleges that he received ineffective assistance when trial counsel: (1) gave deficient advice regarding a plea offer; (2) failed to challenge a prospective juror; (3) argued in closing argument that the Petitioner was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses; (4) failed to object to testimony referring to the Petitioner’s prior incarceration; (5) failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment on the victim’s credibility; (6) failed to call witnesses; and (7) failed to interview witnesses. Because we conclude that the Petitioner has not established either deficiency or prejudice for each claim, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Jonathan Michael Bass, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more, but less than $10,000, two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $2,500, one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, three counts of “doctor shopping,” and three counts of prescription drug fraud. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of eight years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering partial consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Jaleen Genard Allen, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (firearm violation). The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and to six years for the firearm violation. The court ordered consecutive service, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Braxton Levar Taylor, of second-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying two, pre-trial motions to suppress the victim’s dying declaration, wherein the victim named the defendant as his shooter, and a photographic lineup which contained his picture and resulted in two witness identifications. The defendant also argues the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction concerning the victim’s dying declaration and in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-divorce dispute, ex-spouses filed competing petitions to modify alimony.  The wife also sought to hold her former husband in civil contempt for failure to maintain the term life insurance policy specified in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement.  The trial court declined to hold the husband in contempt.  Both parties obtained partial relief on their modification petitions.  The court granted the wife a judgment for a retroactive increase in alimony.  The court also reduced the husband’s alimony obligation prospectively based on his inability to pay the current amount during his retirement.  We conclude that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the husband had the ability to pay additional alimony in the first two months of 2019.  We further conclude that the wife is entitled to an award of post-judgment interest.  So we modify the court’s retroactive judgment accordingly.  Otherwise, we affirm.

Two children were removed from their grandmother’s custody and subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected. The grandmother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for custody of the children, asserting that granting her custody is in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to one child and dismiss the appeal as moot as to the other. 

This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss because Appellant failed to provide Appellees with the proper pre-suit notice under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm.

Alexander R. Carino, Petitioner, appeals the summary dismissal of his 2020 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief which challenged his 2010 convictions for two counts of second degree murder. We affirm.

Defendant-Appellant, Stacy Ann Givens, was indicted by a Henderson County grand jury of filing a false police report in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-502, a Class D felony, and misuse of 911 in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-86-316, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of both offenses. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to five years’ imprisonment for the filing a false police report conviction and thirty days’ imprisonment for the misuse of 911 conviction, to be served concurrently. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the filing a false police report conviction, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Defendant an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Elgene K. Porter, acting pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his “Motion to Correct and/or Amend Sentence” pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon our review, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce child support matter. Elizabeth Dale Crafton (“Mother”) sued James Frederick Roberts (“Father”) for divorce. In 2007, the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Circuit Court”) entered a final decree of divorce in the case. In 2008, the Circuit Court entered a permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ children. The Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”) later accepted jurisdiction for child support matters. Father went on to file a series of motions seeking to be relieved from paying for private school tuition. In 2019, the Juvenile Court entered an order denying Father relief and resolving all outstanding matters. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the original child support order is void as against public policy for failure to adhere to the Child Support Guidelines, and that the succeeding orders are void, as well. As the original child support order did not entirely relieve the parents of their duty to support and otherwise was jurisdictionally sound, we hold that it is not void. We affirm.