APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, William Darnell Richardson, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court jury convictions of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, simple possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, arguing that he is entitled to plain error relief for inappropriate and prejudicial statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments, that the trial court erred by admitting evidence contravening the rules of hearsay, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell.  Because the trial court erred by admitting certain hearsay evidence, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for simple possession of Alprazolam and remand for a new trial on that charge.  Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction of driving on a revoked or suspended license, we vacate that conviction and dismiss that charge.  We affirm the defendant’s conviction of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and find no plain error in the prosecutor’s closing argument.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, James Durand Favors, was charged by information with four counts of aggravated domestic assault. He entered open guilty to pleas to all four counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to a total effect sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration to run consecutively to his sentence in two prior cases. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Stephen Maurice Mobley, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count each of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court merged the attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-six years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s challenge to the State’s striking a prospective juror as violating Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (3) a juror failed to disclose her prior knowledge of the Defendant during voir dire and provided extraneous information to other jurors in violation of the Defendant’s right to a fair trial; (4) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements under the excited utterance hearsay exception; and (5) the trial court improperly admitted evidence that the Defendant had been placed on a most wanted list by law enforcement prior to his arrest. We remand the case to the trial court for a hearing as to whether the State struck a potential juror in violation of Batson. We conclude that none of the other issues raised by the Defendant warrant relief.

An attorney who had been disbarred was assessed costs associated with his disbarment proceedings pursuant to pre-2014 Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 24.3. The attorney timely filed a petition seeking relief from costs, and a panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility conducted a hearing on the petition. The panel reduced the costs for 11.2 hours of disciplinary counsel time and otherwise denied the petition. The attorney has appealed to this Court, as permitted by pre-2014 Rule 9, section 24.3. Having carefully and thoroughly considered the record and each of the issues raised, we affirm the panel’s decision.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Caleb Josiah Cannon, of premeditated firstdegree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine to exclude evidence that a human remains detection dog alerted to the presence of the scent of human remains in the Defendant’s home and car; (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that the victim was deceased or that the Defendant caused her death; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted testimony from a witness identifying him in court because such testimony was tainted; and (4) the trial court erred when it excluded defense proof. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The mother of two minor children appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights upon finding that the Department of Children’s Services established three grounds for termination: (1) abandonment prior to incarceration that exhibits wanton disregard for the welfare of the children; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (3) failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody, and that termination was in the best interest of the children. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This consolidated appeal involves termination of parental rights in a case focusing on Zayne R., the minor child of Brittney R. (“Mother”) and Joseph D., and Matthew K., the minor child of Mother and Joshua K. In June 2019, Mother’s parents, Larry R. (“Grandfather”) and Bertha R. (“Grandmother”) (collectively, “Grandparents”), filed two petitions in the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”), seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights, respectively, to Zayne R. and Matthew K. (collectively, “the Children”). The Children had previously been removed from Mother’s custody and placed in the custody of Grandparents pursuant to an order entered by the Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”). Following a consolidated bench trial, the trial court granted Grandparents’ termination petitions based upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to visit and by failing to financially support them during the statutorily determinative period. The trial court further found that it was in the Children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s final orders terminating Mother’s parental rights.

This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) pre-trial procedural rulings; (2) characterization of certain assets as marital property; and (3) equitable division of the marital estate. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ conversion claim in accordance with Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, determining that it was filed outside the applicable three-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

Nicole Bowlin ("Employee") filed a workers' compensation claim against Servall, LLC ("Employer") alleging injuries suffered in a work-related motor vehicle accident. Employer initially denied the claim. After an expedited hearing, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") ordered Employer to pay Einployee's medical expenses and awarded attorney's fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(a)(1). The Workers' Coinpensation Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") vacated the award of attorney's fees as premature and rernanded the case. The parties settled the case as to all issues except for attorney's fees. The trial court approved the settlement agreement but declined to order Employer to pay the attorney's fees authorized by section 50-6-226(a)(1). The Appeals Board affirmed. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix.

The Defendant, John Gross, was convicted after a bench trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court of violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor, and aggravated stalking, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-113 (2018) (subsequently amended) (violation of an order of protection), 39-17-315 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (aggravated stalking). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of two years, eleven months, twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that plain error exists because the trial court admitted as evidence the recordings of the Defendant’s phone calls to the victim. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his legal malpractice action against Appellee, the attorney who represented Appellant in post-conviction matters related to his criminal case. The trial court held that Appellant’s lawsuit was barred by the running of the one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann § 28-3-104(c)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. 

This is the second appeal from a termination of parental rights case. In the first appeal, we remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to make the requisite written findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court found that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit had been proven and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. In this appeal, Mother argues that the trial court failed to analyze the best interest factors and how they applied to the facts of the case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of severe abuse, abandonment by failure to visit and support, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. We affirm the trial court’s rulings as to both grounds for termination and best interest.

A subcontractor that performed concrete and site work on a hotel construction project filed a lien on the property and then commenced this action against the general contractor and the owner of the property to recover sums due on the balance of the subcontract, for additional change order work, and interest. The claims relevant to the issues on appeal are against the owner for unjust enrichment and to enforce the lien. After obtaining a default judgment against the now defunct general contractor, the subcontractor moved for summary judgment on its claims against the owner. The owner contended that summary judgment was not proper because there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the amount owed to the subcontractor and whether the change orders had been approved. The court found it undisputed that the subcontractor performed work, in addition to that paid by the owner to the general contractor, for which the subcontractor was not paid; and that the owner received and appreciated a benefit from the services rendered by the subcontractor. Based on these findings, the trial court held that the subcontractor satisfied its burden of proving that the property owner was unjustly enriched. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor on its claims of unjust enrichment and to enforce its lien. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This case involves a post-divorce complaint to enforce the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), which was executed in 2005 in Shelby County, Tennessee. The complaint was filed in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”) by the wife and the parties’ adult son. The husband, now a resident of Hamblen County, Tennessee, filed a motion to dismiss based on, inter alia, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and expiration of the statute of limitations. The husband also subsequently filed an answer to the complaint, denying that the wife was entitled to relief and asserting various affirmative defenses. The trial court denied the husband’s motion to dismiss, determining that jurisdiction was proper in Shelby County. The court further found that the husband had breached the terms of the MDA and that the complaint was not time-barred. The court ordered the husband to procure life insurance for the benefit of the parties’ son within thirty days and to cooperate with the wife’s procurement of additional life insurance on the husband’s life. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees. The husband has appealed. Determining that the applicable statute of limitations had expired before the complaint was filed, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of a judgment of dismissal.

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Anderson County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Nicole M. (“Mother”) and Joseph M. (“Father”) to their minor son Evan M. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding a host of grounds for termination against Mother and Father. These grounds were based largely on proof of substance abuse and domestic violence. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm the Juvenile Court as to certain grounds for termination found against Mother and Father. However, we reverse certain other grounds for lack of clear and convincing evidence. In addition, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Juvenile Court, the result being we affirm the termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to the Child.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Mickey Verchell Shanklin, of the sale of heroin, the delivery of heroin, the sale of fentanyl, and the delivery of fentanyl and assessed fines of $50,000 for the heroin convictions and $25,000 for the fentanyl convictions. The trial court merged the heroin convictions and the fentanyl convictions and ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent terms of thirty years for the heroin convictions and fifteen years for the fentanyl convictions as a Range III, persistent offender at forty-five percent. The trial court also affirmed the total fines of $75,000. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the fines are excessive. We remand the case to the trial court for a hearing with regard to the fines. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority that it is necessary to remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the fines owed by the Defendant.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. She challenges the juvenile court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This is a termination of parental rights case.  The trial court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights as to five of his children.  Father now appeals, contending that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision.  For the reasons stated in this Opinion, we vacate in part, reverse in part, but otherwise we affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights.

A father filed a petition to change the surname of his nonmarital child. After the trial court granted the father’s petition, the mother appealed. Finding that the father failed to meet his burden of establishing that a surname change was in the child’s best interest, we reverse.

The Loudon County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Stephen A. Simpson, with one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one count of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. Following trial, a jury convicted Defendant of both counts. For the DUI count, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to forty-eight hours in confinement and the remainder to serve on supervised probation. For possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, the court sentenced Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. The trial court ran the sentences concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Wesley H. Luthringer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated vehicular homicide, alleging that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new counsel and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel.  Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.