APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a bid protest. UWork.com, Inc., d/b/a Covendis Technologies (“Covendis”) successfully bid on a contract to manage a network of temporary workers for the State of Tennessee. Guidesoft, Inc. d/b/a Knowledge Services (“Knowledge Services”), an unsuccessful bidder, filed a protest with the Central Procurement Office (“the CPO”). The CPO dismissed Knowledge Services’ bid for insufficient bond. Knowledge Services appealed to the State Protest Committee (“the Committee”), which denied the appeal. Knowledge Services then filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a hearing, the Trial Court dismissed Knowledge Services’ amended petition. Knowledge Services now appeals to this Court, arguing that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-3-514(d), its protest bond should be based on 5% of the lowest evaluated cost proposal rather than 5% of the State’s estimated maximum liability as found below. We hold, inter alia, that the protest bond statute is meant to protect the State, and the appropriate protest bond amount is based on the costs the State may incur rather than a bidder’s proposed cost. Further, the fee relied upon by Knowledge Services to calculate its protest bond is but a small portion of the contract at issue, which is estimated to cost the State $190,000,000. The Committee did not exceed its jurisdiction or act illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently. We affirm the Trial Court. 

The Appellant, Terrance F. Arnold, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that there was no “substantial evidence” that he violated his probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Quindarius Lamonta Jordan, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13102 (2018) (aggravated assault); 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful weapon possession). The trial court imposed eleven years for attempted second degree murder, five years for aggravated assault, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the firearm violation. The court imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering confinement and consecutive service. Although we affirm the judgments of the trial court, we remand the case for the entry of judgment forms reflecting a dismissal of the charges in indictment Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6.  

This is a collection lawsuit to recover the balance Appellant allegedly owes on a promissory note held by Appellee.  On Appellant’s motion, the trial court stayed the proceedings and remitted the matter to binding arbitration pursuant to the terms of the promissory note.  Appellant brings the instant appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a).  Because the order appealed is not final, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a).  Furthermore, neither the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act provides a mechanism for appeal of Appellant’s issues to this Court.  Appeal dismissed.

Defendant, Robert Joseph McBride, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor involving a number of materials exceeding 25; eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, each involving a number of materials exceeding 100; and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor involving a number of materials exceeding 50. Following the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant to search Defendant’s house and computer, Defendant entered guilty pleas to eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor involving materials exceeding 100, all Class B felonies. The agreed upon sentence was 12 years on each count, to be served concurrently. Defendant reserved for our review eight certified questions of law. We conclude that only Defendant’s question regarding the staleness of the information supporting the search warrant, is dispositive. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darious Fitzpatrick, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. The Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether his sentence is unconstitutional in light of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce proceeding. The father filed a petition to modify child support, and the mother filed a civil contempt action against the father for failure to pay child support as ordered by the court. Following trial, the trial court found that a significant variance existed from the previously ordered child support obligation and granted the father’s petition to modify child support. The trial court retroactively modified the father’s child support obligation from the date the petition was filed, resulting in three modifications while the petition had been pending. In the respective child support worksheets for the modifications, the trial court declined to include a credit to the mother for the health insurance premiums she had paid for the child, determining such expense of additional insurance coverage not to be “a reasonable necessity or requirement.” In consideration of the mother’s civil contempt complaint, the trial court found that the father had been in contempt of court due to his failure to pay child support as ordered by the court but that he had cured his contempt due to an involuntary payment from his income tax refund proceeds and the retroactive modification of his obligation and resultant overpayment of child support while the petition to modify was pending. The trial court further denied an award of attorney’s fees to either party. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. The trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned her child by wanton disregard and by committing severe child abuse against her. The court also concluded that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas McLaughlin, was convicted by a Union County jury of vehicular homicide. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-213. The Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count each of driving on a revoked license, violating the financial responsibility law, driving without registration, and driving without registration plates. The trial court classified the Defendant as a persistent offender and imposed a total effective sentence of 15 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: 1) he was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of his toxicology reports and license status; 2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for vehicular homicide; and 3) his sentence is unlawful because the trial court erroneously applied aggravating factors.1 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Howard Harmon, Jr., appeals his Blount County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, theft of property valued at $500 or less, arson, and abuse of a corpse, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statement of April 10, 2012, and by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce action concerning enforcement of the trial court’s order distributing the parties’ marital property, the trial court ultimately awarded a judgment to the wife in the amount of $206,868.67. The court also ordered that the wife would be entitled to a certain portion of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence. The court dismissed the wife’s contempt claims and declined to award interest or attorney’s fees. The husband has appealed. Having discerned two relatively minor errors in the judgment, we modify the amount awarded to the wife to increase it by $18,525.24, enlarging the trial court’s award to the wife to the total of $225,393.91 rather than $206,868.67. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that seven grounds had been established: abandonment for failure to support; abandonment for failure to visit; abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; persistence of conditions; mental incompetence; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also found that termination was in the child’s best interest for many reasons, including the mother’s failure to provide a safe home, maintain regular visitation, pay child support, and resolve her legal, mental health, and substance abuse issues. The mother contends the trial court incorrectly calculated the period relevant to the ground of abandonment, erred by admitting her mental health records into evidence in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-122, and that the evidence failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. Following a thorough review of the record, we have determined that four of the seven grounds for termination as found by the trial court were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was clearly and convincingly in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order vacating our previous judgment in this matter solely with respect to the division of the marital estate and remanding for our further review consistent with its order. We find upon further review that the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate as it did. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court on this one issue and remand for a new and equitable division of the marital estate.

Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Hamblen County (“trial court”) entered an order of protection against Nigel Reid II (“Respondent” or “Cross-Petitioner”) and in favor of Collette Jean Wallace (“Petitioner” or “Cross-Respondent”). Respondent appealed to this Court. Because Respondent’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Fredrick L. Tucker, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his rape of a child conviction, for which he received a twenty-one-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, Keontis Dontrell Cunningham, of two counts of aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury on selfdefense.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the defendant, Darnell Treshawn Wiggins1, of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its opening statement. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in admitting Officer Dalton’s testimony during the penalty phase, in denying his motion for mistrial, and in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ed Henry Loyde, of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-five years. This Court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Ed Loyde, No. W2014-01055-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1598121 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 6, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 21, 2015). After unsuccessfully filing a petition for post-conviction relief, Ed Loyde v. State No. W2018-01740-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 918602 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 25, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 22, 2020), the Petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

In a consolidated trial of Case No. 18-04092 and Case No. 18-04093, a Shelby County jury convicted Will Vaughn (“Defendant”) of fifteen counts of Class C felony facilitation of attempted second degree murder, fifteen counts of Class C felony employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor facilitation of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years for each of the thirty felony counts and to eleven months and
twenty-nine days for each count of facilitation of reckless endangerment counts. The trial court aligned some convictions concurrently and others consecutively in each case. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it was imposing an effective thirty-year sentence in Case No. 18-04092 and an effective thirty-year sentence in Case No. 18-04093 and ordered the two sentences to be run consecutively for a total effective sentence of sixty years. The “special conditions” section of the thirty-two judgment forms signed by the trial court state that the total effective sentence is fifty-four years. Also, the judgment forms for some of the counts do not match the consecutive/concurrent alignment announced by the trial court. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the convictions and consecutive sentencing but remand for trial court resentencing in two counts and for entry of the proper judgments.

The Appellant, Jody Alan Hughes, was convicted in the Bradley County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder; kidnapping, a Class C felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sentence of life plus fourteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his “numerous” requests to represent himself; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to comment about the codefendants’ exposure to prison sentences during counsel’s opening statement; (4) the trial court erred in its wording of a curative instruction to the jury; (5) the trial court erred by limiting a codefendant’s cross-examination about a false statement the codefendant made in a previous criminal case; (6) the trial court erred by limiting a detective’s testimony regarding the codefendants’ inconsistent statements; and (7) the trial court erred by not allowing testimony about a codefendant’s pretrial statement to impeach the codefendant. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, David Yost, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a car accident involving an employee of the State of Tennessee, Irene Howard (“Claimant”) sought damages against the State based on alleged injuries arising from the accident. The claim was denied by the Division of Claims and Risk Management (the “DCRM”), and Claimant thereafter appealed to the Claims Commission (the “Commission”). Because Claimant failed to appeal the DCRM’s decision within ninety days, however, the Commission concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the appeal. We affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights.  The petition was filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of three minor children.  The petition listed seven grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights.  After a final hearing on the petition, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failing to visit; (2) persistence of conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) failure to manifest an ability or willingness to parent; and (5) severe child abuse.  We affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The defendant, James McClain, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated assault and witness coercion, claiming that the trial court erred by permitting him to represent himself at trial, by permitting the State to proceed on an amended indictment, and by imposing consecutive sentences. Because the record establishes that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, that the indictment was not amended, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.