APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, a Tennessee corporation in the timeshare exit business, brought suit against Appellee, a former employee, for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, and civil conspiracy. Appellant alleged that during Appellee’s employment, she conspired with a competing company to steal business from Appellant. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the complaint in full with prejudice because the alleged employment contract, attached as an exhibit to the plaintiff’s complaint, did not name the plaintiff as a party to the contract. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim but reverse the dismissal of the breach of the duty of loyalty claim and the civil conspiracy claim.

This appeal arises from a class action lawsuit against the City of Franklin. The plaintiffs are the owners of 188 properties, in five subdivisions, whose properties are subject to liens in connection with improvement assessments for sanitary sewer services. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the City had filed notices of liens against the properties in amounts greater than authorized pursuant to the relevant statutes governing improvement assessments. The trial court declared the notices of liens null and void and directed the City to file amended notices of liens. The next phase of the proceeding focused on damages. The owners of eight properties filed claims for monetary damages allegedly caused by the City’s error when the property owners had attempted to refinance or sell their properties. The trial court concluded that a hearing on damages was not necessary and denied all claims, finding that none of the claimants suffered an injury as a result of the City’s actions. The trial court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for an award of the attorney fees they had incurred. The plaintiffs appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in denying their claims for damages and attorney fees. The City of Franklin argues that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the substantive issue regarding the validity of the notices of liens. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Thomas N. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“trial court”) terminating his parental rights to his minor child, Porcalyn N. (the “Child”). Discerning no error, we affirm.

O’Neal Johnson, Petitioner, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, William Gossett, was charged in twelve separate indictments with 26 offenses, including multiple counts of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm, and theft of property. Defendant pleaded guilty to all 26 counts, with the trial court to determine his sentencing. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant received a total effective sentence of 371 years’ incarceration. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly treated Defendant’s 1999 juvenile adjudications for rape of a child, where there were two victims, as multiple offenses for the purposes of determining Defendant’s offender classification at sentencing. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in affirming the sentences in this case, but I write separately to emphasize the danger of expansive, even over-broad locution and reliance upon such locution in place of legal analysis tailored to the facts and issues in each particular case. The majority has concluded that the offense of child rape inherently embraces the elements of serious bodily injury, bodily injury, or the threat to cause serious bodily injury or bodily injury such that the 24-hour rule contained in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-106, -107 does not apply. For the majority, this conclusion is buttressed, at least in part, by language expressed in State v. Kissinger, 922 A.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1996), and State v. Edward Earl Huddleston, No. 02C01-9706-CC-00228, 1998 WL 67684 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 20, 1998).

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s determination that Angelleigh R. (“the Child”) had been the victim of severe child abuse while living with her mother, Amanda B. (“Mother”), and Mother’s paramour, J.M. As noted in the majority opinion, both Mother and J.M. were parties to the proceedings in juvenile court as well as the de novo appeal to the Marshall County Circuit Court (“trial court”). However, the trial court’s dependency and neglect determination as to Mother was based solely on educational neglect while the trial court’s determination of severe child abuse was based solely on its finding of sexual abuse perpetrated against the Child by J.M. Mother was not accused of severe child abuse or failing to protect the Child from such abuse. Although Mother has perfected an appeal to this Court, J.M. did not appeal the determination that he had severely abused the Child, and thus the existence of Mother’s standing to appeal that particular determination, which was not rendered with respect to her, is somewhat uncertain. See Clark v. Perry, No. 02A01-9704-CH-00080, 1998 WL 34190562, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1998) (“As a general rule, . . . a party lacks standing to appeal an order entered against a co-party who has elected not to appeal that order.”). Nevertheless, assuming, arguendo, that Mother possesses the proper standing to appeal the trial court’s determination that J.M. severely abused the Child, I believe that the trial court’s determination should be affirmed.  

Parents filed a healthcare liability and wrongful death complaint after the mother delivered a stillborn infant. We granted this interlocutory appeal to review whether the claims commission erred in denying summary judgment to the defendants. Finding no error in the Commission’s ruling, we affirm.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Antwain Tapaige Sales, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed. Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Marques D. Wheeler, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon and one count of reckless homicide. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to reckless homicide and received an agreed-upon sentence of ten years for his conviction with the manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court dismissed Defendant’s unlawful possession of a weapon charges. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for split confinement and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the matter for entry of a judgment form for count two. 

This appeal stems from the circuit court’s finding that a child was dependent and neglected. In particular, Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that the child was a victim of severe abuse and educational neglect. We reverse the trial court as to both determinations.  

John B. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child, Braylee B. (“the Child”). In September 2019, Brook W. (“Mother”) and Charles W. (“Stepfather”) filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights in the Scott County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”). Father filed a motion to compel discovery and continue the trial, which was denied by the Trial Court. Following a trial, the Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights on two grounds of abandonment due to Father’s failure to support the Child and his wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. The Trial Court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a bench trial, the trial court judge convicted the Defendant, Corey Forest, of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and imposed an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his vehicle. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Aggrieved of her Sullivan County Criminal Court jury conviction of making a false report, see T.C.A. § 39-16-502, the defendant, Kelly Brooke Frye, appeals. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentence originally imposed as well as the trial court’s denial of her motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, to reduce her sentence. She also alleges that she was deprived of her constitutional rights to a public trial, to trial by an impartial jury, and to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Anthony Jackson, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of forty-two years. This court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Anthony Jackson, No. W2015-01403-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4147419 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 2, 2016), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Anwar Ghazali, was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two years imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). On appeal, the Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction based on the following: (1) the substantial two-day delay between the time of the alleged incident and the discovery of the body; (2) the State’s failure to establish that the victim was missing during the two days; (3) and a lack of evidence proving the Defendant shot and killed the victim when the alleged incident occurred in an area where shootings were common. Following our review, we affirm.

Appellant/Wife filed a petition for civil contempt against Appellee/Husband alleging that Husband failed to make payments on a debt owed to Wife as required under the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”). The trial court: (1) held that the MDA was ambiguous; (2) entered judgment for Wife in the amount of $14,636.66; (3) held that Husband was not in contempt of the MDA; and (4) denied Wife attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA. We conclude that the MDA was not ambiguous and that the trial court erred in allowing parol evidence of payments Husband allegedly made prior to executing the MDA. Accordingly, we: (1) reverse the trial court’s finding that the MDA is ambiguous; (2) reverse and modify the trial court’s entry of judgment for Wife in the amount of $14,636.66; (3) vacate the trial court’s finding that Husband was not in contempt; and (4) reverse the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. We remand the case for: (1) entry of judgment in favor of Wife in the amount of $82,000.00 plus post-judgment interest; (2) reconsideration of the question of Husband’s contempt; and (3) calculation of Wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the litigation, including this appeal, and entry of judgment on same.

Defendant, Douglas E. Alvey, was indicted by the Rhea County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, vehicular homicide, and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death. By motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the charge of vehicular homicide. A jury convicted Defendant as charged on the remaining counts, and the trial court imposed a life sentence for Defendant’s first degree murder conviction and a sentence of two years, to be served concurrently, for his leaving the scene of an accident conviction. Defendant appeals his first degree murder conviction, asserting that the evidence at trial of premeditation was not sufficient to support his conviction. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of a complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02 and denial of a motion to alter or amend under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59. The court dismissed the complaint after finding the plaintiffs consistently violated court orders and unnecessarily delayed litigation by, inter alia, violating discovery and procedural deadlines. The plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the trial court already excused any past violations and their latest violations were due to circumstances outside of the plaintiffs’ control. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. We have determined that the court’s basis for dismissing the case is properly supported by evidence in the record, the court identified and applied the appropriate legal principles, and its decision was within the range of acceptable alternatives dispositions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a financial dispute between a drug testing laboratory, H & H Testing, Inc. (“H & H Testing” or “H & H”), and Wesley Young, for whom H & H performed 64 qualitative drug screens while Mr. Young was a client of Transcend Recovery Community (“Transcend”), which operates recovery communities nationwide. Upon commencing treatment for drug addiction at Transcend, Mr. Young agreed to adhere to treatment guidelines that included abstaining from drugs and alcohol and submitting to a rigorous drug screening protocol. Pursuant to this protocol, Transcend forwarded 64 of Mr. Young’s random urine samples to H & H Testing for comprehensive laboratory testing. After H & H performed each drug screen, it submitted a claim to Mr. Young’s health insurance provider, BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (“BlueCross” or “BCBST”). BlueCross approved each and every claim submitted by H & H Testing and remitted payment for the services rendered by H & H in the aggregate of $85,837.11. Because H & H Testing was an out-of-network provider, BlueCross remitted payment for the services rendered by H & H to its insured, Mr. Young, expecting he would forward the proceeds to H & H. Instead of remitting the funds to H & H Testing, Mr. Young entrusted the money to his parents, but they did not forward the proceeds to H & H. When H & H Testing demanded payment, Mr. Young and his parents commenced this action to declare the rights of the parties to the funds. They contended that H & H Testing was not entitled to the insurance proceeds because Mr. Young did not have a contract with H & H Testing, its services were not medically necessary, and the charges were exorbitant. H & H Testing filed an answer and counterclaims for breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Following a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of H & H Testing without identifying the claims upon which the judgment was granted and imposed a constructive trust over the insurance proceeds. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of H & H Testing based on its claims of conversion and unjust enrichment. But we vacate the trial court’s decision to impose a constructive trust over the proceeds because the parties failed to raise the issue in any of the pleadings.

A property development company brought suit against a property owner for specific performance to enforce an option agreement entered into between the company and the property owner.  The trial court held that the option agreement was enforceable and awarded specific performance and damages to the development company.  We have concluded that the option agreement is not sufficiently definite with respect to the option price and, therefore, is not an enforceable contract.  We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings regarding the development company’s alternative cause of action for unjust enrichment.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen L. Purcell, Jr., of felony reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, auto burglary, and theft of property valued at more than $10,000. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and especially aggravated kidnapping. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

The petitioner, Howard Burnett, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Because the petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s representation, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Marcus Thurman Wade, filed for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of first degree murder and one conviction of especially aggravated robbery, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) advising the Petitioner not to testify; (2) failing to request a psychological evaluation of the Petitioner; (3) failing to introduce at the suppression hearing proof of the Petitioner’s mental capacity; (4) failing to challenge the racial composition of the jury venire; (5) failing to request funds for expert witnesses; (6) failing to investigate and review motel camera footage; and (7) failing to file a motion in limine to block evidence of the Petitioner’s drug transactions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.