APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Aggrieved of his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a firearm, the defendant, Brandon Deshun McAlister, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jerry Dale Baker, appeals from the revocation of his probationary sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred by fully revoking Defendant’s probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

This appeal concerns an alleged violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), as well as common law retaliatory discharge. Jennifer King (“King”), a former shipping and receiving coordinator for Delfasco, LLC, a company that manufactures defense-related products, sued Delfasco, LLC and related entity Delfasco Finance, LLC (“Delfasco” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) alleging she was wrongfully fired for refusing to share with Delfasco owner Jack Goldenberg (“Goldenberg”) her government-issued password to the Department of Defense (“DOD”) Wide Area Workflow (“WAWF”) system. King had consulted a DOD representative who advised her not to reveal her password. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of King and awarded her damages. Delfasco appeals, arguing among other things that King was not asked to perform an illegal act. King raises her own issues concerning damages. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings, and we leave undisturbed the Trial Court’s credibility determinations.

Jeffrey Allen McNew, Defendant, entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of carjacking, and four counts of aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, Persistent Offender, and the trial court determined the length and alignment of the sentences. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 135 years. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgments merging the aggravated assault conviction in Count 7 into the aggravated robbery conviction in Count 3 and merging the aggravated assault conviction in Count 8 into the aggravated robbery conviction in Count 4.

The Petitioner, Carl Prince, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

After a jury trial and subsequent retrial on two of the charges, the defendants, Jalean Robert Williams and Markeil Linskey Williams, were convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of Alprazolam with intent to sell or deliver, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fourteen years on each defendant. On appeal, both defendants assert the evidence is insufficient to sustain their convictions. In addition, Defendant Markeil argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask leading questions, and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences violates the prohibition against double jeopardy. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After counsel announced that the parties had settled their differences, the trial court entered a consent judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. One year later, one of the litigants moved to set aside the judgment arguing lack of consent and fraud. The moving party claimed that it never approved the settlement or consented to entry of the dismissal order. The trial court denied the motion. Because the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marc Baechtle, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. The trial court dismissed the aggravated sexual battery and rape convictions due to statute of limitations and ultimately imposed a 25-year sentence for the rape of a child conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that trial counsel advised him not to testify and failed to impeach a witness. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Matthew Sealey, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The pro se petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition as the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, William Scott Hunley, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Maurico Grandberry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Khamphonh Xayyasith, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-111 (2018) (domestic assault). The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions and imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for aggravated assault and eleven months, twenty-nine days for domestic assault. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated assault convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting a recorded jail telephone call, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to change the parties’ permanent parenting plan to designate Father as the primary residential parent of the children. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

A property owner filed suit against the owners of a neighboring property, alleging that the neighbors had created a nuisance and trespassed by diverting surface water onto his property and causing a sinkhole to develop. After a trial on the matter, a jury returned a verdict finding that the neighbor had not created a nuisance and had not trespassed. The trial court judge confirmed the jury’s verdict and dismissed all claims against the neighbor with prejudice. Because the record contains material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, we affirm.

The defendant, Reginald Bond, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Dennis Allen Rayfield, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree murder, alleging that the trial court committed errors which deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

An issue regarding attorney’s fees remains pending.  As such, the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Emmanuel Wallace, Defendant, and co-defendant Joshua Aretz were indicted for their roles in the shooting death of Savon Easterling in Clarksville in August of 2015.  Defendant was indicted for premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery.  Defendant elected to proceed to trial.  After the presentation of the proof, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the offense of aggravated robbery.  The trial court submitted the lesser-included offenses of attempted aggravated robbery, attempted robbery, and attempted theft of property for the jury’s consideration.  After deliberating, the jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder and felony murder but not guilty of attempted aggravated robbery and all lesser included offenses.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective life sentence after merging the convictions.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed to this Court.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent because he was found guilty of felony murder and not guilty of the underlying felony.  He also argues that the trial court improperly responded to a jury question in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c).  After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief.  Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Johnny Lee Jenkins, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. One of the counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony was dismissed after the Petitioner filed a motion for new trial, and this court reversed and vacated the voluntary manslaughter conviction on direct appeal and remanded the case for entry of corrected judgments to reflect a conviction for reckless homicide. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically contending that trial counsel failed to argue the inclusion of lesser-included offenses. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Courtney Perry, appeals the summary dismissal of his “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion.

Former firefighter who alleged miscalculation of his Line of Duty disability benefits brought an action for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the City of Memphis. In this appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) we affirm the trial court.

Aggrieved of his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, the defendant, Zacarias Salas-Rufino, appeals, challenging the admission of certain telephone calls and the testimony of the medical examiner on the issue of “excited delirium.” Discerning no error, we affirm.

In the underlying declaratory judgment action, an insurance company sought a judgment that an automobile insurance policy issued to a mechanic does not provide coverage for an accident involving the mechanic. After examining the mechanic under oath, the insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policy contained a business purpose exclusion for accidents occurring while road testing a vehicle, which the mechanic stated he was doing at the time the accident occurred. The mechanic responded with an affidavit asserting that he was driving the vehicle for personal errands. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the mechanic’s purpose for driving the vehicle. At trial, the mechanic testified that he was running personal errands at the time of the accident but offered no explanation for his contradictory sworn statements. Following the close of proof, the insurance company renewed its argument regarding the policy’s exclusion and moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the matter to a jury, which found that the exclusion did not preclude coverage of the accident.