APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jaylon Hatch, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted premeditated first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, a Class C felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (first degree murder), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2019) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm). The trial court imposed an effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the conviction offenses because they are based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Thor Lucas Coleman, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault by strangulation, aggravated assault by violating a restraining order, possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced him to a forty-five-year effective sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted first degree murder. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to six children based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and severe abuse. The trial court further concluded that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Defendant, Roger Trino Spencer, Jr., was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault by displaying a deadly weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective eighteen years’ confinement. The trial court also imposed an effective $15,000 fine and ordered Defendant to pay $971 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; the State’s improper comments during opening statement and closing argument entitle him to plain error relief; the trial court erred by failing to consider a validated risk and needs assessment in imposing his sentence; and the trial court erred by failing to consider his ability to pay in imposing fines and ordering restitution. Having reviewed the briefs and arguments of the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A decedent’s stepchildren filed a complaint contesting ownership of a portion of his twenty-acre property. They asserted theories of adverse possession, express oral trust, and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Because we conclude that the allegations of an express oral trust and breach of contract are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, we reverse in part.

Katherine Malone died in an accident in Idaho. Her ex-husband, Patrick Malone, was named guardian of their child, Beatrice Rose Malone (“Rosie”). A trust (“the Tennessee Trust”) was established in Davidson County, Tennessee, for all funds due to Rosie. Katherine Malone’s parents, James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“the Roses”) were the personal representatives of her estate and “Limited Trust Protectors,” of the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone, as Rosie’s guardian, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Idaho and recovered a settlement. The settlement funds were placed in a trust Mr. Malone established in Missouri with Blue Ridge Bank and Trust. The Roses filed this action to transfer the funds to the Tennessee Trust and to find Mr. Malone in civil contempt. The Probate Court agreed with the Roses, finding Mr. Malone in civil contempt and ordering that the funds be transferred to the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone and Blue Ridge Bank and Trust appealed. We affirm.

For disobedience of or resistance to a court order to constitute contempt, four elements must be satisfied.  Konvalinka v. Chattanooga–Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) (2024) (defining the scope of a court’s contempt power).  This case turns on the second of the four: whether “the order alleged to have been violated . . . [was] clear, specific, and unambiguous.”  Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354.  Because the order here was not sufficiently specific to support the finding of contempt, I would reverse.

Following a jury trial, a Cheatham County jury convicted Defendant, Jared A. Smith, of three counts of Rape of a Child, four counts of Aggravated Sexual Battery, and three counts of Incest, for which he received a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a police witness; (2) the State’s election of offenses was “vague, ambiguous and unsupported by the evidence,” in violation of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (3) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on generic evidence.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. 

Petitioner, Rico Eugene Mallard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 1999 especially aggravated robbery conviction, for which he was sentenced to twenty-two years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to his life sentence for first degree murder. The post-conviction court found that State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), did not establish a new constitutional right applicable to Petitioner’s case, and therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled, and the petition was time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ricky Hunt, pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, along with two amended petitions. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the corroboration requirement regarding accomplice testimony and for failing to help him file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel failed to advise him that his sentence was required to be served at 100%. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Timothy Dion Wells, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of second degree murder, for which he is serving a twenty-two-year sentence as a
Range I offender. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2018). On appeal, he contends that: (1)
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in various
evidentiary rulings, (3) he is entitled to a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of
multiple trial errors, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

After three days of a Dickson County jury trial, the Defendant, Mendy Powell Neal, who was charged with the first degree premeditated and felony murder of her husband and the aggravated arson of their home, entered a North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), best interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, in exchange for the dismissal of the felony murder and aggravated arson counts of the presentment and an agreed range of three to four years, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, determined that she was not a suitable candidate for probation or other alternative sentencing, and sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to four years at 30% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following the denial of what the Defendant styled as a “Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court treated as a Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence, the Defendant filed an untimely appeal to this court in which she argues that the trial court erred in both the length and manner of service of the sentence. Based on our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not warrant that the timely notice of appeal requirement be waived for the Defendant’s attempt to appeal the trial court’s original sentencing determinations. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by declining to reduce or modify the sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Parents filed competing petitions to modify a parenting plan.  The parents agreed there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification.  But they disagreed over the residential custody schedule and decision-making provisions. After a hearing, the trial court modified the schedule and granted joint decision-making.  Because neither decision was an abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

The defendant, Calvin Dwight Butler, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor. As a
condition of his plea, the defendant agreed to a sentence of six years with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court
ordered the defendant to serve his six-year sentence incarcerated with the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in
sentencing the defendant to a term of confinement. Upon our review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

In this contract dispute, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation predicated on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Shortly after the City of Memphis (“the City”) made public announcements regarding untested sexual assault kits, three women filed a class action complaint alleging that the announcements caused them severe emotional distress. More than a year after the announcements, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a new plaintiff. The three original plaintiffs’ claims were either voluntarily dismissed or dismissed by the trial court based upon the statute of limitations. The City sought summary judgment against the only remaining plaintiff on the ground that her claims were time-barred. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and this Court granted the City’s petition for an interlocutory appeal. Concluding that the applicable statute of limitations barred the new plaintiff’s claims, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand.

Ms. Ward hired Kedalo Construction LLC (“Kedalo”) to renovate her store. She claimed that the work was not completed or was not done properly. After Kedalo attempted to remedy the situation, Ms. Ward was still not satisfied. Kedalo then said she was not their problem anymore. Ms. Ward created a website and Facebook page criticizing the company.  Kedalo sued for defamation. Ms. Ward responded with a petition to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After many filings and a deposition, the trial court dismissed the petition. Ms. Ward appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Joshua Anthony Williams, alias, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to statutory rape. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant was to receive a four-year sentence as a Range II offender to be served on probation following one year of confinement, and the trial court was to determine whether to grant judicial diversion and whether to require the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, extending the diversionary period to six years, and placed the Defendant on the sexual offender registry during the diversionary period. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in placing him on the sexual offender registry. We conclude that the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and that the Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements for extraordinary relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Desmond Lanier Hatchett, was convicted by a Knox County jury of evading
arrest with risk of death or injury, driving while his license was revoked, reckless driving,
violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the window tint law. The trial
court imposed an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing
that the trial court erred in imposing a six-year sentence for evading arrest with risk of
death or injury. Upon review of the entire record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this negligence action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff, who is legally blind, had failed to present evidence that her fall from a street curb and resultant injury were caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to make a courtesy stop at the location the plaintiff had requested for exiting a city bus. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a class certification. Because the trial court failed to clearly define the class being certified, we are unable to proceed to review the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s certification order and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

In its divorce decree, the trial court “adopted” Wife’s proposed parenting plans without signing or attaching the plans. More than a year after the resolution of Husband’s subsequent motion to alter or amend, the trial court eventually signed the parenting plans pursuant to a motion to enter by Husband. Because we determine that Husband’s argument that the trial court’s order only became final when the plans were signed is without merit, we conclude that Husband’s appeal was untimely. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed. Wife is awarded her appellate attorney’s fees.

This Tennessee Public Participation Act appeal involves three parties and multiple issues. The plaintiff/appellee, Lisa Garramone (“Ms. Garramone”), while serving as a commissioner for the City of Nolensville, Tennessee, filed a complaint for, inter alia, false light invasion of privacy against four defendants, including appellants Jason Patrick (“Mr. Patrick”) and Dr. Joe Curtsinger (“Dr. Curtsinger”). Ms. Garramone alleged that the defendants acted in concert to spread defamatory information about her during her 2022 re-election campaign. Each defendant responded by filing a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (“the TPPA”). Mr. Patrick also filed a motion for summary judgment; Dr. Curtsinger did not. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Garramone filed a notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice” of all of her claims under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01(1), to which the defendants objected. While the TPPA petitions were pending, this court ruled on the interplay between the TPPA and Rule 41.01(1) in Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade I”), No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023). Consequently, the trial court ordered the parties to reargue the TPPA petitions considering this court’s rulings in Flade I. Thereafter, the trial court determined that Ms. Garramone’s voluntary dismissal mooted Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition but that it was ineffective against Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition because of his pending motion for summary judgment. The trial court further held that Mr. Patrick established that the TPPA applied because Ms. Garramone’s claims were based on, related to, or in response to his exercise of the right to free speech. But the court held that Ms. Garramone failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for her tort claims as required by the TPPA. Thus, the court granted Mr. Patrick’s petition, dismissed Ms. Garramone’s claims against him, and ordered Mr. Patrick to submit his claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Mr. Patrick sought $74,346.50 in attorney’s fees and $920.09 in costs, but the court awarded him only $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $66.91 in costs based on its determination that the TPPA’s fee-shifting provision—Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107—should be construed narrowly because it runs contra to the American Rule. Thus, the court found that Mr. Patrick was entitled to only those fees “reasonably incurred in obtaining the dismissal of the action,” which did not include, inter alia, services rendered to prepare a defense against Ms. Garramone’s tort claims. The court reasoned that “more than $46,600.00 of his total fees and $853.18 of his costs” were incurred after Ms. Garramone filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit with prejudice, which the trial court stated disposed of the case “for all practical purposes.”  Mr. Patrick appeals the amount of the award for his attorney’s fees and costs; he also seeks his attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. Dr. Curtsinger appeals the denial of his TPPA petition as moot. For her part, Ms. Garramone contends the trial court erred by not denying Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition as moot when she filed her notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice.” After these consolidated appeals were filed and argued, our Supreme Court rendered two decisions pertaining to the TPPA, Charles v. McQueen, 693 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2024), and Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade II”), ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024). Based on the reasoning in Flade II, we hold that Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition did not curtail Ms. Garramone’s “free and unrestricted” right to voluntarily dismiss her claims against him; thus, we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition as moot. We further find that Ms. Garramone’s characterization of her dismissal as “with prejudice” did not place it outside the ambit of Rule 41.01(1)’s summary-judgment exception. As for Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs, we rely upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charles and Flade II to find that the trial court erred by categorically excluding all fees and costs he incurred in preparing a defense to Ms. Garramone’s claims. Accordingly, we vacate the award of Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs and remand for reconsideration of the reasonable amount to which he is entitled under § 20-17-106 and to enter judgment accordingly. We also find that Mr. Patrick is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal pursuant to § 20-17-107, as explained in Nandigam Neurology, PLC v. Beavers, 639 S.W.3d 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. 

A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. In an earlier appeal, we determined that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign judgment, but we vacated the enforcement decision to determine the outstanding amount owed under the judgment. In this appeal, the judgment debtor faults the trial court for not considering his equitable estoppel defense on remand. Discerning no error, we affirm.