APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant, Jordan Dane Weatherspoon, of one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, and he later pleaded guilty to two additional counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Jay James Macken, Defendant, was convicted of aggravated assault, aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and interference with emergency communication after a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of 20 years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant sought review of his convictions in this Court. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for aggravated assault and especially aggravated kidnapping. Because the evidence supported the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Austin Cunningham, of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, among other offenses. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we hold that the Defendant has waived his issues by failing to properly prepare his brief in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. Although we remand Count 6 for entry of a modified judgment as to the sentence imposed, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis challenging his 2011 convictions for first degree felony murder, aggravated arson, and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The coram nobis court held an initial hearing to determine whether Petitioner was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing; after the initial hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without a full evidentiary hearing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, James Phillip Rickman, of one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder resulting in serious bodily injury, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury and one count of aggravated assault; and (2) the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion to suppress. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a personal injury case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, and because the order was improperly certified as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant Brandon M. Jones was convicted by a jury of seventeen counts of a twenty-seven-count indictment. The offenses involved the possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the jury to deliberate late into the evening before reaching a verdict in a bifurcated trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable authority, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Steven Mitchel Ambrose, appeals his jury convictions for four counts of rape of a child and his resulting effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to law enforcement; (2) the State provided an insufficient election of offenses which deprived him of a verdict by a unanimous jury; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (4) his sentence is excessive; and (5) the multiple “procedural errors and constitutional violations” that occurred in the trial court violated his right to due process and entitle him to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Stephen Charles Johnson (“Husband”) filed for divorce against Elizabeth Kay Johnson (“Wife”) in the Chancery
Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”).2 Former Chancellor Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr., presided at trial.
However, he was defeated for re-election midtrial. Richard B. Armstrong, Jr. succeeded Pridemore as Chancellor.
Shortly before his statutory authority expired, Chancellor Pridemore entered a one-page order adopting Wife’s
59-page proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in full. Husband appeals. We conclude that Chancellor
Pridemore’s order does not reflect his own deliberations and decision-making. We, therefore, vacate the Trial
Court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

This appeal raises a thorny question about adverse possession. Under that doctrine, a party may gain legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property by maintaining exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious possession of the property for a certain length of time. At issue here is the adversity requirement. The original plaintiff in this case, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property near downtown Nashville years ago but did not register the deed. About two decades later, the individual who sold the property to Mr. Eads defaulted on a loan, and his creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold to enforce the lien. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Eads adversely possessed the property during the intervening years. Defendant, the subsequent purchaser of the property, disagrees and argues that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse. We agree with defendant. Adversity, for purposes of both common-law and statutory adverse possession, requires either a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Because neither existed here for the requisite time period, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and reinstate the chancery court’s judgment in favor of defendant.

Greywood Crossing Owners Association, Inc. (“Greywood”) commenced this action to enforce the
development’s Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions (“the Declaration”) against one of its homeowners,
Barbara Holleman, who had failed to pay assessments for more than three years.1 Specifically, the complaint
asserted claims against Ms. Holleman on a sworn account to collect unpaid assessments plus attorney’s fees
and costs of collection as well “an Order of Sale of the Property to satisfy [Greywood’s] assessment lien and
judgment.” Ms. Holleman, acting pro se in the trial court, filed an answer in which she denied the debt. Upon
Greywood’s motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court found that Ms. Holleman owed the
assessments, awarded fees and costs to Greywood, and ordered Ms. Holleman to list her property for sale to
satisfy the debt. When Ms. Holleman failed to list her property for sale as ordered by the trial court, Greywood
filed a Rule 70 motion for specific performance, which the court granted, directing the clerk and master to sell
Ms. Holleman’s property. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

I agree with the majority that, to acquire legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property through adverse possession, the Plaintiffs must show Mr. Eads had “exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious” possession of the property for the requisite time. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Eads’s possession of the property was not “adverse.” ¹ I would hold Mr. Eads has met the requirements to show a hostile or adverse possession for common-law and statutory adverse possession.²

Appellant, Raven Cobins, appealed a February 16, 2023 order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is dismissed.

This is the second appeal involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two children. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s finding that the mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We remanded the case for the trial court to make additional factual findings and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order with additional findings and conclusions. The mother appeals again. We affirm.

The appellants sued the appellee, a law firm, alleging that the law firm committed legal malpractice when it gave the appellants legal advice with regard to the tax implications of a stock sale. The law firm filed two motions for summary judgment arguing that the legal malpractice case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Both motions were denied when the trial court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found that the legal malpractice case was timely filed but that the law firm had not committed legal malpractice. Upon our diligent review of the record, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Duncan, appeals from the Cheatham County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted
second degree murder, aggravated arson, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
burglary, and theft of property valued at more than $2,500 but less than $10,000, for
which he is serving an effective seventy-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner
contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective
assistance of counsel allegations for trial counsel’s failure (1) to file motions to suppress,
(2) to file a motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants, (3) to file a motion to
dismiss count five of the indictment relating to theft of property and to object to other
evidence relating to the theft of the victim’s car, (4) to request jury instructions for
facilitation of a felony or accessory after the fact, and (5) to object to the State’s witness
vouching during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned his child by failure to visit. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

The Defendant, Andrew James Skaalerud, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of the three-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded conviction for possession with intent to sell or to deliver alprazolam. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Derrick Lee Johnson, Defendant, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s judgment revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his probationary sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by improperly considering Defendant’s indicted charges instead of the ones for which he was ultimately convicted, and by failing to consider whether alternative sentencing would serve the ends of justice. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties to this appeal separated in 2019 and executed a separation agreement requiring
the husband to pay child support for the parties’ three children. When the husband filed
for divorce in 2021, he requested that the child support be modified pursuant to a provision
in the separation agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the
husband’s child support obligation should be modified due to a substantial change in the
parties’ circumstances. Following a motion to alter or amend filed by the wife, however,
the trial court reversed its initial ruling, holding that the husband’s child support obligation
was non-modifiable. The husband appealed to this Court. Because the trial court erred in
granting the wife’s motion to alter or amend, we reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court found multiple counts of criminal contempt stemming from Husband’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug and alcohol testing. It fined him $7,100.00 and sentenced him to fifty days in jail. On appeal, Husband contends that the court’s order holding him in contempt lacked sufficient factual findings. He also contends that the orders requiring testing were ambiguous and unclear and that there was insufficient proof that his failure to submit to testing was willful. Finally, he challenges the punishment because of its impact on his parenting time. We affirm the finding of criminal contempt in part as modified and vacate the sentence.

The defendant, Eric L. Hoosier, Sr., was found guilty by a Montgomery County jury of criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder, criminal attempt to commit second-degree murder, employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, and reckless endangerment firing a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventy years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding character evidence of a victim, in denying the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial, and in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence within the range. The defendant also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm.

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two of her children based on three statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. Michelle Miller, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

After remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court, we reconsider Petitioner’s, Marshall G. Tate’s, appeal from the Franklin County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.