APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

While incarcerated for first-degree murder, Appellant filed suit against Appellee, an attorney who represented Appellant during his criminal trial, for legal malpractice. Shortly after filing the complaint, Appellant filed a motion to appear for hearings by video. The trial court did not rule on the motion to appear by video and proceeded to enter several orders on other motions on the pleadings only, including an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Because the trial court failed to address Appellant’s motion to appear by video, we vacate specific orders of the trial court in their entirety, including the final order dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider Appellant’s motion to appear by video.

Defendant Kavaris Javon Booker and Defendant Clifton Donnell Craig were each charged in separate indictments of first degree premeditated murder (count one), felon in possession of a firearm (count two), and aggravated assault resulting in death (count three). The trial court granted the State’s motion to join the two cases and in a joint trial, a jury convicted Defendant Booker as indicted in count two but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first degree murder in count one and facilitation of aggravated assault in count three. The jury convicted Defendant Craig of all the indicted charges. Defendant Booker received an effective seventeen-year sentence; Defendant Craig received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this consolidated appeal, Defendant Booker claims that the trial court denied him a speedy trial, the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his case from Defendant Craig, and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for facilitation of first degree murder. Defendant Craig likewise claims the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the weight afforded to circumstantial evidence. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable authority, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights with respect to her two children. The trial court concluded that three grounds for termination were established, and thereafter, it determined that it was in the best interests of the children for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the establishment of three grounds for termination as well as the finding that termination was in the best interests of both children, we affirm.

The Juvenile Court for Franklin County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Chasity R. (“Mother”) to her son, Ryan B. (“the Child”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect and dismissal of adoption proceedings. Adoption petitioner contends that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address dependency and neglect, which the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear. Concluding that the chancery court had exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption petitions, we affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Harold Thomas Centers, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated assault and received a sentence of six years. After that, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to conduct an adequate investigation before the plea. The post-conviction court denied the petition by finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition, asserting that he proved his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The attorneys for a deceased defendant appeal the trial court’s order dismissing this action pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). Because the attorneys do not have standing, this appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, she argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because the State failed to establish she acted knowingly; and (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of three prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Petitioner, Jah’quie Brown, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He argues he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations because his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right to file a direct appeal or petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Melvin Hudson, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and violating the sexual offender registry act. The trial court imposed an agreed-upon sentence of eight years and denied the Appellant’s request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Appellant argues this denial was an abuse of discretion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming newly discovered evidence of an improper ex parte communication between the assistant district attorney general and the trial court about her case. Based upon our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Tenants filed action against their former landlord in the form of a Countercomplaint, alleging that they had
suffered emotional distress resulting from slanderous statements that the landlord made to others about the
tenants. In response, the landlord moved to dismiss the tenants’ claims under the Tennessee Public Participation
Act (“TPPA”). The trial court determined that the landlord had not met its prima facie burden to show that the
tenants’ claim fell within the scope of the TPPA and dismissed the landlord’s TPPA petition. Discerning no error,
we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the issues on appeal principally concern the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional school or extracurricular expenses. Prior to trial, the parties agreed to a parenting schedule and that the husband would pay $4,100 per month in child support, but they did not agree on the wife’s claim for alimony, the allocation of optional expenses for the children’s school or extracurricular activities, or the division of the marital estate. Following a multi-day trial, the trial court divided the approximately $12 million marital estate equally between the parties and awarded the wife $2,000 a month in alimony in futuro. The award of alimony in futuro was based, in principal part, on the court’s finding that the wife had an earning capacity of $160,000 a year—although the most the wife had ever earned was $80,000 a year—and that some of the wife’s claimed monthly expenses were “overstated” or unsubstantiated. The court also allocated 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school and extracurricular activities to the wife and 80% to the husband. The wife challenges the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional expenses, contending that the trial court “grossly overestimated” her earning capacity and erred by reducing her claimed expenses. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination of the wife’s earning capacity, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and the court’s order that the wife pay 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school or extracurricular activities, and remand both issues for further consideration. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

In 2006, the Defendant, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, pled guilty to second degree murder and attempted aggravated rape. Seventeen years later, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or, alternatively, to modify his sentences. The trial court denied the motion, finding it to be untimely. On appeal, the Defendant raises different issues. He argues that an amended judgment for his attempted aggravated rape conviction is improper because the sentence is expired. He also asserts that his conviction for second degree murder is invalid because it violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant did not raise these issues in the trial court and has thus waived them on appeal. We respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence four statutory grounds supporting termination. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety, including termination of the father’s parental rights.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s classification, valuation, and equitable division of marital property. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner, Michael D. Lewis, pleaded guilty to four counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and received an effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because counsel: (1) was unprepared for trial and failed to develop a defense; (2) failed to inform Petitioner “of the potential merits of his motion to suppress the State’s evidence” before Petitioner entered a plea agreement; and (3) failed to contact material witnesses named by Petitioner that may have benefited his defense. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

In 2020, the Defendant, Dominque Justice, entered an open plea to twenty-eight counts of
rape of a child, twenty counts of aggravated statutory rape, and forty-eight counts of incest.
Eight months later, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea which the trial court
denied. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence
of one hundred and five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted and that the trial court erred when it
sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to deny its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and grant the plaintiff’s motion to confirm an arbitration award. Because we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish that the trial court had either specific or general jurisdiction over this matter, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Lizandro Guevara, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a jury trial, Appellant received a $500.00 award. She then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the exclusion of certain testimony, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Appellant again argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony. Because Appellant failed to properly raise these issues post-trial, the issues are waived, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This appeal concerns service of process and the statute of limitations. Vicki Ann Giro (“Giro”) sued Kaleb Wilburn (“Wilburn”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Giro sustained in a car accident with Wilburn. Giro failed to timely serve the summons in compliance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and failed to issue new process before the statute of limitations expired. Giro filed a motion for enlargement of time. In opposition to Giro’s motion, the Trial Court was furnished with an altered copy of Hollis ex rel. Nicole N. v. Sanchez, No. M2022-01190-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5920145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2023), no appl. perm. appeal filed. The altered copy of Hollis retains the heading “MEMORANDUM OPINION” but omits Footnote 1 stating that, as a memorandum opinion, Hollis is not to be cited or relied on in any unrelated case pursuant to Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10. The Trial Court, which had been furnished on Wilburn’s behalf with the altered copy missing the explanatory footnote, relied heavily on Hollis to deny Giro’s motion for enlargement of time. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to exercise its discretion on whether to grant Giro’s motion for enlargement of time without considering Hollis or any other opinion designated by this Court as a memorandum opinion.

This appeal stems from a petition for a parenting plan modification filed by Jacob Cipolla (“Father”). Father shares one child with Sylvia Coutras (“Mother”). The parties engaged in contentious and protracted litigation over the custody of their child. In October of 2022, a juvenile court magistrate entered an order naming Father as the child’s primary residential parent. Mother sought a rehearing before the juvenile court judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107 but later withdrew that request. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order awarding Father his attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. Mother appeals that ruling to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a breach of trust action by a trust beneficiary, Nancy Hardison (Stokes) Williams (“Plaintiff”), against the co-trustees, Ernest K. Hardison, III, and Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (collectively “Defendants”). The issues raised in this appeal only pertain to Plaintiff’s claims against Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (“Cumberland”). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Cumberland committed a breach of trust by failing to properly manage and invest trust assets resulting in the trust sustaining significant financial losses. In her effort to recover damages against Cumberland, Plaintiff also sought to declare two trust indemnity and investment agreements—which she and all qualified beneficiaries entered into with Cumberland in 2006 and 2009—void ab initio on the basis that they are unenforceable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008 because they violate a material purpose of the trust. She also contended that the agreements are unenforceable because they constitute “an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008(b). Upon the motion of Defendants for partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims arising prior to July 1, 2016, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1005(a). Additionally, upon the finding that Plaintiff and the qualified beneficiaries had released Cumberland from liability pursuant to the indemnity and investment agreements, the trial court summarily dismissed all remaining claims against Cumberland. The court then awarded Cumberland its attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $45,594.70 pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1004(a). This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Cumberland is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses it has incurred in this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award.

Defendant, Demond Maurice Buchanan, appeals his resentencing resulting in a 52-year sentence, imposed following the trial court’s revocation of his original 12-year community corrections sentence. Defendant argues the sentence is excessive and the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects, but, because Defendant’s 12-year sentence for evading arrest in case number 2016-C-1352 is illegal, we modify the sentence to six years and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in that case.