APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from an order establishing the amount of retroactive child support owed by the father for the care of two of his children. The father challenges the trial court’s decision to impute income to him for the purposes of instituting that order. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Cedric Taylor, was indicted for possession with intent to deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine (count one), possession with intent to deliver between one half ounce and ten pounds of marijuana (count two), and resisting arrest (count three). He entered an open guilty plea as charged in counts one and three, and the State agreed to nolle prosequi count two. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fourteen years for count one and six months for count two to be served in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. 1 On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion denying his request for community corrections. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a dispute over homeowner’s insurance coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insuror, finding that the insureds made a misrepresentation on their application for insurance which voided the policy pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-103. Because whether the insureds made a misrepresentation is a question of fact for the jury in this case, we reverse.

This appeal arises out of a contract for the sale of a hotel property near the Nashville airport.
After numerous amendments to the purchase and sale agreement, the seller declared the
prospective buyer to be in default, sold the property to a different buyer, and retained over
18 million dollars in earnest money. The prospective buyer filed suit against the seller for
a declaratory judgment that the liquidated damages provision in the contract was
unenforceable and for conversion. The trial court dismissed the conversion claim and ruled
in favor of the seller on summary judgment. We have concluded that the trial court erred
in its disposition of both causes of action.

This second recusal appeal in the underlying conservatorship case is currently before this Court on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. This Court had issued an opinion vacating, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, three orders entered by the trial court, including the trial court’s order denying the second motion to recuse that is the subject of this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that (1) the stay imposed by this Court during pendency of the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case and (2) the proponents of the stay had waived any argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. Accordingly, the second recusal motion is again before this Court. Upon thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the second motion to recuse.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion finding that recusal is not justified in this case. Like Judge Armstrong, I believe that the majority “fails to consider the cumulative effects of the trial court’s actions, and wholly fails to consider the fact that the ultimate result of these actions is usurpation of the autonomous decisions Ms. Malone made for her own care when she was competent to do so.” Malone v. Malone, No. W2023- 00843-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 8457951, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (Armstrong, J., dissenting).

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Charles S.(“Father”) to his minor son, Lynell S. (“the Child”). Father pled guilty to aggravated assault on the Child’s mother. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Father appeals, arguing among other things that he addressed his domestic violence issues by taking certain classes, even though he assaulted Mother after having taken these classes. We find that all three grounds found for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Moats, appeals from the Coffee County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions to kidnapping and evading arrest. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, which he asserts resulted in unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Francisco Oliva, of second degree murder, and the trial court ordered him to serve a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Jackie Lee Kirby, was convicted after a bench trial of attempted aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that structural constitutional error occurred when the trial court left the bench three times while defense counsel refreshed the victim’s recollection using audio recordings. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court determined that (1) the father had abandoned his child by willfully failing to pay child support and (2) termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed, contending that his failure to pay child support was not willful because the mother intentionally blocked his access to the child and because he was actively seeking visitation rights with the child in two separate juvenile court actions when the petition for termination was filed. The father also argues that the trial court did not properly evaluate and weigh the evidence in its analysis of the best interest factors.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

While incarcerated for first-degree murder, Appellant filed suit against Appellee, an attorney who represented Appellant during his criminal trial, for legal malpractice. Shortly after filing the complaint, Appellant filed a motion to appear for hearings by video. The trial court did not rule on the motion to appear by video and proceeded to enter several orders on other motions on the pleadings only, including an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Because the trial court failed to address Appellant’s motion to appear by video, we vacate specific orders of the trial court in their entirety, including the final order dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider Appellant’s motion to appear by video.

Defendant Kavaris Javon Booker and Defendant Clifton Donnell Craig were each charged in separate indictments of first degree premeditated murder (count one), felon in possession of a firearm (count two), and aggravated assault resulting in death (count three). The trial court granted the State’s motion to join the two cases and in a joint trial, a jury convicted Defendant Booker as indicted in count two but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first degree murder in count one and facilitation of aggravated assault in count three. The jury convicted Defendant Craig of all the indicted charges. Defendant Booker received an effective seventeen-year sentence; Defendant Craig received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this consolidated appeal, Defendant Booker claims that the trial court denied him a speedy trial, the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his case from Defendant Craig, and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for facilitation of first degree murder. Defendant Craig likewise claims the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the weight afforded to circumstantial evidence. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable authority, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights with respect to her two children. The trial court concluded that three grounds for termination were established, and thereafter, it determined that it was in the best interests of the children for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the establishment of three grounds for termination as well as the finding that termination was in the best interests of both children, we affirm.

The Juvenile Court for Franklin County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Chasity R. (“Mother”) to her son, Ryan B. (“the Child”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect and dismissal of adoption proceedings. Adoption petitioner contends that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address dependency and neglect, which the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear. Concluding that the chancery court had exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption petitions, we affirm the trial court.

Tenants filed action against their former landlord in the form of a Countercomplaint, alleging that they had
suffered emotional distress resulting from slanderous statements that the landlord made to others about the
tenants. In response, the landlord moved to dismiss the tenants’ claims under the Tennessee Public Participation
Act (“TPPA”). The trial court determined that the landlord had not met its prima facie burden to show that the
tenants’ claim fell within the scope of the TPPA and dismissed the landlord’s TPPA petition. Discerning no error,
we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the issues on appeal principally concern the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional school or extracurricular expenses. Prior to trial, the parties agreed to a parenting schedule and that the husband would pay $4,100 per month in child support, but they did not agree on the wife’s claim for alimony, the allocation of optional expenses for the children’s school or extracurricular activities, or the division of the marital estate. Following a multi-day trial, the trial court divided the approximately $12 million marital estate equally between the parties and awarded the wife $2,000 a month in alimony in futuro. The award of alimony in futuro was based, in principal part, on the court’s finding that the wife had an earning capacity of $160,000 a year—although the most the wife had ever earned was $80,000 a year—and that some of the wife’s claimed monthly expenses were “overstated” or unsubstantiated. The court also allocated 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school and extracurricular activities to the wife and 80% to the husband. The wife challenges the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional expenses, contending that the trial court “grossly overestimated” her earning capacity and erred by reducing her claimed expenses. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination of the wife’s earning capacity, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and the court’s order that the wife pay 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school or extracurricular activities, and remand both issues for further consideration. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Harold Thomas Centers, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated assault and received a sentence of six years. After that, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to conduct an adequate investigation before the plea. The post-conviction court denied the petition by finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition, asserting that he proved his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The attorneys for a deceased defendant appeal the trial court’s order dismissing this action pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). Because the attorneys do not have standing, this appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, she argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because the State failed to establish she acted knowingly; and (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of three prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Petitioner, Jah’quie Brown, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He argues he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations because his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right to file a direct appeal or petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Melvin Hudson, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and violating the sexual offender registry act. The trial court imposed an agreed-upon sentence of eight years and denied the Appellant’s request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Appellant argues this denial was an abuse of discretion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.