APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a dispute over a piece of real estate in Shelby County, Tennessee. The property owner executed a quit claim deed transferring ownership of the property to his daughter, who was also his attorney-in-fact, shortly before he died in 2023. After his death, the man’s surviving spouse filed a petition to set the deed aside, claiming that the daughter obtained the deed by undue influence. The trial court held a bench trial and entered an order setting the deed aside. The daughter timely appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Buyers of a residential home brought action against sellers for 1) breach of contract, 2)
negligent misrepresentation, 3) negligence, 4) negligence per se, 5) gross negligence, 6)
residential disclosures violations, and 7) fraud. The claims arise from the discovery of a
sinkhole months after the sale. The sinkhole was not indicated “through the contour lines
on the property’s recorded plat,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-212(c) (2015), and the sellers
insist they had no knowledge of a sinkhole on the property. For these reasons, they did not
disclose the existence of the sinkhole on the Tennessee Residential Property Condition
Disclosure form. Nevertheless, the proof at trial established that one of the sellers, Larry
Baskin, while mowing the lawn, discovered a depression in the yard six months prior to
listing the property for sale, which he believed to be caused by rotting roots from a tree that
had been removed years earlier. He filled the depression with two four-by-four, pressuretreated,
rot-resistant posts and topsoil. Because it was near a downspout, he also placed the
plastic bag from the topsoil over the posts, which he covered with more soil and grass. The
property was sold seven months later, during which time Mr. Baskin did not notice the area
“concaving or dipping in any way” even though he mowed regularly over the area with his
500-pound riding mower. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed all claims except the
negligence claim. Significantly, the court dismissed the claim for negligent
misrepresentation because the purchase agreement contained an “as is” clause. However,
the court held that Larry Baskin was liable under the claim for common law negligence,
finding that he “breached the duty of reasonable care by not informing the Buyers of the
existence of the hole prior to their purchase of the Property. The harm resulting from Mr.
Baskin’s breach was damage to the value of the Property.” The court awarded the buyers
compensatory damages of $55,000 for the diminution in value of the property.
Additionally, finding the buyers to be the prevailing parties according to the purchase
agreement, the trial court awarded them attorney’s fees and costs. This appeal followed,
with the sellers challenging Mr. Baskin’s liability under the negligence claim and the
buyers challenging the dismissal of the gross negligence claim. For the reasons explained
below, we affirm the dismissal of the claim for gross negligence; however, we reverse the
finding of Mr. Baskin’s liability based on the claim of negligence because “a seller’s
liability for the failure to disclose such material facts in a real estate transaction is
coextensive with a party’s liability for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.” Fayne
v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d 162, 177 (Tenn. 2009). Because we have affirmed the dismissal of
the claim for gross negligence and reversed the ruling concerning the negligence claim, we
also vacate the award of damages and attorney’s fees to the buyers. In that the sellers are
now the prevailing parties, we remand with instructions to award the sellers the reasonable
and necessary attorney’s fees and costs they are entitled to recover pursuant to the parties’
contract.

Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal without including either the motion to recuse filed in the trial court or the trial court’s order denying the motion to recuse. As such, we dismiss this appeal.

Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal without including either the motion to recuse filed in the trial court or the trial court’s order denying the motion to recuse. As such, we dismiss this appeal.

The defendant, April R. Austin, was indicted by the Knox County Garnd Jury for four counts of theft of property valued over $2500 and four counts of theft of property valued over $1000. The defendant pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued over $2500 and one count of shoplifting. Per the terms of the pela agreement, the defendant agreed to concurrent sentences of three years for her theft conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for her shoplifting conviction with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. 

The defendant, Keith Lamar March, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of unlawful possession of a weapon after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, failure to drive on the right side of the roadway, and evading arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. 

A property owner hired a local contractor to build a custom-designed home. A payment dispute arose midway through construction, and the contractor stopped working. The owner paid others to repair and complete the home. Then he filed suit against the contractor asserting multiple theories of recovery. Among other things, the trial court found the contractor liable for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. As compensatory damages, it awarded the owner the additional costs he incurred to repair and complete the home above the contract price. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for recalculation of compensatory damages.

A Montgomery County jury convicted Defendant, Esperanza Mariaelena Joy Flores, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, and possession of an open alcohol container. Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred in not dismissing the charges after the State failed to preserve evidence; (2) the trial court improperly limited her cross-examination of a witness; (3) the trial court improperly limited Defendant’s testimony; (4) the prosecutor made improper closing argument; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for failure to yield to an emergency vehicle; (6) the record was not properly preserved because a court reporter was not provided to transcribe the proceedings; and (7) she is entitled to cumulative error relief. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case is before the Court on the Rule 11 application of Plaintiffs Teresa
Thompson Locke and Randy Locke (collectively the “Lockes”). This Court granted the
Rule 11 application on March 6, 2024. The matter was fully briefed and oral arguments
were conducted on December 4, 2024. We have determined that the appeal should be
dismissed, and the Court of Appeals judgment and related trial court orders vacated, for
the reasons set forth below.

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights. As to Mother, the trial court found three grounds for termination: substantial noncompliance with a parenting plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Regarding Father, the trial court found four grounds for termination: severe child abuse, imprisonment for two years for conduct qualifying as severe child abuse, imprisonment for ten years when the child is under eight years of age, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that terminating each parent’s rights was in the child’s best interest. The trial court properly determined that a termination ground existed as to each parent and that terminating each parent’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

Testator created a generation-skipping trust and instructed the eventual trustee to distribute all remaining trust funds to the “then living descendants of the child per stirpes” upon the death of Testator’s child. Testator’s child later died, leaving two generations of descendants. Each first-generation descendant is the parent of a corresponding second-generation descendant, and neither predeceased the Testator’s child. Trustee brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking to ascertain whether only the first generation of the child’s descendants should inherit trust funds or if, instead, members of both generations should take equally. Relying on Testator’s choice of a per stirpes distribution system, the probate court concluded that trust funds should be split equally between the first-generation descendants, reasoning that the funds do not go any further under a traditional per stirpes framework. We affirm.

A grandparent petitioned for visitation with her grandchild. The juvenile court found that the loss or severe reduction of visitation with the grandparent would cause severe emotional harm. The child’s mother appeals. Because the evidence preponderates against the court’s finding that denial of grandparent visitation would cause severe emotional harm, we reverse.

The Defendant, Colton Shane Sutliffe, was convicted in the Maury County Circuit Court of eighteen offenses, including multiple counts of aggravated rape, rape, and incest, and received a total effective sentence of thirty years, six months to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the juvenile court erred by transferring him to circuit court to be tried as an adult, that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Osayamien Ogbeiwi, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This court upheld Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to challenge an expanded jury instruction on premeditation at trial and on appeal; (2) advising him to testify regarding self-defense and in failing to request a jury instruction on self-defense and in failing to challenge the lack of an instruction on appeal; and (3) failing to adequately challenge the admission of DNA evidence at trial and on appeal. Petitioner also maintains that he was denied due process due to the State’s failure to provide his capias in discovery during the post-conviction proceedings. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ritika Arora, was charged in the Williamson County Circuit Court with driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, simple possession, and possession of drug paraphernalia and filed a motion to suppress the results of her blood alcohol test because the search warrant authorizing her blood draw did not expressly authorize chemical analysis of her blood sample. The trial court granted the motion, and the State filed this interlocutory appeal. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the order granting the motion to suppress should be reversed and that the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Jonathan Rogers Robertson, was convicted by jury of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-five years. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to establish that he possessed the firearm and drug paraphernalia. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand for merger of counts one and two and entry of corrected judgment forms. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Ashley Lenal Crowder, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her guilty-pleaded convictions for second degree murder, aggravated child neglect and attempted aggravated child neglect, arguing that she was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and that her guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to two of their minor children, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a complaint filed by Abdolhossain Motealleh (“Plaintiff”) entitled, “Petition for Criminal Conspiracy to Petition David Margulies for Representations.” The trial court dismissed the complaint upon the defendants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.06(b) motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff appeals that decision. Due to profound deficiencies with Plaintiff’s brief, particularly his failure to comply with Rule 27(a)(4) and (7) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee in several material respects, Plaintiff has waived his right to an appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The defendants, ReMax Tri Star Realty and Jarrod Cruz, (“Defendants”) contend this is a frivolous appeal and seek an award of damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122. Having determined that this appeal is devoid of merit, we find the appeal to be frivolous. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to recover their reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this frivolous appeal. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court to make the appropriate award.

The plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration on whether a settlement agreement she signed in 2016 and amended in 2017 still requires her silence on the details of the alleged sexual abuse of her son in light of the 2018 enactment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-34-103, which makes such agreements “void and unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of this state.” The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, issued a blanket sealing order, and held that the Attorney General and Reporter did not have to be notified of the action and that the plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute would lead to unconstitutional retrospective application. We reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, vacate the decisions on the remaining issues, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately only to elaborate on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, versus how it may be used. 

The extrinsic evidence at issue in this case is Mr. Smith’s deposition testimony. During the deposition, the State’s counsel asked Mr. Smith whether it was his “understanding that it was within Pharma’s ability and Pharma’s sole determination to decide what conferences were feasible to produce?” Mr. Smith responded, “Yes.” Discussing this evidence, the majority opinion says that evidence of “a party’s subjective views on the contract’s meaning . . . should not be considered.”

A husband filed for divorce from his wife in 2022. Just before they were set to go to trial in July of 2023, the parties settled their divorce and announced their agreement to the trial court. Before the written consent judgment could be entered, however, the wife filed a notice revoking her consent to the agreement. The trial court entered the judgment regardless, and the wife later filed a motion to set that judgment aside. The trial court denied the wife’s motion, and she appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and sentenced to forty years in incarceration after stabbing his neighbor, the victim, several times. Defendant represented himself at trial and now represents himself on appeal. He raises a variety of issues including: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (4) whether the trial court should have granted a continuance; (5) whether the trial court erred in excluding a statement; (6) whether the trial court improperly allowed a witness to use a “script”; (7) whether the State violated Brady, Napue, or Giglio; (8) whether the State improperly used Defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment; (9) whether Defendant was denied access to court; (10) whether the trial court properly limited Defendant’s use of an intake video; (11) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury; (12) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (13) whether Defendant was denied compulsory process; (14) whether the trial court should have recused itself; (15) whether the appellate record was transmitted in error; (16) whether the sentence is excessive; and (17) whether cumulative error requires reversal of the conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a judgment upholding a decision by the Administrative Procedures Division of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services denying the appellant an award of reasonable expenses after a contested case hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-301, et. seq. Upon the appellant seeking judicial review, the trial court affirmed the decision by the Department. We affirm.

A father and mother appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to their two minor children. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of each parent’s rights based on the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions which led to removal, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.