APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Cornelius Williams IV, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second-degree murder and convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error in providing the jury with an erroneous instruction; (3) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce a pro se pleading purportedly filed by the defendant; (4) the defendant is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) the defendant’s sentence for convicted felon in possession of a handgun is illegal. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count two indicating the statutorily authorized release eligibility of eighty-five percent on the handgun conviction.

I fully concur with my respected colleagues reasoning and judgment as it relates to Parts I through IV of the majority opinion. As it relates to Part V, however, I must depart from the majority regarding the remedy for the trial court’s imposition of an illegal sentence. I believe the Defendant has the right to a sentencing hearing upon remand. On this point alone, I dissent.

Petitioner, Danielle Wright, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal
of her petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review of the entire record, briefs
of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that Petitioner filed an untimely notice
of appeal and the interest of justice does not warrant a waiver of the notice requirement
because Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was not timely filed, there is no basis for
tolling the statute of limitations, and the petition fails to state a colorable claim for relief.
Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as untimely.

The Defendant, John Houston-Polk, III, was convicted in a Rutherford County Circuit Court bench trial of simple possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail with the first 30 days to be served at 100% and the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in two general sessions court cases. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle parked in the driveway of his parents’ home. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jarmie Alonzo Hill, whose first trial with a codefendant before a Davidson County Criminal Court jury ended in a mistrial, was convicted in a second Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not sua sponte recusing itself based on a prejudicial finding it made against the Defendant in the codefendant’s unrelated drug case; (2) whether the State committed a Brady violation by not providing the Defendant with the transcript of an unavailable witness’s jury trial testimony until the first day of the retrial; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his fourth untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. He argues on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because he presented newly discovered evidence in support of actual innocence; therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. Alternatively, he argues that the lower court improperly denied his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the coram nobis petition and conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the denial of the motion to reopen and dismiss the appeal in that respect.

Geri McBride, individually and d/b/a The Real Estate Shop (“Buyer”), sued Cynthia H. Allison (“Seller”) for breach of contract with respect to a real estate purchase and sale agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Seller had breached the agreement and granted Buyer specific performance but denied Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. Seller filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively for a new trial. The trial court denied Seller’s post-judgment motion, and Seller appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s grant of specific performance to the Buyer and reverse the trial court’s denial of Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher R. Smith, of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to consecutive fifteen-year sentences for each conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in Count 1 for aggravated assault, modify Count 2 to a conviction for assault, and remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentencing on Count 2. 

The Petitioner, Kenyon Demario Reynolds, appeals from the Knox County Criminal
Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murder,
delivery and sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a
firearm. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying
relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court.

The Defendant, Kenneth Ray Niles, appeals from his convictions in the Dickson County Circuit Court for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and one count each of aggravated arson, a Class A felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; theft of property, a Class D felony; and aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-14-302 (2018) (aggravated arson), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14-406 (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated criminal trespass). He received an effective sentence of life plus fifty years. The Defendant contends that (1) the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence found in the Defendant’s wife’s truck, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the victims. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Shawn Foutaine Shaw, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant claims that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. He also raises an evidentiary issue regarding the testimony of a witness at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment in count 2 and corrected judgments in counts 3 through 6. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Defendant, Brandon Theus, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical mistake in his judgments of convictions for simple possession of methamphetamine and driving on a suspended license. The Defendant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to award pretrial jail credit on his sentence in the instant case, which had been ordered to run consecutively to separate cases that were pending parole revocation proceedings at the time of the Defendant’s sentencing. The State contends that the Defendant’s appeal was untimely, that the record is inadequate for review, and, nonetheless, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Defendant’s motion to correct a clerical mistake. We conclude that the appeal is timely and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Lacy L. Austin, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for two counts of possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony involving the use of force or violence; simple possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s entry of a parenting plan naming Appellee/Father primary residential parent, awarding him sole decision-making authority, and awarding Mother 80 days of visitation. Because the trial court did not engage in a best-interest analysis as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106, and because the trial court’s orders are too vague to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful review of its decisions, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I concur in the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s ruling should be vacated in this case. Because I conclude that the record clearly reflects that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in this case, however, I write separately.

This is a wrongful death negligence action arising out of a fatal automobile collision that occurred on Long Lane, a public road in Franklin, Tennessee, which abuts a TA Travel Center. On October 6, 2016, Kenneth Page (“Mr. Page”) was traveling northbound on Long Lane in a vehicle with his wife as passenger. As he began to turn left into the entrance of the TA truck stop marked for semi-trailer trucks (“the trucks only entrance”), where there was a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested shortly ahead, Mr. Page was hit by Rondell M. Mershon (“Mr. Mershon”), who was traveling southbound on Long Lane on a motorcycle. The collision occurred on Long Lane before Mr. Page could enter the TA Travel Center. Mr. Mershon died soon after the collision. Mr. Mershon’s wife, Melba P. Mershon, brought a wrongful death negligence action on behalf of herself and her two daughters (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Mr. Page. She later amended the complaint to add the owner and operator of the TA Travel Center, HPT TA Properties Trust and TA Operating LLC d/b/a Travel Centers of America (collectively “the TA Defendants”), alleging that the TA Defendants created a hazardous condition by failing to display clearly visible signage at the “trucks only” entrance of the TA truck stop directing passenger vehicles to the proper entrance located a short distance down Long Lane. Thereafter, Plaintiffs settled their claims against Mr. Page, leaving the TA Defendants as the only defendants in the case. In 2017, the trial court granted the TA Defendants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that they owed no duty of care to Mr. Mershon. Plaintiffs appealed. In the first appeal of this action, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the TA Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not come forward with any evidence to show that they “owed a duty of care to Mr. Mershon related to the applicable sight distances and visibility of signs on TA’s property and that TA Defendants breached that duty.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs failed to present any genuine issues of material fact, and that the TA Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs could show no evidence that the TA Defendants owed a duty to Mr. Mershon or that any act or omission of the TA Defendants constituted a cause in fact or proximate cause of Mr. Mershon’s injuries. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the TA Defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

In 2015, the Defendant, Ryan Leath, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him to six years, suspended, and ordered him to supervised probation. In May 2023, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation for being arrested for driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, and harassment. The trial court returned the Defendant to probation, extending it by six years, and ordered him to sign up and attend a mental health treatment program. In October 2023, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had not attended the program. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation after a hearing, and on appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Lonnie K. Cody, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary
sentence for aggravated burglary, vandalism of $1,000 or less, and unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) persistent conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds relied on by the trial court and its determination that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.

In 2018, the Defendant, Joey Lasean Scribner, pleaded guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years to be served on probation.  The Defendant violated his probation, and the trial court reinstated his probation.  In April 2023, the Defendant was stopped by law enforcement for speeding.  Law enforcement determined that he was intoxicated.  After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had again violated his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to place adequate findings in the record to support its decision to fully revoke his probation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The State appeals a judgment against it for an injury caused by the gross negligence of its employees in the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition on state-owned property. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims for gross negligence, we reverse.

Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

In this appeal, we examine the intersection of the rule governing the voluntary dismissal of a civil action, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, and the statutory scheme of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (2021). Robert E. Lee Flade filed suit against several defendants over what he considered to be disparaging remarks that were made on social media. Two of the defendants, Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (“the BCLP”), each filed not only a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but also a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA. The TPPA petitions sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and an award of sanctions. Mr. Flade filed responses, and both the motions and the petitions were set for hearing. However, before the trial court conducted the hearing, Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. As a result, the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice. Ms. Isaacs and the BCLP sought to have the trial court adjudicate their TPPA petitions notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court determined that Mr. Flade’s nonsuit concluded the matter and declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Flade v. City of Shelbyville, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 9, 2023). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that although the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is subject to certain limitations, the mere filing of a TPPA petition is not among them. Thus, we hold that the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the pending TPPA petitions after Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

In 2016, Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of
aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of seventeen years’ incarceration as
a Range II, multiple offender at eighty-five percent to be served consecutively to sentences
for convictions in other counties. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the
Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief,
alleging the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following a bifurcated
hearing only on Petitioner’s appellate counsel claim, the post-conviction court granted a
delayed appeal, finding that Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. A panel of this Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the post-conviction
court had failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the
post-conviction court again heard Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel as well as his trial counsel claims. The post-conviction court denied relief, and
this appeal followed. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel ineffectively crossexamined
the State’s witnesses, that trial counsel failed to file motions to suppress several
pieces of evidence, that trial counsel failed to appeal the general sessions court’s bind over
of his charges to the grand jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction,
that newly discovered evidence proves his actual innocence, and that appellate counsel
failed to file a reply brief on appeal.1 After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

In this consolidated appeal, the Defendants, Sanquez Keshawn Jones and Deion Jamaar Glover, appeal their convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. For these convictions, both Defendants received an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Relative to Defendant Jones’s appeal, he contends the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b)’s general prohibition on propensity evidence by admitting a photograph depicting him possessing a firearm as a juvenile because such behavior is a criminal act. As to Defendant Glover, he first argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State’s proof failed to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of these offenses. He further alleges the trial court erred by admitting a photograph showing him possessing a firearm, arguing this photograph was irrelevant under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 402, unfairly prejudicial under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, and propensity evidence violative of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Next, Defendant Glover contends he is entitled to plain error relief because his right to confrontation was violated when his cell phone data was extracted by a non-testifying Federal Bureau of Investigation agent and admitted against him at trial. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender classification of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.