APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Tomar Donyelle Beard, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it excluded the Defendant’s expert from testifying and denied the Defendant’s motion for a continuance. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, James Carter Millinder, appeals the trial court’s decision ordering his agreed-upon nine-year sentence to be served consecutively to an unserved sentence in another county. The Defendant claims that the trial court erred by sentencing him in a manner not contemplated by the agreement between the parties and that this error rendered his guilty plea involuntary. Given the deficiencies in the Defendant’s appellate brief, as well as the absence of transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings from the appellate record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2012, the Defendant, Reginald D. Bond, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of attempted rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years of incarceration and ordered him to community supervision for life and to register as a sex offender. After his release, the Defendant was convicted of violating the sex offender registry, and the trial court sentenced him to six years, suspended to probation. He violated his probation by being charged with new offenses, so the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to correct an illegal sentence, contending that his sentence was illegal because the community supervision and sex offender registry requirements violated double jeopardy. The trial court summarily denied Rule 36.1 relief. On review, having determined that the Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Dewayne Edward Harris, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate, failure to develop a reasonable trial strategy, and failure to object to the use of Petitioner’s nicknames and to testimony regarding statements made by a non-testifying co-defendant. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Curtis Bradley, was indicted on one count of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury and one count of false imprisonment. He entered a negotiated plea agreement to the lesser-included charge of reckless aggravated assault with the trial court to determine the length of sentence and whether Defendant would receive judicial diversion. The false imprisonment charge was dismissed pursuant to the agreement. The trial court denied judicial diversion, and ordered Defendant to serve three years, suspended to probation. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for judicial diversion and by imposing more than the minimum sentence. Based on our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, Shelby County juries convicted the Petitioner, Curtis Keller, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of evading arrest (No. 10-02756); and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” (No. 10-07532). The Petitioner received effective sentences of 300 years (No. 10-02756) and 210 years (No. 10- 07532). The Petitioner appealed his convictions in both cases. See State v. Keller, No. W2012-01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6021332 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2013), perm. app. granted, cause remanded (Tenn. Feb. 11, 2014) and State v. Keller, No. W2012- 01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4922627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015). The Petitioner then filed a series of motions and petitions, which this court has addressed on appeal. Keller v. State, No. W2019-01652- CCA-R3- ECN, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2021), perm. app. denied; Keller v. State, No. W2020-00590-CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL 2886338 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2021). In the consolidated matter herein, the Petitioner filed: a petition “new post-conviction” relief and a “supplemental” petition for writ of error coram nobis in No. 10-02756; a petition for DNA post-conviction analysis in Nos. 10- 07532 and 10-02756; and a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 in No. 10-07532. The trial court denied the petitions, and the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. After this appeal was docketed, counsel filed a motion for a late-filed notice of appeal for all five underlying petitions. On review, having determined that all of the Petitioner’s filings in No. 10-02756 and his petition for DNA analysis in No. 10-07532 were untimely, we deny his motion for a late-filed notice of appeal and dismiss the appeal with respect to those filings. The remaining motion, the Petitioner’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in No. 10-07532, was timely filed and, 09/12/2024 2 upon review, we conclude the Petitioner has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the petition.

This appeal stems from a contract to purchase real property in Knox County, Tennessee, which ultimately fell through. The intended purchaser filed suit against the property owner seeking to enforce the contract. The property owner brought a counterclaim against the intended purchaser and a third-party claim against the intended purchaser’s principal averring that they fraudulently induced him to enter into the contract. After contentious litigation, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the property owner as a sanction for ongoing discovery abuses by the intended purchaser and its principal. The intended purchaser and its principal sought relief from the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, which the trial court denied. Discerning no error by the trial court, we affirm

Pro se Appellant, Willie Gordon, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on December 15, 2023. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

This is a consolidated appeal from the trial court’s denial of Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”) petitions filed by each of the named defendants in the underlying defamation lawsuit. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as to each defendant.

The Defendant, David Lynn Richards, Jr., appeals his Knox County Criminal Court
convictions for three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure (Counts 1, 2, and 9),
two counts of rape (Counts 3 and 4), three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure
(Counts 5, 6, and 7), and one count of incest (Count 11).1 On appeal, the Defendant argues:
(1) if newly discovered forensic biological evidence had been presented to the jury, then it
likely would have changed the result of his trial; (2) if newly discovered forensic electronic
evidence had been presented to the jury, then it likely would have changed the result of his
trial; (3) if the newly discovered records related to victim’s mental health history had been
presented to the jury, then it likely would have changed the result of his trial; (4) his due
process rights were violated under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); (5) the trial court committed plain error by
permitting the State to play the entire recording of victim’s forensic interview; (6) he
received ineffective assistance from trial counsel; (7) the State’s erroneous election for the
rape offense in Count 4 failed to protect his right to a unanimous jury verdict in that count;
(8) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for sexual battery by an authority
figure in Count 1 and his conviction for rape in Count 4; (9) his dual convictions for sexual
battery by an authority figure in Counts 1 and 2 violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy; (10) the trial court abused its discretion by denying all forms of alternative
sentencing and by imposing a partially consecutive sentence; and (11) the cumulative effect
of these errors entitles him to a new trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.2

The Petitioner, Donte R. Swanier, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions of felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to convey an offer of settlement to him prior to trial, in failing to move for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State’s proof at trial and challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal, in failing to pursue a conviction for a lesser included offense at trial, in failing to effectively argue against the admission of evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and in failing to seek suppression of cell phone records and evidence obtained from a GPS tracker placed by law enforcement on the Petitioner’s vehicle. The Petitioner also maintains that the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficiencies deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jonathan M. Cooper, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief challenging his multiple convictions for aggravated sexual battery, incest, and rape
of a child. On appeal, the Petitioner argues the post-conviction court erred in denying his
motion to continue the evidentiary hearing requesting more time to develop recently
discovered evidence—the report of the victim’s medical examination. The Petitioner also
contends the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because (1) the State violated his
due process rights by failing to disclose Brady evidence at trial, i.e., the report of the
victim’s medical examination; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to
trial counsel’s failure to familiarize himself with Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence, and this failure resulted in the exclusion of evidence of the victim’s sexual
behavior with her stepbrother; (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to
trial counsel’s failure to object to the State’s improper closing argument; (4) he received
the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to properly address the
issue of venue; and (5) the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies, along with the
State’s withholding of Brady evidence, violated his right to a fair trial. After review, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jonathan Hamilton, of first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective life sentence plus twenty-six years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motions to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, as well as an out-of-court identification; (2) admitting autopsy photographs; (3) failing to instruct the jury on aggravated assault, facilitation, and accessory after the fact; (4) allowing improper closing arguments; and (5) imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Tevin Wayne Griffin, was convicted by a Davidson County jury for the premeditated first degree murder of the victim and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that during trial Defendant opened the door to previously excluded cell site location data and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted with premeditation. Upon our review of the entire record, oral arguments and briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of the trial court’s removal of the appellant as co-personal representative of a probate estate. The appellant also appeals the trial court’s ruling that he forfeited his right to a share of the estate assets. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A shopper slipped and fell on a slippery liquid that was on a convenience store floor, resulting in injuries. The shopper sued the property owner. The property owner sought summary judgment, arguing the shopper had not provided sufficient evidence to establish how long the liquid had been on the floor prior to the slip and fall. The trial court granted summary judgment. We reverse.

A Bedford County Jury convicted Defendant, Charles Edward Young, of: (1) especially aggravated robbery; (2) first degree murder during the perpetration of a robbery; (3) premeditated first degree murder; and (4) conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus ninety years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone; the court erred in declining to compel the State to disclose evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and that the jury’s verdicts are against the weight of the evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this probate matter, the plaintiff filed a petition to establish a lost will, submitting for admission to probate a copy of a handwritten document alleged to be the decedent’s holographic will. The trial court determined that the handwritten document met the requirements for a holographic will and that the plaintiff overcame the presumption of revocation afforded to a lost will. The decedent’s intestate heirs appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In March 2021, the Knox County Grand Jury issued an indictment, charging Defendant, Jason Lee Kinser, with rape and aggravated burglary. Following a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that he is entitled to plain error relief based upon testimony during trial that Defendant’s name was in a criminal justice database. Defendant also contends that he was under the influence of drugs during trial and was incompetent to waive his right to testify. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A pro se litigant brought suit against the State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission, where his suit was dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction and a failure to abide by the statute of limitations. We hold that the appellant has waived all issues on appeal by failing to set forth a legal argument, and we affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission.

This is a dependency and neglect case. Appellants/parents do not dispute the trial court’s finding that the children are dependent and neglected. Rather, the sole issue involves whether the trial court’s disposition, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-130, was made in compliance with section 37-1-130(c) and, if so, whether the placement of the children with their aunt was “best suited to the protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(a). Affirmed and remanded.

In 1996, a Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Courtney B. Mathews, of four counts of felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant received consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each felony murder conviction and twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. The Defendant sought post-conviction relief, and this court subsequently held that he was entitled to post-conviction relief with respect to the motion for a new trial. On remand, the Defendant filed an amended motion for a new trial, and following a hearing, the trial court reduced his sentence for especially aggravated robbery to twenty years but otherwise denied his motion. On appeal, the Defendant raises challenges regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, the validity of the indictment, and the State’s failure to elect an offense; the admission into evidence of a black denim jacket; the State’s failure to correct false testimony; the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial based on an impermissible outside influence on the jury; the trial court’s refusal to allow additional closing arguments after it gave a supplemental jury instruction on criminal responsibility during jury deliberations; the trial court’s failure to issue an enhanced identification jury instruction; the trial court’s jury instruction on the reliability of fingerprint evidence; the State’s reliance on the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance during his trial while asserting that the aggravating circumstance could not be supported during the co-defendant’s subsequent trial; and the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself from the trial and post-trial proceedings. The Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him to a new trial. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s (1) distribution of the marital estate; (2) award to the wife of modifiable transitional alimony; and (3) two awards to the wife of alimony in solido, one for half of what the court found to be assets dissipated by the husband and one for attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the divorce. The husband also appeals the trial court’s adoption of the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan and a requirement that the husband attend in-person reunification therapy with the parties’ children in their home city of Chattanooga. Upon careful review, we determine that the trial court erred in failing to set a determinate time period for transitional alimony, and we accordingly modify the transitional alimony award to a five-year period. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. Exercising our discretion, we deny the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

This is a termination of parental rights case.  The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the two minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) severe child abuse; (5) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody.  The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.  As an initial matter, Mother asserts that, having surrendered her parental rights at the outset of the hearing (she later rescinded her surrender), the trial court was required to continue the hearing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-112. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-112 does not require a trial court to either continue or delay a contested termination hearing when a parent surrenders his or her parental rights before or during the hearing.  We reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse.  We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory grounds of severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision.