APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Kelby Lerha Taylor, appeals his convictions for nine counts of incest, eight counts of rape, three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated rape. Specifically, the Defendant argues that his substantive due process and fair trial rights were violated when the State, after its case-in-chief, dismissed a count charging continuous sexual abuse of a child under the Child Protection Act (“CPA”). This dismissal occurred after the Defendant had previously withdrawn a motion to sever the offenses based upon his understanding that the presence of the CPA charge necessitated joinder of at least some of the offenses. The Defendant additionally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellees brought suit under the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to recover attorney’s fees incurred in attempting to collect an underlying judgment from one of the Appellants. The trial court awarded Appellees’ attorney’s fees. Because the Act does not authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees, we reverse.

The Estate of John A. Queener (the “Estate”), by and through Personal Representative, Carolyn Q. Junck, seeks to recover funds paid out with respect to two certificates of deposit (“CDs”) owned by the decedent, John A. Queener (the “Decedent”), at the time of his death and funds paid from the Decedent’s checking account during his lifetime. The Estate sued Jim Griffith (“Mr. Griffith”), stepson of the Decedent, and relied upon legal theories of undue influence, fraud and/or fraud in the inducement, lack of competency in the contract, and conversion. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the Estate $13,355.05 plus pre- and post-judgment interest against Mr. Griffith to reimburse the Estate for a number of checks that Mr. Griffith wrote from the Decedent’s checking account during the Decedent’s lifetime. The trial court denied the Estate any recovery with respect to the CDs. On appeal, the Estate and Mr. Griffith both raise issues with the trial court’s judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves our review of the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her two minor children. Having carefully reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Acting under authorization of subsections (1) and (7) of Tennessee Code Annotated section 70-1-305, officers of the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA), suspecting violations of wildlife laws, entered onto the Plaintiffs’ properties on multiple occasions, seeking to enforce restrictions upon hunting. The TWRA’s officers did so without a warrant or consent. The Plaintiffs brought suit, asserting that the statute authorizing these entries is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. A three-judge trial court panel concluded the statute is unconstitutional on its face and granted declaratory judgment and nominal damages. The three-judge panel divided on two issues. One, the majority pretermitted the as-applied constitutional challenge, while the third judge would have found the statute unconstitutional as applied. Two, the majority declined to grant injunctive relief while the third judge would have granted injunctive relief. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency appeals. We conclude the statute is facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied. We affirm the award of nominal damages.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s modification of: (1) the parenting plan for the minor child; and (2) Appellee/Father’s child support obligations. Because the trial court erred in setting the parties’ respective monthly gross incomes for child support purposes, we vacate its order concerning child support and remand for recalculation. The trial court’s order granting Father the federal Child Tax Credit is also vacated. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

Two relatives filed competing petitions to adopt a minor child after his mother’s death. The child’s father was unknown. The trial court conducted a comparative fitness analysis and found that it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted by the child’s maternal grandfather. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an order denying a nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings in a wrongful death action commenced by a former resident’s wife. The nursing home argued that the wife was bound by an optional arbitration agreement that she signed during her husband’s admission to the facility. However, the trial court held that the wife was not bound by the arbitration agreement because she signed it in a representative capacity and was not a party to the agreement. This appeal followed. Following the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC, 685 S.W.3d 718 (Tenn. 2024), we hold that the wife lacked the legal authority to bind her husband to the optional arbitration agreement because she had the powers of only a healthcare agent, and entering into the optional arbitration agreement was not a healthcare decision. Thus, neither the wife nor any of the resident’s heirs are precluded from bringing and maintaining a wrongful death action on the resident’s behalf. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, albeit on different grounds, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A woman fell in a Gallatin, Tennessee grocery store and suffered a labral hip tear. She and her husband filed suit against the grocery store, alleging claims for premises liability and loss of consortium. The case proceeded to a jury trial. After the close of the plaintiffs’ proof, the store moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiffs put forth no proof of constructive notice. The plaintiffs appeal; discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Ryan Michael Ramey, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition,
arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of
counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of
the petition.

The plaintiffs, who are former employees of a municipal police department, were discharged after the District Attorney General sent an email to the city manager stating that the plaintiffs’ testimony at hearings may be impeached without independent corroboration, thus allegedly “creating challenges for the State in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” The plaintiffs thereafter brought suit against the District Attorney General and specifically asserted claims for official oppression under a negligence per se theory and for tortious interference with a business relationship and prospective business relationships. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of qualified immunity and absolute immunity. The plaintiffs appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal, the District Attorney General died. The personal representative of her estate, who was substituted as the appellee in the wake of her death, has argued that this case abated upon her death because the plaintiffs’ lawsuit is “for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference abated upon the District Attorney General’s death. Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs’ separate pursuit of recovery under a negligence per se theory did not abate, we nonetheless affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence per se theory due to their failure to raise an effective challenge to the dismissal of the theory in their appellate briefing.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that four statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to make findings concerning the mother’s affirmative defense of lack of willfulness relative to the statutory grounds of abandonment through failure to visit and support the child, we reverse the trial court’s reliance on those grounds. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child.

This appeal concerns a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her young daughter. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination existed as to Mother: (1) persistent conditions; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child.

A Williamson County jury convicted Defendant, Ashley Bianca Ruth Kroese, of vehicular
homicide by intoxication, vehicular homicide with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08%
or greater, vehicular homicide by recklessness, and reckless aggravated assault resulting in
death for which she received an effective eight-year sentence. Defendant appeals,
contending that the search warrant failed to establish probable cause of intoxication; the
search was executed beyond the scope of the warrant; the State failed to demonstrate an
unbroken chain of custody of the blood samples; and the trial court erred when it did not
sentence her as an especially mitigated offender. Following our review of the record, the
briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffrey1 Milton Stokes aka Real Black, was convicted by a Knox County jury of first-degree premeditated murder and reckless endangerment, and he was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Bobby L. Franklin, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Criminal Court for Johnson County, arguing the habeas court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. The petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because a “new judgment” was entered, lengthening his sentence. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the interest of justice does not mandate waiver of this requirement. Thus, the instant appeal should be dismissed.

The Defendant, Benjamin L. Bradford, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree murder in the perpetration of theft, and destroying, tampering, or fabricating evidence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1)-(2) (first degree murder) (2018) (subsequently amended), 39-16-503 (2018) (destroying, tampering with, or fabricating evidence). The jury imposed a sentence of life without parole for each of the first degree murder convictions and merged the judgments. The trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence for destroying, tampering, or fabricating evidence, to be served consecutively to the life-without-parole sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The parties are all of the owners of four neighboring lots in a small, exclusive residential development. Each lot is subject to restrictive covenants. Kurt M. Chambless and Jill S. Chambless originally filed suit against Terry L. Rutledge and Cynthia L. Rutledge, averring that the Rutledges were violating the restrictive covenants. While the Chamblesses’ suit was pending, all of the lot owners (other than the Chamblesses) voted to amend the restrictive covenants. The Chamblesses amended their suit to seek a declaratory judgment invalidating the amended covenants and seeking a refund of certain monies they paid to Mr. Rutledge for the benefit of the homeowners’ association.1Each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Chamblesses’ declaratory judgment claim due to their failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss, in part, and ruled that the amended covenants were valid and enforceable. The Chamblesses timely appealed to this Court. Upon careful review, we find that the trial court erred in granting the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim after determining that the amended covenants are valid and enforceable. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of those parts of the Amended Complaint challenging the validity of the amended covenants, and we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order declaring that the amended covenants are valid and enforceable. Further, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim against the Maxwells and the Dotys arising out of Mr.Rutledge’s use of association funds but decline to award the Maxwells and the Dotys their attorneys’ fees on appeal.

Mother seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motions to recuse both the trial judge and the child support magistrate. After a de novo review, we affirm the denial of the motion to recuse the trial judge. We transfer the appeal of the denial of the motion to recuse the child support magistrate to the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, an action for declaratory judgment filed by the petitioner homeowners’ association against the respondent developer. The developer had formed the homeowners’ association to oversee the development of Timberlake Subdivision in Knox County and had executed a declaration of covenants and restrictions that provided, inter alia, that the developer retained the exclusive right to appoint a three-member review board to oversee construction of the subdivision until such time as the developer assigned its rights to the homeowners’ association. The declaration also included a waiver provision that enabled the developer to unilaterally amend and waive any portion of the declaration at any time. In October 2020, the developer and homeowners’ association executed and recorded a document assigning to the homeowners’ association the developer’s rights to appoint members to the review board, expressly excluding from the assignment any lots still owned by the developer or its affiliate company. The developer then executed a waiver document waiving its obligation to submit its remaining lots to board review. The homeowners’ association filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration from the trial court that (1) the developer had assigned to the homeowners’ association all rights to appoint members of the oversight board; 2) there existed only one oversight board, which was now controlled by the homeowners’ association; and (3) the waiver document was null and void. Upon a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) by the developer, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that the declaration, the assignment, and the waiver documents were unambiguous as a matter of law and that they granted the developer the power to retain oversight of its lots and to waive any portion of the declaration. The trial court further determined that because the president of the homeowners’ association had signed the assignment, the homeowners’ association was estopped from arguing that the developer had assigned all authority to appoint members to the review board to the association. The homeowners’ association filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing, inter alia, that dismissal of a declaratory 05/03/2024 2 judgment action based on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) is generally improper and that the trial court should instead have declared the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the documents. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend and the homeowners’ association timely appealed. Upon careful review, we find that the trial court improperly dismissed the declaratory judgment action for failure to state a claim after determining that the documents at issue were unambiguous as a matter of law and essentially declaring the rights of the parties. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint and its award of attorney’s fees to the developer based on that dismissal, and we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order declaring certain rights and responsibilities of the parties.

In this appeal, the trial court granted a motion to rescind a tax sale with respect to a particular parcel. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law reflecting the basis for its decision. To the extent that a constitutional challenge is raised, the trial court should also determine on remand whether notice must be provided to the Tennessee Attorney General pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.04.

This is the second appeal in this personal injury matter involving the plaintiff’s injury from an uneven sidewalk owned by the defendant city. In the first appeal, this Court remanded for the trial court to consider expert testimony that had been erroneously excluded by the trial court. On remand, the trial court heard expert testimony on the issue of the city’s maintenance and inspection of its sidewalks. Because the evidence on remand did not include any new evidence regarding the length of time that the sidewalk defect had existed, we have concluded that the issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal are pretermitted by the law of the case doctrine.

The Defendant, Claude Harvey Banner, was convicted by a Carter County Criminal Court
jury of attempted second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. The trial
court initially approved the verdicts as thirteenth juror but later granted the Defendant’s
untimely motion for a new trial. We granted the State’s application for an interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 to consider whether the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial in its capacity at thirteenth juror after the
judgments were final. We reverse the trial court’s order granting a new trial and reinstate
the judgments of conviction.

A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant, Olga Narnia Sevilla, of aggravated child
abuse and aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to a total effective
sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred when it sentenced her.
After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

sell and/or deliver marijuana, a Class E felony, and the trial court imposed an agreed upon
sentence of three years suspended to supervised probation. In November 2022, the trial
court issued a probation violation warrant, alleging that the Defendant had been arrested
for new felony offenses. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had
violated his probation based on these arrests. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve
one year in confinement before returning to supervised probation. On appeal, the
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting unreliable hearsay during the
revocation hearing; (2) revoking his probation sentence; and (3) ordering him to serve one
year in confinement. After a thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.