APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jonathan Keith Hughes, Jr., was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of one count of first degree murder, one count of criminally negligent homicide, and three counts of conspiracy to commit murder. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence of his gang affiliation, the trial court’s failure to provide an accomplice instruction to the jury, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Upon review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments reflecting the defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder under the proper statute. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a complaint against four defendants for damages arising out of an automobile accident. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against three of the four defendants. Because the order does not resolve the plaintiff’s claims against all of the defendants, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal concerns the Tennessee Prompt Pay Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-34-101, et seq. (“the PPA”). King Construction Group, Inc. (“King”) sued Highlands Residential Services (“HRS”) in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Trial Court”) for violating the PPA. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court ruled in King’s favor, granting an award to King for HRS’s failure to place retained funds in a separate, interest-bearing escrow account as required by the PPA. The Trial Court further awarded King statutory interest and attorney’s fees. HRS appeals, arguing that an amendment to the PPA, which became effective in July 2020 after the parties had entered into their agreement, means that HRS, a public housing agency, did not have to place retainage in an escrow account. We hold that, as HRS first failed to place retained funds in an escrow account before the amendment became effective, the pre-July 2020 version of the PPA applies to this action. We affirm the Trial Court’s award of a penalty to King for HRS’s failure to place retainage in an escrow account. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to King because the Trial Court made no supporting findings nor is there any evidence of bad faith by HRS. In addition, we vacate the Trial Court in its award of statutory interest to King and remand for the Trial Court to calculate a new award of statutory interest to King at the interest rate specified in the pre-July 2020 version of the PPA. We thus affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and vacate, in part, and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In this appeal, Appellant does not offer any argument as to the trial court’s final order, and among other technical issues, fails to properly cite to her appendix or to the record. Because Appellant has failed to comply with the requirements set out in Rules 27 and 28 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss the appeal.

Father, who is serving an eight-year sentence on a rape conviction, appeals the termination of his parental rights. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Logan Darby Helton, Defendant, claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his application for judicial diversion relative to his guilty-pleaded convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated criminal trespass, and unlawful photographing in violation of privacy. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 2 reflecting a sentence of eleven months twenty-nine days.

Trevale Demarco Davis, Defendant, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of his effective five-year sentence for three counts of aggravated burglary and one count of robbery. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Chad Anthony Turner, entered an open guilty plea to theft of property $250,000 or more, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to sixteen years’ incarceration and ordered to pay $100,000, in restitution to be paid in monthly installments of $700, should he make parole. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing a restitution amount without any significant findings on Defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay and conditioned on the possibility of parole, by ordering a restitution amount which could not be satisfied prior to the end of his sentence, and by denying his request for an alternative sentence. Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding the length and manner of Defendant’s sentence. However, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand for a new restitution hearing consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Horatio Lewis Rice, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately investigate Petitioner’s mental health issues and that Petitioner lacked the mental capacity to enter into a constitutionally valid plea agreement. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on January 23, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until February 23, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Shelton Hall, III, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher A. Maxwell, pleaded guilty to one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, and was sentenced to an effective term of life plus twenty years. Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after conducting a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner alleges he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were entered unknowingly and involuntarily. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Knox County Grand Jury charged Defendant, Jonathan Darrell Hardin,1 with one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser offenses of aggravated kidnapping and assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), to be served consecutively to a ten-year sentence for a prior conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the State committed discovery violations by not disclosing certain evidence; (2) Defendant’s fair trial rights were violated by the State’s failure to preserve and withhold material evidence; (3) the State improperly commented on Defendant’s right to silence; (4) the State improperly commented on Defendant’s post-arrest silence during Defendant’s cross-examination; (5) Defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not calling an eyewitness witness to testify; and (6) Defendant is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Sevier County jury found the defendant, Christopher Joe Whaley, guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a seatbelt violation for which he received an effective
sentence of sixteen years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court erred in sentencing; and the judgments entered were
incorrect and failed to properly award the defendant his pretrial jail credit. Upon our review of the record, the
parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand for the
determination by the trial court as to whether the defendant is entitled to pretrial jail credit and for entry of
corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 4.

In this personal injury action, the plaintiff slipped and fell while jumping off of a diving board during a visit to a city owned pool, injuring his knee. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the city based on negligence to recover for his injuries sustained from the accident and his wife sought damages for a derivative claim for loss of consortium. The city filed an answer, raising the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (hereinafter “the TRUS”) as an affirmative defense. The city then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city is a “landowner” as defined by the TRUS, the plaintiff was engaged in a “recreational activity” listed in the TRUS at the time of the accident, and none of the exceptions or limitations to the TRUS were applicable. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The trial court found that the language of the TRUS is not ambiguous and found that the city was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city pool, which is government-owned property, was being used for recreation at the time of the plaintiff’s injury and involved an activity included in the TRUS, “water sports.” The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s holding that swimming in a city pool is a recreational activity protected under the TRUS. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Defendant, Roger Earl England, appeals as of right from his conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant
contends that (1) the evidence of premeditation is insufficient to support his conviction; (2)
the trial court erred by admitting Defendant’s jail telephone calls and emails, which alerted
the jury to Defendant’s pretrial incarceration; (3) the prosecutor made improper statements
during the State’s closing and rebuttal arguments; (4) the trial court erred by instructing the
jury that destruction of evidence could be considered evidence of guilt only as to the
charged offense of first degree murder and by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors
entitles him to a new trial. After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable case
law, we affirm

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (5) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; (6) severe child abuse; and (7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

A Knox County jury convicted Horace Andrew Tyler Nunez, Defendant, of one count of first degree premeditated murder and four counts of reckless endangerment. On appeal, Defendant advances multiple arguments related to: admissibility of evidence; improper jury communications; sufficiency of the evidence; failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and sentencing. The State argues: the trial court did not err, or alternatively, any error was harmless; the evidence was sufficient; and the sentence was proper. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kelby Lerha Taylor, appeals his convictions for nine counts of incest, eight counts of rape, three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated rape. Specifically, the Defendant argues that his substantive due process and fair trial rights were violated when the State, after its case-in-chief, dismissed a count charging continuous sexual abuse of a child under the Child Protection Act (“CPA”). This dismissal occurred after the Defendant had previously withdrawn a motion to sever the offenses based upon his understanding that the presence of the CPA charge necessitated joinder of at least some of the offenses. The Defendant additionally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Terrance Collins (“Defendant”) appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court conviction for aggravated arson, a Class A felony, and resulting twenty-year sentence. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing more than the minimum in-range sentence. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves our review of the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her two minor children. Having carefully reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Appellees brought suit under the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to recover attorney’s fees incurred in attempting to collect an underlying judgment from one of the Appellants. The trial court awarded Appellees’ attorney’s fees. Because the Act does not authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees, we reverse.

The Estate of John A. Queener (the “Estate”), by and through Personal Representative, Carolyn Q. Junck, seeks to recover funds paid out with respect to two certificates of deposit (“CDs”) owned by the decedent, John A. Queener (the “Decedent”), at the time of his death and funds paid from the Decedent’s checking account during his lifetime. The Estate sued Jim Griffith (“Mr. Griffith”), stepson of the Decedent, and relied upon legal theories of undue influence, fraud and/or fraud in the inducement, lack of competency in the contract, and conversion. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the Estate $13,355.05 plus pre- and post-judgment interest against Mr. Griffith to reimburse the Estate for a number of checks that Mr. Griffith wrote from the Decedent’s checking account during the Decedent’s lifetime. The trial court denied the Estate any recovery with respect to the CDs. On appeal, the Estate and Mr. Griffith both raise issues with the trial court’s judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Ryan Michael Ramey, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition,
arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of
counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of
the petition.

Acting under authorization of subsections (1) and (7) of Tennessee Code Annotated section 70-1-305, officers of the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA), suspecting violations of wildlife laws, entered onto the Plaintiffs’ properties on multiple occasions, seeking to enforce restrictions upon hunting. The TWRA’s officers did so without a warrant or consent. The Plaintiffs brought suit, asserting that the statute authorizing these entries is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. A three-judge trial court panel concluded the statute is unconstitutional on its face and granted declaratory judgment and nominal damages. The three-judge panel divided on two issues. One, the majority pretermitted the as-applied constitutional challenge, while the third judge would have found the statute unconstitutional as applied. Two, the majority declined to grant injunctive relief while the third judge would have granted injunctive relief. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency appeals. We conclude the statute is facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied. We affirm the award of nominal damages.