APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Jason Matthew Wyatt, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 and summarily dismissing post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues the trial court erred in (1) holding that the Criminal Savings Statute in Code section 39-11-112 did not apply to the amendments to the theft grading statute in Code section 39-14-105 and (2) dismissing his Rule 36.1 motion/post-conviction petition without appointing counsel. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Benjamin Scott Brewer, Defendant, was convicted after a jury trial of six counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, driving under the influence, violation of motor carrier regulations, and speeding. As a result, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 55 years in incarceration. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, arguing on appeal that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); that the trial court improperly certified a witness as a drug recognition expert; that the evidence was insufficient to show intoxication; and that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences. Following our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is the second appeal arising from probate proceedings involving the estate of Jesse McCants, Sr. The first appeal concerned the accuracy of the personal representative’s final accounting. The trial court determined that some expenses identified by the personal representative should not be allowed. This Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded “for the entry of a modified order consistent with this Opinion and for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with our direction herein.” The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly followed our instructions on remand. We conclude that the trial court did so; therefore, we affirm.

The plaintiffs filed a health care liability action against a pharmacy and other medical defendants, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants failed to provide proper patient counseling and failed to warn of the risks associated with a prescription drug. The pharmacy defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the gravamen of the complaint against them was a products liability action rather than a health care liability action. The defendants further asserted that the “seller shield” defense found within the Tennessee Products Liability Act provided them with immunity from liability. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint stated a health care liability action rather than a products liability action. The trial court subsequently granted the defendants’ motion for permission to seek interlocutory appeal regarding whether the seller shield defense contained within the Tennessee Products Liability Act could be asserted when the plaintiffs’ claim is made pursuant to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. Following our thorough consideration of the issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, determining that the seller shield defense found in the Tennessee Products Liability Act is inapplicable to claims made under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.

This appeal concerns a lawsuit between brothers over funds belonging to their late mother, Helen D. Turley (“Decedent”). Tim Turley, executor of Decedent’s estate (“the Estate”), deposited $138,605.14 from a Y-12 Federal Credit Union (“Y-12 FCU”) account owned by Decedent into an estate account at ORNL Federal Credit Union (“ORNL FCU”). An issue arose because William Dean Turley was named sole payableon- death beneficiary on the Y-12 FCU account, and he asserted the funds were his. ORNL FCU filed a complaint for interpleader in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) to determine the funds’ owner. In a cross-claim, Tim Turley and the Estate alleged that William Dean Turley exercised undue influence over Decedent and that Decedent was incompetent when she named William Dean Turley as the payable-on-death beneficiary on the account. William Dean Turley filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Estate and Tim Turley appeal. We hold that William Dean Turley successfully demonstrated that the evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish undue influence, fraud, or lack of mental competency, and there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment, however, to the extent it awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to William Dean Turley, as these fees and expenses were awarded in contravention of the American Rule. Otherwise, we affirm.

Petitioner, Jeremy Cooper, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine in an amount over .5 grams. Petitioner was sentenced to twelve-years’ incarceration to be served concurrently with a ten-year, Madison County, sentence he was already serving. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The
post-conviction court denied relief. After a reviewing the record, we affirm the judgement of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Roy L. Crawford, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the alleged unlawful detainment related to an escape charge, for which he was not convicted, and to his second degree murder conviction, for which he received a life sentence.  The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition.  We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Quintin Brittenum, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-504, -522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant’s sole issue for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support each of his convictions. Upon our review, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Carlos Rice, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County, arguing the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. The petitioner asserts that his sentence has expired and that he is being held past his release date. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition because the petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to relief.

This appeal arises from a hit–and–run involving a tractor-trailer and a passenger vehicle. The plaintiffs—the car driver and passenger—alleged in their complaint that the defendant trucking company owned the tractor-trailer that collided with their vehicle on the interstate. The plaintiffs also served a copy of the complaint on the car owner’s uninsured motorist carrier as an unnamed defendant. Following discovery, the trucking company moved for and was granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs were unable to establish liability because they were unable to prove that the trucking company owned the tractor-trailer. The court also dismissed the claims against the uninsured motorist carrier because the plaintiffs failed to establish legal liability against the alleged defendant tortfeasor. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant, Markist Kantrell Cole, appeals his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by issuing a jury instruction on flight. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, William Lanier, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for premeditated first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his two attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the following: (1) original counsel’s investigation and preservation of an alibi witness’s testimony; (2) trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of a third-party defense at trial; (3) trial counsel’s decision to call or not call certain witnesses; (4) trial counsel’s failure to object to false or prejudicial testimony and statements by the State in closing; (5) trial counsel’s failure to impeach a witness’s reason for changing her statement; (6) trial counsel’s failure to request a special jury instruction; (7) trial counsel’s failure to object to testimony about a theft ring and counsel’s eliciting testimony about the same; and (8) original counsel’s failure to argue the motion to dismiss for lack of corpus delicti. The Petitioner also requests a new post-conviction hearing because the post-conviction court failed to make findings of fact related to two of his issues. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, David Black, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of attempted rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s jury instruction on aggravated sexual battery and failed to argue in his motion for new trial that the instruction was erroneous, trial counsel advised him not to testify at trial, and appellate counsel failed to argue on direct appeal of his convictions that the proof did not meet the elements of aggravated sexual battery. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal of a probate matter, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion occurred as a result of transactions conducted by Appellant as attorney-in-fact of Decedent. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that a bank account where both Appellant and Decedent signed a signature card was an individual account instead of a joint account with rights of survivorship. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Marcellus Hurt, of aggravated assault, vandalism, and domestic assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to argue a new theory during rebuttal, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify regarding the cost of the repairs to his car; (3) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions of aggravated assault and felony vandalism; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing the Appellant for a Class D felony for the vandalism conviction, by erroneously applying enhancement factors, and by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we agree that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony regarding the amount of the damages. Therefore, we must reverse the Appellant’s vandalism conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge. The Appellant’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

Respectfully, I disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusions that the victim’s testimony regarding the cost of the repairs to his car was inadmissible hearsay and that admission of this evidence necessitates a new trial for the vandalism conviction.

A Dyer County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Christopher Ricardo Bonds, of evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve nine months in jail at seventy-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court arbitrarily imposed the percentage of the sentence to be served in confinement. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this post-divorce action involving the interpretation of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement and allegations of contempt for failure to comply with the same. We remanded the case to the trial court for submission of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The husband appeals the trial court’s opinion on remand. We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Jay Hathaway, appeals the probation revocation order from a February 25, 2019 probation violation hearing. The trial court determined that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation sentence, applied eighty-five days of time served toward the revocation sentence, and ordered an additional sixty days to serve in jail before the Defendant would be reinstated to a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that he was denied due process because he was not provided an expert on the issue of drug patch testing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this divorce action, the issue is whether the trial court correctly credited the number of parenting days awarded to each parent for purposes of calculating child support under the terms of the permanent parenting plan (PPP). Scott Gates (father) argues on appeal that the trial court miscalculated his residential time by undercounting the number of days awarded him in the PPP. We hold that there are irreconcilable inconsistencies in the PPP that require us to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for clarification of the actual number of days awarded and recalculation of child support.

The Petitioner, Michael Shane McCullough, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his jury convictions for criminal littering, initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance due to (1) trial counsel’s failure to interview the arresting officer and investigate the case, especially as it related to the weather conditions on the night of the Petitioner’s traffic stop; (2) trial counsel’s failure to adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses at trial about the substance found in the ditch; and (3) trial counsel’s (who was also appellate counsel) failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his Class B misdemeanor conviction for criminal littering. After our review, we conclude that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance with regard to the appropriate classification of his criminal littering conviction; however, the Petitioner’s other allegations of ineffective assistance are without merit. We must reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for correction of the Petitioner’s mitigated criminal littering conviction judgment form to reflect the appropriate Class C misdemeanor classification and a corresponding thirty-day sentence.

This appeal involves a slip and fall premises liability case filed by an invitee against a business proprietor. The trial court granted summary judgment to the business proprietor because invitee’s evidence did not show that the condition in the business proprietor’s store was inherently dangerous and because the court found the condition to be open and obvious. For the following reasons, we agree with the trial court that the condition at issue was not inherently dangerous and summary judgement should be granted for Defendant.

This personal injury action concerns an automobile accident. The defendant died shortly after the accident. The estate was opened, administered, and closed before the plaintiff filed suit against the former personal representative within the applicable statute of limitations. The personal representative moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff moved to enlarge the time for filing service of process based upon a claim of excusable neglect. The trial court dismissed the action as untimely. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights to his three children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination were proven and that termination is in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns the court’s summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s age discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims against the State of Tennessee, Department of Correction. We affirm the trial court.